A memory model of presymbolic unconscious mentation by Lockhart, Ian Andrew
A MEMORY MODEL OF PRESYMBOLIC UNCONSCIOUS MENTATION 
by 
IAN ANDREW LOCKHART 
submitted in accordance with the requirements 
for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF LITERATURE AND PHILOSOPHY 
in the subject 
PSYCHOLOGY 
atthe 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
PROMOTER: PROF S.H. VANDEVENTER 
NOVEMBER 1999 
2 
ABSTRACT 
The biological energy concepts used by Freud to account for unconscious mental 
processes in psychoanalysis are discredited by modem biological findings. As a result, 
different psychoanalytic schools developed new foundational theories in order to verify 
unconscious mentation. The present study argues that these theories are unsuccessful for 
two main reasons. Firstly, replacing Freud's drive energy theory with other equally 
hypothetical foundational constructs does not solve the problem of finding proof for the 
existence of unconscious mentation. Secondly, the clinical psychoanalytic definition of 
unconscious mentation as imaginary, internally generated processes, autonomous from 
the external world is misguided. External sensory data may play a formative role in 
producing unconscious mentation. In particular, neurobiological findings on sensory data 
encoding and storage in human infants may throw light on the nature of unconscious 
processes. The present study therefore compares ideas derived from Lacanian 
psychoanalysis with neuropsychological memory and infant research findings to ascertain 
whether unconscious mentation is linked to the memory encoding of sensory data in 
infants. This analysis is in tum contrasted with a more contemporary psychoanalytic 
synthesis of findings on infant memory and unconscious mentation (Lichtenberg, 1989, 
Lichtenberg, Lachmann, and Fosshage, 1992). The latter theory identifies connections 
between unconscious mentation and the encoding of sensory memories in infancy, but 
does not connect the episodic and procedural memory constructs used in this account to 
specific neurofogical mechanisms in the brain. The present study's original contributions 
therefore involve firstly connecting the development of aversive episodic and procedural 
memories to neurological mechanisms in the brain during the period between birth and 
28 months of age. Secondly, this memory model suggests that the storage of aversive 
memories in infancy has lasting unconscious motivational significance for subjects. 
Presymbolic memories may unconsciously manipulate conscious attention and memory 
retrieval in verbal subjects, inviting comparison with the psychoanalytic concept of 
dynamic unconscious mentation. 
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Thirdly, the presymbolic memory model contributes towards a novel understanding of 
false memories of childhood sex abuse, and the dissociation of real traumatic memories 
that occur in many cases of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. 
Keywords: Psychoanalysis; Unconscious mentation; Episodic memory; Procedural 
memory; Infant Research; Neuropsychology; Lacan; Lichtenberg; Dissociation; Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder; Freud. 
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A MEMORY MODEL OF PRESYMBOLIC UNCONSCIOUS MENTATION 
Empirically verifying Wlconscious mental processes has been an ongoing concern for 
psychoanalytic researchers ever since Freud's original problematic formulation of 
Wlconscious mentation and its Wlderlying foWldations. The present study firstly attempts 
to trace this problematic history and the consequent attempts to reconfigure Wlconscious 
mentation from within a variety of different conceptual frameworks. Secondly, in light of 
the limitations of these earlier attempts, the present study proposes a new model of 
Wlconscious mentation using neuropsychological conceptions of how brain systems, 
perceptual-motor functions and cognitive processes are integral to the formation and 
storage of episodic and procedural memories. The study adopts a developmental 
perspective in order to descnbe how from infancy aversive experiences are encoded and 
stored in episodic and procedural memory formats. This in tum has important 
implications for the development of different kinds of WlConscious mentation. 
The purpose of the first chapter is to present a historical overview of the problems 
inherent in the Freudian formulation of Wlconscious thought. Freud (1905/199lb, 
1915/1957) proposed two innate conflicting drives that accoWlted for the production of 
Wlconscious, irrational fantasy-based wishes. These in turn influenced conscious 
language-framed thought and logic. This drive model of Wlconscious mentation was 
intrinsically connected to biological concepts in three different ways. First, the language 
of energetics and tension reduction pervading the drive model was inherited from earlier, 
WlSOWld neurological formulations that Freud (1950/1966) set out in his Project for a 
Scientific Psychology. These scientifically incorrect concepts were redeployed in Freud's 
later psychoanalytic formulation of the psychosexual model of human development. 
Second, the psychosexual model conceptualises drives as manifesting in experiences 
occurring at specific anatomical locations, viz. the mouth, anus and genitals. Third, drives 
are conceptualised as evolutionary acquisitions, i.e. behavioural tendencies in unicellular 
organisms that were inherited by more complex multicellular organisms, and have 
evolved into mental attributes in human beings. 
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In chapter one the scientifically incorrect nature of points one and three is explored to 
illustrate how this mistaken conception of the origins of unconscious mentation presented 
a problem for future generations of psychoanalysts in search of a solid foundation for the 
theory of human psychosexual development and unconscious mentation encapsulated by 
point two. Given Freud's use of scientifically untenable biological concepts to build 
psychoanalytic theory, future generations of theorists were understandably wary of 
connecting unconscious infantile wishes initiated by body-based experiences of primary 
caregivers with the concept of biologically innate drives that supposedly enabled these 
wishes to coalesce in the infant-caregiver context. The Freudian connection of 
unconscious infantile wishes with drive terminology and evolutionary biology presented 
a complex problem for those theorists who were concerned with providing the 
psychosexual model of infant development with a scientifically credible foundation. 
Historically there have been four broad categories of response to this problematic triad of 
conceptual connections that constitutes the legacy of classical psychoanalysis. These four 
categories of response are outlined in chapter two. The first category ostensibly preserves 
aspects of Freud's dual drive model, but proceeds to introduce additional motivational 
concepts that in effect supersede drive formulations as the foundational constructs of 
unconscious mentation. The second category explicitly abandons drive terminology in 
favour of other motivational constructs that appear to offer more plausible accounts of 
how unconscious mentation develops in human beings. These other constructs may 
include biologically innate properties, depending on the view held by the theorist in 
question regarding the scientific validity of making connections between biological and 
psychoanalytic constructs. 
The third category, normally conceptualised as the hermeneutic-clinical model, criticises 
the search to validate drives or other motivational constructs as the way to establish a 
sound scientific foundation for psychoanalytic unconscious mentation. Drives, as 
foundational constructs are untenable because as innate biological entities they receive no 
empirical support from contemporary biological findings on motivation. 
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It is argued that drives have no intrinsic relation to Freud's clinical discoveries, and 
psychoanalysis cannot look to the discipline of biology for empirical support for its own 
constructs. Instead, category three prioritises the systematic categorisation of thematic 
connections between overt events occurring in the analytic therapy setting, and 
hypothetical covert events that occurred earlier in the patient's life. Psychoanalytic 
constructs that can supposedly be validated in this fashion include unconscious wishes, 
repression, the dream theory, primary process operations, and the existence of 
psychosexual stages of development in childhood. These constructs were previously 
reliant on drive formulations. 
This category makes the valid point that simply replacing drive constructs with another 
theory of how unconscious mentation is constituted, e.g. object relations or interpersonal 
constructs, without any form of independent verification of the latter does not solve the 
problem concerning the scientific validity of psychoanalytic constructs like repression 
and primary process operations. However, the present study is critical of this third 
response because it mistakenly equates thematic affinities with causal connections 
between clinical phenomena and earlier hypothetical events. Secondly, it claims that the 
core foundational propositions of psychoanalysis can only be validated in terms of 
phenomena native to the domain of psychoanalysis itself There can therefore be no 
mutually profitable relationship between psychoanalysis and the biological sciences. In 
particular, this category asserts that psychoanalysis is principally concerned with 
unconscious motives, and therefore with primary process operations. These operations 
are defined as internally generated modes of thought that condition the production of 
fantasy wishes. Primary process operations are imaginary functions autonomous from 
underlying neuropsychological events pertaining to brain, perception, and memory 
processes. As such, primary process operations can only be validated at a psychoanalytic 
level of enquiry and have no correlates in, for example, a neuropsychological discourse 
that describes nonconscious memory, perception, visuospatial processing and linguistic 
operations. 
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In light of the above assertions, the present study offers three critical proposals: 
i) It is unproven that unconscious mentation coincides principally with internally 
generated fantasy wishes. 
ii) External sensory data may play a formative function in relation to the genesis and 
operations of unconscious mentation. 
iii) It is unproven that knowledge derived from neuropsychological and recorded 
observations of infant behaviour is irrelevant to psychoanalytic models of unconscious 
mentation, and that such knowledge cannot provide independent verification of the 
existence of unconscious mentation relevant to psychoanalytic formulations of this 
phenomenon. 
In the light of category three and the critical proposals raised by the present study, the 
fourth category of response provides a platform from within psychoanalysis for re-
opening the debate concerning: i) The nature of the relationship betweep. biological/ 
neuropsychological processes and unconscious mental operations. ii) The nature of the 
relationship between external sensory material and the development of unconscious 
operations. 
This fourth category, viz. Lacanian psychoanalysis, retains some of the drive terminology 
of classical psychoanalysis, but alters the definition and foundational status of these 
entities to such an extent that they bear little resemblance to Freud's original constructs. 
Drives are no longer biologically innate motivational forces, but are secondary products, 
the outcome of the infant's biologically immature perceptual processing of environmental 
material. Drives consist of primitive linguistic, visual, and tactile data that are processed 
inefficiently by the infant, who is primordially attuned to external stimuli. What is of 
central motivational importance for this fourth category is not drives, but the biological 
immaturity of the infant, and its initial primitive attempts to process environmental data. 
11 
The resulting encoding of sensory data represents not only a distortion of real infant-
caregiver interactions, but also the first instance of an unconscious mental operation. 
The following theoretical proposals that emerge from category four have an important 
bearing on the three critical proposals already put forward by the present study in relation 
to category three. 
i) The concept of immature biological, viz. perceptual and motor, systems underlying the 
first instances of unconscious mentation in infants. 
ii) The concept of a primordial infant attunement to external sensory stimuli that ensures 
this information is encoded. 
iii) The concept of external sensory material being essential to the formation of 
unconscious mental processes in infants. 
The above points serve as a launch pad for chapter three's use of neuropsychological and 
infant research findings to investigate the validity of the concepts of biological 
immaturity and primordial environmental attunement in infants. Furthermore, chapter 
three explores neonatal and early infant information processing in order to establish 
whether unconscious mentation may be connected to immature biological constraints in 
sensory data processing in the manner suggested by points one and three of category four 
above. In particular, attention will be paid to the role that memory encoding and storage 
functions play in regard to the constitution of unconscious mental operations in infants. 
The present study intends to show that the biological sciences play a decisive role in the 
reformulation of psychoanalytic constructs pertaining to unconscious mentation. 
The second part of chapter three outlines Lichtenberg's (1989, 1992) psychoanalytic 
model of presymbolic unconscious mentation that draws explicitly on infant research and 
neuropsychological memory constructs. 
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While this model accords with category four in stressing the importance of early 
perceptual and mnemonic processing of external information in the production of 
unconscious mentation, it represents a more explicit integration of psychoanalytic 
constructs with infant research and neuropsychological memory findings. 
In particular, this model explicitly connects the neuropsychological concepts of episodic 
and procedural memory with the development of presymbolic unconscious operations in 
infants. As such it represents a more contemporary integration of many of the insights 
initially generated by category four. The episodic and procedural memory constructs 
imported from the neuropsychological literature are not explicitly connected to specific 
anatomical brain locations by Lichtenberg (1989), so there are no explicit links made 
between unconscious mental operations, memory constructs, and anatomical systems in 
the brain. Instead these links are indirectly inferred in Lichtenberg's (1989) model. 
Chapter three concludes with an outline of the present study' s original contribution, viz. 
the construction of a model of presymbolic unconscious mentation that explicitly links 
episodic and procedural memory constructs to anatomical sites in the brain. This model is 
described in chapter four. 
Chapter four uses the Lichtenberg model as a starting point for the empirical grounding 
of presymbolic aversive unconscious mentation via reference to neuropsychological 
research on memory. The present study will show that prior to 28 months of age, aversive 
episodic and procedural memories are encoded and stored by an array of anatomically 
distinct brain regions representing diverse components and processing aspects of these 
two different memory formats. The aim is to demonstrate how cortical and sub-cortical 
brain regions responsible for encoding and storing externally mediated aversive 
information in infants engenders a primordial level of presymbolic unconscious 
operations. The grounding of a presymbolic aversive memory system in diverse brain 
regions suggests that aversive events and their procedural responses stored in infancy 
have long-term unconscious motivational significance for the subject. 
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In this vein the present study argues that the unconscious presymbolic memory system 
persists into adulthood, in that it continues to interact with and influence later 
symbolically mediated experiences in verbally competent subjects. Chapter five explores 
how the presymbolic memory model enables a new view to emerge of how unconscious 
mentation can condition and interact with later events experienced by verbally competent 
subjects. It is argued that presymbolic procedural memories triggered by aversive cues in 
verbal subjects are able to dynamically influence conscious attention to and voluntary 
retrieval of currently experienced events. This ability of presymbolic memory to 
unconsciously manipulate conscious experience and voluntary memory retrieval in verbal 
subjects is in tum compared with the psychoanalytic conception of dynamic unconscious 
mentation. The memory model developed in the present study aims to provide a more 
empirically viable reformulation of psychoanalytic unconscious mentation than has been 
available up to now in the various psychoanalytic paradigms. 
In conclusion, chapter six demonstrates how the model of pre-symbolic memory 
contributes towards an understanding of false memories of childhood sex abuse and the 
dissociation of real traumatic memories in verbally competent subjects, the latter 
phenomenon being central to the symptomatology structure of Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD). It will be explored how the present model of presymbolic memory 
contributes towards a more complete neuropsychological understanding of the memory 
dissociation and involuntary recall phases characteristic of PTSD. By offering new 
insights into these areas of memory manipulation, the present study hopes to demonstrate 
the explanatory efficacy of the memory model beyond the theoretical parameters within 
which it was originally developed. 
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CHAPTER ONE: mE BIOLOGICAL LEGACY OF mE FREUDIAN MODEL 
1.1 Connecting Freud's Neurological Model of Mental Processes with the 
Psychoanalytic Formulation of Drives 
Freud's psychoanalytic theory of drives attempted to explain how forces having their 
origin in the biological body were able to influence psychological functioning in the form 
of unconscious mental representations (1905/199lb, p.83). The present study will show 
that the conceptual origins of drives can be found in Freud's (1950/1966) pre-
psychoanalytic Project for a Scientific PsychologyL wherein a neurological conception of 
mental processes is outlined. It will become apparent that later psychoanalytic drive 
formulations are founded on scientifically discredited neurological concepts dating from 
this earlier publication, reformulated into psychological language. The dual drive theory 
of unconscious thought processes therefore rests on the back of discredited neurological 
concepts. 
1.2 A Brief Description of Freud's Neurological Energy Model 
The concept of drives as quanta of mental energy has its origin in the Project for a 
Scientific Psychology (Freud, 1950/1966). This work proposes that quantities of mental 
energy accumulate in neuronal systems and must be discharged to avoid the unbearable 
overloading of these systems. Stimuli arising from the external world and within the cells 
of the body are registered by the neuronal systems as smaller or greater quantities of 
energy (Freud, 1950/1966, p.304). Three distinct yet interconnected neuronal systems 
progressively modify these energy quanta in their journey from the sense organs or the 
internal nerve-endings of the body to the brain. The first two neuronal systems absorb the 
quantitative impact of the energy, somehow recognising the specific amount of energy 
involved. This energy is then siphoned off, so allowing the third system to process the 
qualitative dimension of the stimulus devoid of its energetic force (Freud, l 950/l 966, 
p.3 IO). The quality of the stimulus is experienced as a conscious sensation leading to 
reactive activity on the part of the organism (Freud, l 950/l 966, p.311 ). 
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This activity enables the energy accumulated in the first two neuronal systems to be 
discharged, so allowing the organism to return to its original level of functioning. 
1.3 A Contemporary Critique of Freud's Neurological Energy Model 
Freud's model of three separate but interconnected neuronal systems is refuted by 
contemporary neurochemical findings. 
i) Neurochemical studies show that there are many different types of sensory neurons 
respond to a specific incoming stimulus, or to a class of related stimuli (Kalat, 1984, 
p.32). So from the outset, neurons are responsive to specific qualities of energy as 
opposed to the quantitative impacts of incoming stimuli. Therefore Freud's (1950/1966) 
conception of the sense organs being linked to neuronal systems dealing exclusively with 
the reception and storage of energy quantities is incorrect. 
ii) Individual neurons respond to a specific class of stimuli, but the quantitative intensity 
of the stimulus does not affect the electrical and chemical changes that take place within 
the neuron concerned (Kalat, 1984, p.41). The action potential of a particular neuron is 
fixed, reaching the same intensity every time it is activated regardless of the intensity of 
the incoming stimulus. At the peak of the action potential, the chemical properties of the 
stimulation change, so that the neuron returns to a resting level regardless of ongoing 
external stimulation (Kalat, 1984, p.42). The relative quantity of the stimulus is irrelevant 
to the neuronal conveyance of qualitative data in the form of a chemical code. Therefore 
separate neuronal systems that encode the quantitative aspect of sensory data in isolation 
from its qualitative nature are unnecessary. Freud's (1950/1966) neuronal classification 
system is therefore both redundant and incorrect. 
iii) Freud's three neuronal systems were developed in response to the idea that the 
organism needs to discharge energy in order to return to a state of relative quiescence 
(Freud, 1950/1966, p.318). This discharge is accomplished in the form of motor activity. 
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However, an external discharge is unnecessary because the nervous system is able to 
internally self-regulate all available energy (Hobson, 1988, p.285). Chemical receptor 
sites in neuronal cell membranes react to incoming stimuli by activating the action 
potential of each cell, and subsequently become inactive when the action potential itself 
temporarily shuts down all receptors (Kalat, 1984, p.42). Because the chemical feedback 
mechanisms of individual neurons allow for an intermittent nonreceptivity to incoming 
stimuli (Hofer, 1981, pp.36-37), the organism does not suffer from stimulus overload. 
Furthermore, competing chemical messages from neighbouring neurons may either 
facilitate an action potential or inhibit it at a particular neuron, so that an energy stimulus 
may either be conveyed through that point in a neural network or be cancelled (Kalat, 
1984, p.59). The nervous system is therefore able to receive, direct, or cancel energy 
without any recourse to a mechanism of discharge that involves energy release into the 
environment. Freud's (1950/1966) concept of neuronal energy being principally 
organised and regulated by a mechanism of external discharge is therefore mistaken. 
1.4 From Neurological Energy to Psychoanalytic Drives: Freud's Model of 
Psychosexual Development 
While it is relatively easy to refute Freud's neurological model of quantitative energy 
build-up and discharge from the perspective of modem neuroscience, it is also necessary 
to trace how these early concepts were integrated into Freud's psychoanalytic 
psychology. By the time The Interpretation of Dreams was published, Freud 
(1900/199la) had already distanced himself from his earlier attempt to directly link 
psychological motives to neurological concepts. Although Freud (1905/199lb, 
1915/1957) never abandoned the idea that drives have their sources in the biological 
body, psychoanalysis shifted the focus away from neurological systems and events, and 
instead concentrated on the way in which energy occurring in specific body areas 
becomes transformed into unconscious mental wishes (Freud, 1915/1957, p.123). In the 
psychosexual model the exact biological nature of drives remains unknown, although it is 
probably chemically constituted (Freud, 1905/199lb, p.83). 
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Freud therefore left the door open for the establishment of a link between the nervous 
system and this 'chemical origin' of drives. Freud (1905/199lb, p.169) concludes the 
outline of the psychosexual model by stating that far too little is known about the 
biological processes underlying sexuality, and by implication the constitution of the 
sexual drive itself However, while the biological origin of the sexual drive is unknown, 
its somatic manifestation is self-evident in the various erotogenic zones, i.e. the sensitive 
areas of the mouth, anus and genitals of the infant, by means of which the survival needs 
of hunger, thirst, and waste elimination are transacted (Freud, 1905/199lb, p.83; 
1940/1964b, p.151). 
Freud (1915/1957) theorised that in early infant development the sexual drive is attached 
to the survival needs of the infant, and the initial manifestations of a separate sexual drive 
only gradually become visible (p.126). The focus of psychoanalytic formulations 
therefore shifted away from the preoccupation with neurological energy, and onto the 
energy forms drives assume in infant development. The different components of the sex 
drive share the same somatic locations as survival needs, but Freud (1912/199lc) claimed 
that their aims are different (p.249). The sensual satisfaction occurrin~ during the 
fulfilment of a survival need is the first instance of the sexual drive. The sensual contact 
of the infant's mouth with the caregiver's breast during feeding, for example, represents 
the first instance of the oral component of the sexual drive. This sensual satisfaction 
becomes detached from the need for nourishment, as the infant wishes to recreate this 
sensation of pleasure for itself (Freud, 1905/199lb, p.98). Likewise it is the sensual 
pleasure felt during anal and genital transactions, e.g. waste elimination and cleaning, that 
constitutes the anal and genital components of the sexual drive (Freud, 1905/199lb, 
pp.102-105). 
In situations where the primary caregiver is absent, the infant may attempt to recreate 
earlier drive satisfactions via self-stimulation, e.g. by sucking its thumb or rubbing its 
genitals (Freud, 1905/199lb, p.99). Accompanying the experience of satisfaction are 
perceptual and motor sensations that together constitute the infant's first unconscious 
mental content (Fenichel, 1946/1971, p.37). 
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This content is fantasmatic in the sense that the perceptual and motor sensations are 
linked to the sensation of pleasure and not to the nature of the objects (infant and 
caregiver) involved in creating this pleasure. The association between the pleasure 
experienced and the accompanying perceptual and motor sensations forms the content of 
the wish to repeat this experience. In summary, an endogenous unconscious drive 
impulse actualised in the pleasurable somatic sensations elicited in interactions with the 
caregiver gives rise to an unconscious wish, i.e. a fantasy thought-process that is framed 
by the primitive sensory and motor sensations accompanying the sensual pleasure. 
It soon becomes apparent to the infant that pleasurable wish-fulfilment cannot be 
autogenerated for very long without the intervention of a caregiver,· for the latter 
facilitates or frustrates pleasurable discharge (Freud, 1915/1957, p.137). It is in the latter 
instances of need frustration that the infant learns about the importance of the caregiver 
as a separate person. The infant learns to separate itself from the other, and in the process 
the primordial unconscious drive wishes are subjected to a secondary repression in the 
light of reality-based considerations, viz. retaining the love and positive attentions of the 
primary caregiver. The infant's developing sense of a conscious self, .i.e. the ego, 
becomes actively involved in keeping oral, anal and genital impulses from becoming 
conscious, as these wishes could include thoughts harmful to the harmonious relationship 
with the now separately perceived primary caregiver on whom the infant depends for 
continued well-being. 
1.5 The Psychosexual Model is founded on Discredited Neurological Energy 
Constructs 
In this model of infant psychosexual development, Freud (1905/199lb) produced his 
most compelling argument for the way in which innate drives and external environmental 
conditions shape unconscious mentation. 
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By connecting the self-preservative (survival needs) and the sexual drives to regions of 
the body, Freud (1905/199lb) attempted to show how these biological forces become 
manifest in localised bodily sensations experienced by the infant. Pleasurable relief from 
tension in oral, anal and genital regions produces unconscious fantasy wishes for the 
repetition of this pleasure. 
The quantitative aspect of the older neurological energy model is retained, but redeployed 
in a different context, viz. the tension build-up and discharge properties of the mouth, 
anus and genitals. In particular, the concept of unconscious erotic tensions that cannot be 
cancelled, but must either be discharged directly in sexualised activity, diverted into non-
sexual activity, or manifest as neurotic symptoms, represents the cornerstone of 
psychoanalytic drive theory (Freud, 1905/199lb, p.163). If either discharge or diversion 
of the original drive wish into an alternative activity is prevented from occurring, the 
subject will develop neurotic symptoms. In conclusion, the entire theoretical foundation 
of the psychosexual model rests on the energy discharge mechanism model originally 
described in the neurological language of the Project for a Scientific Psychology. 
However, as Sulloway (1979) observes, this debt owed by the psychosexual model to 
earlier neurological energy constructs remained unacknowledged by Freud precisely 
because of the dubious scientific status of many of these constructs, even in Freud's own 
era (pp.120-121). 
In Freud's time the psychosexual model became subject to a different kind of 
controversy. It was not long before Adler (1923/1971) and Jung's (1960/1969) theoretical 
critiques of its premises forced Freud to respond with some quite fundamental revisions 
in regard to the nature of drives. It was in order to ground these revisions in a plausible 
foundation that Freud turned to a Lamarckian evolutionary approach, and so initiated his 
most controversial conceptual linkage between biology and psychoanalytic theory. In 
order to see why Freud was driven to make such a speculative and ultimately misguided 
connection, it is first necessary to outline Adler and Jung's criticisms of his psychosexual 
theory, and secondly to describe Freud's subsequent revisions of this model in the light of 
these criticisms. 
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1.6 Adler and Jung's Critique of the Psychosexual Drive Model 
The early disagreements of Jung and Adler with Freud concerned the priority the latter 
gave to sexual drive motivations. Adler (1923/1971) critiqued Freud's concept of a 
sexual drive being the primary form of human motivation. According to Adler 
(1923/1971) what characterises infant development is a sense of primordial inferiority 
(p.13). Adler (1923/1971) traced this inferiority back to biology, specifically the child's 
possession of "inherited inferior organs, organic systems and glands" (p.18), which 
greatly intensifies the child's natural organ immaturity, feelings of helplessness, and 
dependency in relation to the caregivers. Out of this pervasive and fundamental sense of 
unconscious inferiority a covert desire for mastery takes root, and usually shows itself in 
the form of aggression. Aggression is therefore a secondary characteristic that emerges 
out of a sense of a fundamental unconscious inferiority. Adler (1923/1971) perceived 
Freud's sexual drive in the same light as aggression, i.e. as a secondary manifestation of 
unconscious inferiority. 
Jung (1960/1969) on the other hand proposed that mental energy is fundamentally of a 
neutral composition, but that it manifests in specific mental forms, e.g. as sexual, 
aggressive or spiritual, depending on the context and type of emotional complex 
possessed by the person. Therefore sexual impulses and symptoms are only one 
manifestation amongst a multitude of unconscious and conscious forms that energy can 
assume. Energy can undergo an unlimited number of unconscious moderations in 
expression as long as the intensity, i.e. the quantity of the force, remains constant. No one 
expression, be it sexual, aggressive, or spiritual, has foundational priority over the others 
(Jung, 1960/1969, p.22). In other words, the oral, anal and genital stages of infant 
development are not manifestations of a primordial sexual drive, but specific sexual 
expressions of general life energy. 
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1.7 Freud's Revision of the Psychosexual Drive Model 
Freud's (1922, 1923/1961) revision of the drive model was in part a response to these two 
sets of criticisms. The death drive was developed at a psychological level in order to 
accommodate Adler's descriptions of the role that aggressiveness and mastery play in the 
life of neurotic individuals. Adler's (1923/1971) concept of inferiority became 
reconceptualised as a primordial unconscious drive towards masochism and self-
destruction, i.e. death, that co-exists with the survival and sexual drives of human beings 
(Freud, 1933/1964a, p.105). Freud (1923/1955a) had previously introduced the concept 
of narcissism, i.e. the idea that the ego serves as a reservoir of mental energy that can be 
directed towards external objects or redirected back into itself (p.249). The energy 
directed towards objects represents the sexual drive, whereas the energy stored or 
retracted into the ego is regarded as desexualised, i.e. forming part of the self-
preservative drives (Freud, 1923/1955b, p.257). The two drives therefore share the same 
energy and are reclassified as a single life drive known as Eros (Freud, 1923/1955b, 
p.257). 
Freud recognised that it was difficult to explain how the death drive, a tendency in 
organisms to aim for a non-energy state, could nevertheless manifest in the form of 
external aggression, a state demanding energy discharge. Freud (1923/1961) reasoned 
that the narcissistic withdrawal of energy back into the ego allows this energy to become 
desexualised because it is temporarily not being used for sexual aims, and so is at the 
disposal of other drives, including destructive tendencies (p.46). Freud (1933/1964a) 
proposed that this desexualised energy is used by the death drive, examples being 
masochism and aggression (p. l 05). Furthermore, desexualised energy is a secondary 
product of the sexual drive, not a fundamental quality of mental energy as Jung proposed 
(Freud, 1923/1961, p.46). Desexualised energy accounts for the active expression of the 
death drive as well as explaining other kinds of non-sexual drive aims that Jung 
(1960/1969) had originally highlighted. 
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On first appearances these theoretical revisions counteract Jung and Adler's criticisms, 
but while the concept of sexual and self-preservative drives had some evidential support 
from the psychosexual model and the clinical findings of work with adult neurotics, there 
was little discernible evidence for the fundamental nature of the death drive, viz. a 
primordial internal unconscious tendency towards self-destruction. It therefore became 
important to legitimise the primordial nature of the death drive so that it would not be 
relegated to a characteristic of desexualised energy as in the Jungian perspective. It was 
in order to substantiate the death drive as the co-foundation underlying unconscious 
thought, as opposed to a secondary feature of a unitary unconscious energy, that Freud 
(1922) turned to evolutionary biology in search of the means of verification (p.52). 
1.8 Psychoanalytic Drives and Evolutionary Biology 
Although Freud left the door open, he did not explicitly connect the drive energy 
formulations of the psychosexual model to a neurochemical foundation, because he had 
recognised during the writing of the Project that the available neurological paradigm was 
unable to validate his mentalist constructs (Sulloway, 1979, p.131). However, the 
biological model that Freud (1922) used to explain the origins of the death drive was 
concerned neither with human neurology nor neurochemistry, but involved an 
evolutionary-historical paradigm that located the origins of the drives in the primordial 
behaviour of unicellular and multicellular organisms (pp.47-50). 
The evolutionary perspective that Freud adopted was not only Darwinian, but also greatly 
influenced by the theories of Lamarck (Sulloway, 1979; Badcock, 1994), particularly the 
latter's theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics. This theory proposed that 
learned behavioural adaptations io internal biological needs are the major sources of 
evolutionary change, not Darwinian natural selection (Sulloway, 1979, p.274). These 
adaptations are inherited in the sense that they become part of the genetic constitution of 
the organism (Sulloway, 1979, p.408). From a Freudian perspective, this implied that 
drive motivations originated as adaptations to internal physiological needs in the first 
primitive organisms. 
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According to Sulloway (1979), Freud used this Lamarckian theory to justify the existence 
of a primal phylogenetic principle, viz. a tendency for all organisms to respond to their 
primordial internal biological needs, these responses becoming incorporated as genetic 
material that is henceforth inherited (p.408). Freud (1922), with reference to the work of 
several contemporary biologists, proceeded to locate the primordial origins of the drives 
in the behaviour of unicellular and multicellular organisms (pp.45-50). The tendency for 
energy processes to break down to simpler levels is exhibited in the case of unicellular 
organisms, where cell death occurs as a result of exposure to endogenous toxic metabolic 
waste products (Freud, .1922, p.48). However, when there is a union between two cells 
and an exchange of cellular material, both upon separation become rejuvenated, i.e. the 
infusion of new material into each cell offsets the toxic qualities of their own metabolic 
products (p.48). 
Based on these findings, Freud (1922) proposed that the internal metabolic processes of 
early unicellular organisms represented the evolutionary origin or prototype of the death 
drive (p.49), whereas the union of alien material with internal cell processes that occurs 
in primitive unicellular conjugation represents the evolutionary prototype of the life drive 
(p.55). According to Freud (1922) the earliest form of reproduction is life-preserving 
because unicellular organisms takes other cells as their objects, and introduce new 
material, i.e. tensions or energy processes, into each other that inadvertently prolongs life 
(p.55). Freud (1922) reasoned that the adaptive reproductive behaviour exhibited by the 
first unicellular organisms became internalised as an inherited predisposition, because it 
was a response to the primordial tendency for living matter to bind together, i.e. a 
primordial chemical affinity evidenced by unicellular organisms (p.58). This connecting 
disposition of organic matter therefore exists alongside the death drive prototype of 
internal metabolic destruction. Freud (1922) argued that the connecting predisposition of 
organic matter was repeated and elaborated through all life forms until it became part of 
the genetic material of humans, where it takes the form of the sexual and self-
preservative drives as outlined in the psychosexual model. 
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This evolutionary account of unconscious dispositions embodied Freud's Lamarckian 
conviction that human development involved a recapitulation of all earlier organic life 
forms (Sulloway, 1979, p.408). In conclusion, Freud suggested that individual cellular 
behavioural tendencies towards internal metabolic destruction and mutual reproduction 
evolved, via multiple elaborations in the genetic material of successive species, into 
macro life and death drives. These drives express contrasting unconscious mental 
dispositions of the entire human organism rather than simple cellular behaviours per se. 
The fundamental problems with Freud's evolutionary biological assumptions are: 
i) That the Lamarckian concept of inherited behavioural responses, which are repeated 
and elaborated through all unicellular and multicellular organisms, is incorrect. 
ii) That the fundamental biological behaviour of cells, i.e. cellular connectivity and 
metabolic self-destruction, are unsupported by contemporary findings in cell biology. 
There are therefore no biological, cellular precursors that can be used to justify the 
validity of the dual drive model. The nature of these errors will be outlined in section 1. 9 
below. 
1.9 The Errors in Freud's Biological Formulation of the Life and Death Drives 
i) Modem Mendelian and molecular genetics refutes Freud's Lamarckian assumption that 
behavioural adjustments to endogenous stimuli (the properties of organic matter) can 
become part of an organism's genetic endowment (Badcock, 1994, p.13). Research on the 
human genome in the light of Darwin's theory of natural selection indicates that, in 
response to the co-ordinates of specific environmental stimuli, specific genes are selected 
and expressed while others remain dormant (Steen, 1996, p.18). Behavioural adaptations 
in response to environmental or internal stimuli are not heritable in themselves (although 
the pre-existing specific set of genes enabling the adaptation may be more likely to be 
selected in the next generation if similar stimuli are present). 
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A behavioural adaptation therefore cannot be recapitulated without fail by successive 
generations in different species in the Lamarckian manner suggested by Freud. 
Secondly, the genome of a living organism, whether it is single-celled or multicellular, 
consists of a macromolecule called Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) that encodes all the 
information necessary for the initiation of life processes (Steen, 1996, p. 5). This includes 
instructions for the construction and maintenance of the internal cell metabolism as well 
as for the type of reproduction relevant to the organism (Wills, 1992, p.41). The 
fundamental chemical properties of organic matter therefore include self-maintenance 
and self-generation in concert with environmental stimuli. This contradicts the Freud-
Lamarck conception of a primordial internal metabolic breakdown predisposition in 
organic matter. At the level of molecular genetics the cell prototype of the death drive has 
no foundation. 
ii) At the intercellular level in multicellular organisms, Freud's (1922, p.60, footnote 1) 
concept of a cellular life drive, i.e. a generalised predisposition of cells to engage in 
transactions and functional organisations with neighbouring cells, is simply incorrect in 
many cases. In some cases it is clear that cells react to one another in terms of avoidance, 
e.g. in the developing brain individual neurons make connections with some adjacent 
nerve cells but not with others, depending on the chemical nature of the membrane cues 
of each individual cell concerned (Hofer, 1981, p.149). This contradicts Freud's (1922) 
claim of a general connective cellular predisposition (p.60). Freud's (1922) basic concept 
of connectivity cannot begin to provide a complex account of the different categories of 
cellular interactions, let alone genetic processes in interaction with the environmental 
contingencies of social systems. Given the failure of the concept of organic connectivity 
to account for our contemporary complex understanding of energy and information 
exchange between cells, Freud's (1922) attempt to correlate this cellular prototype of the 
life drive with its mental-energetic counterpart is doomed to failure. 
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Therefore Freud's psychosexual theory of the life drive - as an unconscious mental 
disposition consisting of oral, anal, genital and desexualised components developing 
during infancy - becomes detached from its evolutionary origin in cell biology once his 
account of cell behaviour in unicellular and multicellular organisms is shown to be 
mistaken. 
Finally, the organic prototype of the death drive, i.e. the alleged tendency for organic 
matter to decompose as evidenced in the regressive metabolic processes of isolated cells, 
appears to be contradicted by the behaviour of cellular DNA. DNA actively produces 
proteins that serve as building blocks in all further life-functions of unicellular, 
multicellular and human organisms (Wills, 1992, p.41 ). In the most fundamental sense, 
the genetic code of unicellular, multicellular, and human organisms actively initiates the 
metabolic processes necessary for the functioning of life, including the organism's ability 
to respond to environmental stimuli (Cosmides and Tooby, 1992, pp.38-39). There is no 
primal tendency at this molecular level towards lower energy levels or an inorganic state. 
In fact the reverse occurs, for DNA provides the codes for the manufacture of specific 
enzymes that ensure the replication of the individual cell as well as the entire organism 
(Wills, 1992, p.41; Steen, 1996, p.6). Therefore the organic prototype of the death drive is 
refuted by the evidence of how cellular DNA functions at the molecular level. 
In conclusion, the death drive concept is cast adrift from any empirical scientific support, 
unlike the life drive that can still be explained in the infant development terms of the 
psychosexual model. The scientifically discredited nature of Freud's evolutionary 
biological assumptions pertaining to the death drive soon became apparent to many of his 
followers. This resulted in the death drive being reconceptualised as a reactive-
aggressive, secondary characteristic of unconscious motivation by future generations of 
psychoanalytic theorists. However, while the biological-evolutionary foundation of the 
drive model was largely rejected or ignored by psychoanalysts, an attempt was made to 
preserve the psychosexual model of the life drive (sexual and self-preservative drives) 
and its unconscious thought derivatives. 
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1.10 Biology Becomes a Problem for Psychoanalysis 
The problem of the detachment of the psychosexual drive model from its discredited 
biological foundations has itself been addressed from many different angles by 
subsequent psychoanalytic schools. It could be argued that one of the major motivations 
for the splintering of psychoanalysis into competing theoretical discourses was the 
problem of finding adequate scientific foundations for the psychosexual model, once it 
became clear that Freud's biological foundations for the dual drives and the origins of 
unconscious thought were empirically untenable. Simultaneously a need arose to define 
psychoanalysis as an autonomous body of knowledge and to delineate its independence 
from the biological sciences. This redefinition was attempted in different ways by 
successive generations of psychoanalytic theorists. 
In the following chapter the history of the different responses to these issues will be 
outlined in order to ascertain: 
i) The implications that the search for alternative theoretical foundations had for the 
relationship between psychoanalysis and the biological sciences. 
ii) The implications of this search for conceptualising the origins and proof criteria 
pertaining to the existence of psychoanalytic unconscious mentation. 
Both these issues are central to the concerns of the present study in its attempt to develop 
a model of unconscious mentation that avoids the limitations of these earlier 
reformulations. 
CHAPTER TWO: NEW FOUNDATIONS FOR PSYCHOANALYTIC 
UNCONSCIOUS MENTATION 
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The discrediting of the evolutionary and neurobiological foundations of the Freudian 
drive model, as outlined in chapter one, prompted future generations of psychoanalysts to 
formulate different foundations for the development of unconscious mentation. These 
reformulations can be divided into four major response categories. 
2.1 Four Different Theoretical Responses to the Question of New Foundations for 
Psychoanalysis 
i) The first response ostensibly preserves the original sexual and self-preservative drive 
aspects of the psychosexual model, but additional ego, interpersonal, or social relations 
concepts are introduced that end up subverting drives as foundational constructs. In the 
process the biological origin and constitution of unconscious mentation undergoes a 
transformation. 
ii) The second response includes theorists who have abandoned biological explanations 
of drive constructs altogether in favour of a relational/psychosocial approach. This 
approach appears to offer a more secure foundation for the origins and constitution of 
psychoanalytic unconscious mentation. Some of these theorists provide an exclusively 
psychosocial account of unconscious mentation and mental conflict. Others suggest that 
both biological needs, divorced from drive theory, and psychosocial factors interact to 
create unconscious mental processes. 
iii) The third response critiques these attempts to elaborate drive or other kinds of 
biological-psychosocial constructs in the quest for scientific foundations for 
psychoanalytic unconscious mentation. Instead, it prioritises the systematic elaboration of 
thematic connections between a patient's symbolic material arising in the clinical setting 
and the hypothesised existence of unconscious mentation. 
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These thematic connections, it is argued, represent causal relationships between the 
patient's experiential material and psychoanalytic constructs such as repression, dream 
formation, primary process operations and unconscious sexual wishes. Furthermore, this 
category claims that the latter are core foundational constructs that can only be validated 
in terms of phenomena native to the domain of psychoanalysis itself There can therefore 
be no mutually profitable relationship between psychoanalytic conceptions of 
unconscious mentation and findings from the biological sciences. 
iv) A fourth response proposes that life and death drives are not innate motivational 
forces, but are products of environmental material that the biologically immature neonate 
must somehow process. From this perspective, drives are environmental constructs 
consisting of primitive linguistic, visual, and tactile data that are inefficiently processed 
by the infant. What is of central foundational importance for this model is not drives, but 
the neonates' biological immaturity, which includes initial primitive attempts to process 
complex environmental stimuli. The resulting encoding of perceptual information 
involves an inevitable distortion of real events, and it is precisely on the basis of this 
distorted encoding that psychoanalytic unconscious mentation is first produced. 
Therefore, contrary to the third response, the fourth response implies that biological 
considerations, viz. the infant's immaturity, cannot be excluded from the 
conceptualisation of psychoanalytic unconscious mentation. Furthermore, pre-eminence 
is given to the role of environmental material in constructing internal unconscious mental 
processes. 
The remaining sections of the chapter exanune these four responses, attending 
particularly to how each view the relationship between unconscious mental processes and 
the biological sciences. The evolving relationship between unconscious mentation and 
the biological sciences evident in these responses has implications for the model of 
presymbolic unconscious mentation to be outlined by the present study. 
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2.2 Response One: Drives Co-Exist Uneasily with Other Biopsychosocial Factors 
2.2.1 Drives are subordinated to Biological Adaptation 
Hartmann's (1939/1958) psychoanalytic ego psychology stresses that biological and 
environmental processes are not mutually exclusive, but implicate one another in the 
process of adaptation. Hartmann (1939/1958) retains Freud's psychosexual drive model, 
agreeing that the biological substrate of drives visible in the oral, anal and genital 
changes in children are the necessary precursors for psychosexual development (p.44). 
However, he regards the evolutionary-biological foundations of the life and death drives 
as irrelevant to his central concern, viz. the adaptive role of various ego mechanisms 
(p.44). 
While acknowledging the importance of drive impulses on ego functioning in the context 
of unconscious mental conflict, Hartmann (1939/1958) proposes that ego functioning 
concerned with the development of perception, intention, object comprehensi,on, thought, 
language, memory and motor processes is free from unconscious drive conflicts (p.8). 
Adaptive ego functions share a common genetic, biological origin with psychosexual 
drive functions (p.102); adaptive ego mechanisms and unconscious psychosexual 
impulses have equal ontogenetic and motivational status. 
Furthermore, the ego no longer defends against the drives, but rather actively inhibits 
drive demands via the mechanisms of defence. This is an adaptive procedure, for it 
enables the ego to concentrate on environmental specifications relatively unhindered by 
drive impulses (Hartmann, 1939/1958, p.106). Hartmann displaces the drive formulations 
of the psychosexual model with his increasing emphasis on the inhibitory and adaptive 
functions of the ego. Hartmann's (1939/1958) attempt to reconcile biology with 
psychoanalytic constructs via the concept of adaptation therefore paves the way for 
unconscious dispositions and mental conflict to become less important from a 
motivational perspective in comparison to conscious ego functions. 
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2.2.2 Fromm: Drives are moulded by Socio-Economic Conditions 
Fromm (1970), like Hartmann, believes that evidence for the existence of sexual and self-
preservative drives can be observed in infants, young children, and in clinical practise 
(p.151, footnote 2). Contrary to Freud, Fromm (1970) proposes that relations with other 
people are not simply a means of satisfying drive impulses, but that drives are energy 
forces striving to relate and unite with significant others (p. 72). The physiological 
pleasure associated with tension reduction is a means of expressing a more fundamental 
psychological motivation, i.e. the need to relate and be related to by significant others 
(Fromm, 1970, p.74). 
Using the theories of Marx, Fromm (1970, p.164) proposes that the family is the medium 
whereby economic conditions structure and systematise the survival and psychosexual 
needs of the infant, i.e. in terms of the material resources each family possesses. Drives 
are conditioned by and adapt to the emotional and pedagogical configurations of the 
family, whose structure is in turn determined by social class and economic infrastructure 
variables (Fromm, 1970, p.158). While drives actively and creatively respond to social 
conditions, Fromm (1970) maintains that ultimately '1:he role of primary formative 
factors goes to the economic conditions" (p.164). 
Fromm (1970) rejects Freud's death drive formulation because he views this construct as 
based on biological evidence that had little empirical foundation (Fromm, 1970, p.150, 
footnote 1). While acknowledging the role of aggressive and destructive motivations 
within human beings, he views these as reactions to imagined survival threats or as 
consequences of psychosexual fiustrations in relationships (Fromm, 1970, p.213). In 
Fromm's model, drive wishes are fiustrated, satisfied or moulded by the economic 
conditions implicit in family structures. Unconscious mentation is a product of the 
moulding of biological drive demands by economic conditions, while the ego is a product 
of successful drive modifications mediated by psychosocial conditions, not an 
independent biological adaptation agency (Fromm, 1970, p.43). 
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Unconscious mentation occurs when socio-economic conditions impose limits and 
inhibitions on innate wishes for gratification, as well as unconsciously shaping these 
wishes and forms of gratification. 
2.2.3 Melanie Klein: Drives are Object-Seeking Emotions 
Klein (1975) focuses on neither ego adaptation nor socio-economic conditions at the 
expense of drive impulses. Instead, drive constructs remain central to her theory of object 
relations. However, implicit in Klein's definition of drives and unconscious thought is a 
completely different non-biological foundation from that proposed by Freud (Greenberg 
and Mitchell, 1983). In the Kleinian schema, drives no longer have a biological origin in 
the body, i.e. oral, anal and genital erogenous zones are not the primary manifestations of 
drive impulses. On the contrary, the primal expression of the life and death drives is 
manifest in the fundamental emotions of love and hate (Klein, 1975, p.306). These 
emotions occur when gratification or frustration of bodily needs produces the 
corresponding sensual stimulation at the oral, anal and genital zones (Klein, 1975, p.306). 
Drives are intrinsically psychological fantasy elements (Klein, 1975, p.308). The oral, 
anal and genital zones are simply the initial physical contexts in which the drives express 
themselves as imaginatively constructed unconscious emotions ultimately aimed towards 
external objects, i.e. the caregivers (Klein, 1975, p.408). Pleasure and frustration 
experienced at these bodily zones are not ends in themselves~ rather they point the way to 
emotional relationships with the internal representatives of the external caregivers (Klein, 
1975, p.408). Klein severs the link between drives as energy quanta and their 
unconscious mental manifestation as wishful fantasies. Furthermore, Klein rehabilitates 
the death drive by linking it to the directed emotion of hate. The death drive is no longer 
dependent on an evolutionary-biological foundation, but is grounded in the infant's 
earliest negative experiences of the primary caregiver. The life and death drives in the 
form of love and hate are unconscious experiential phenomena that in clinical settings 
speak for themselves, i.e. via the client's symptoms and emotional communication. 
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For Klein, drives are innate mental properties that emerge in meaningful ways at the level 
of psychological functioning, and within the context of the infant's experience. Their 
possible physico-chemical constitution is regarded as irrelevant to the task of deciphering 
the dynamics of unconscious thought processes. 
2.2.4 Winnicott: Drives are subordinated to the Infant-Mother Relationship 
Winnicott (1986) echoes Klein in stressing the importance of relational patterns with 
caregivers, but relegates dual drive wishes and the emergence of love and hate to a status 
secondary to that of ego development in the mother-infant context. The mother initially 
provides a holding function (Winnicott, 1986, p.240), which is the foundation for the care 
of the infant's physiological needs and the management of its ongoing experience. From 
the infant's perspective this holding relationship also has a psychological dimension, i.e. 
it facilitates the development of the ego as an integrated structure which eventually 
allows the infant to experience itself as a unified being (Winnicott, 1986, p.241). The 
holding function of the mother-infant relationship is the fundamental motivational 
principle in Winnicott's theory, for it "overlaps with, but is initiated prior to, instinctual 
experiences that in time would determine object relationships" (1986, p.240). 
The Kleinian view of drives as experiences of love and hate only becomes realisable once 
the concept of the whole person is an integral part of ego experience. According to 
Winnicott ( 1986), before the infant is able to experience him/herself as a whole person, 
drive impulses are experienced as intrusive seductions or attacks on the developing 
conscious ego. The development of both normal and pathological mental structure 
therefore has a common foundation in the maternal holding function of the mother-infant 
relationship. In Winnicott's model, the holding dimension of the mother-infant 
relationship is the foundation for all subsequent psychoanalytic drive-object interactions 
involved in the production of unconscious mentation . 
. 
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2.2.5 Kohut: Drives are subordinated to the Self-Object Relationship 
Kohut ( 1996) reiterates Winnicott' s emphasis on the foundational importance of the 
infant-mother relationship. Kohut (1996, p.352) coins the term "self-object" to describe 
the infant's initial experience of non-differentiation from the caregiver. The infant's self 
begins to differentiate from the caregiver when minor, adaptive delays in gratification 
lead to an increase in the intensity of needs. The infant begins to perceive a distinction 
between certain needs belonging to him/her, and processes whereby these demands are 
met or frustrated (Kohut, 1996, p.200). Kohut (1996) views drives as existing in larger 
compound relationships with the transactions of the primary caregiver. From birth, drives 
are fully integrated into the self-object unit (Kohut, 1996, p.199). They do not exist as 
primordial entities, but only as fragmentation products of the earlier self-object 
relationship if the primary caregiver empathically fails the infant (Kohut, 1996 p.199). 
This empathy failure is traumatic, and is followed by the break-up of the self-object 
experience. The components of the sexual drive then become visible as pathological 
bodily interactions, i.e. orally, anally and genitally fixated activity (p.188). 
In response, a reactive aggressive drive resembling Freud's psychological version of the 
death drive emerges. This comes to dominate the infant's functioning in the form of rage 
or the wish to destroy itself or others (Kohut, 1996, p.200). In normal development, both 
the sexual and aggressive drive components would have no impact as unconscious 
thought and behavioural predispositions, because they are seamlessly integrated into the 
experiential unit of the self-object relationship that functions according to optimal 
frustration (Kohut, 1996, p.187). The infant-mother relationship is the foundational 
matrix for the later emergence of a cohesive self-identity, while drives have a secondary 
role in forming unconscious pathological experiences if serious failures in caregiver 
empathic responsiveness occur. 
2.2.6 Critical Comment 
i) These five theories typify the modifications made to classical drive theory once Freud 
had departed from the scene. 
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In each case the influence of unconscious drive wishes are subordinated to some other 
central consideration, i.e. ego adaptation, socio-economic conditions, object relations, 
infant-mother relations or self-object relations. However, no effort is made in any of 
these theories to provide empirical proof, apart from clinical material, that their 
constructs are any more valid than the admittedly speculative foundations of Freud's 
psychosexual model (Edelson, 1988). 
ii) In the review of the third psychoanalytic response category presented in section 2.4 
below, it will be demonstrated that clinical case material is inadequate proof of the 
empirical existence of a psychoanalytic construct, e.g. unconscious infantile sexual 
wishes, or empathic failures in infant self-object relations. Therefore the above five 
approaches, while providing alternative conceptions of unconscious mentation, conflict 
and motivation, do not provide a foundation for these concepts that is any more valid than 
that which exists in Freud's psychosexual model. 
iii) Specific biological mechanisms involved in psychological development, whether 
relating to drive, ego, or object relations formulations, are never explicitly addressed by 
any of the theorists outlined above. The role of biology and innate factors in 
underpinning psychoanalytic views of human development is acknowledged, only to be 
largely ignored in favour of studying unconscious mentation in infant and child 
development exclusively from a psychosocial perspective. 
2.3 Response Two: Abandoning the Drive Model in the Search for New Foundations 
2.3.1 Fairbairn: Object Relations Explicitly Replaces Drives as the Foundation for 
Unconscious Mentation 
Fairbairn (1986a, 1986b) reformulates the concept of a life drive in his model of object-
seeking behaviour. Psychosexual energy is formulated as the motivation to obtain a 
satisfying experience from an external object, i.e. a real person, rather than a discrete 
quantity separable from this activity (Fairbairn, 1986a, p. 7 4 ). 
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Energy and mental intention are therefore fused in Fairbairn's model. The oral, anal and 
genital zones are simply convenient somatic locations that the object-seeking life drive 
uses in order to secure satisfying experiences from the primary caregiver (Fairbairn, 
1986a, p.74). According to Fairbairn (1986a), the importance of these zones in early 
caregiving procedures makes them especially suitable for the expression of object-
seeking aims (p.75). For Fairbairn (1986a), the life drive simply uses the body as a means 
to make gratifying connections with the primary caregiver. The life drive therefore has no 
chemical origin in the tissues of the body. 
Fairbairn (1986b) explicitly abandons Freud's dual drive model and reformulates the life 
and death drives into a single object-seeking drive. Life and death ·dynamics are 
respectively explained in terms of satisfying connections to external objects and 
destructive connections to internal objects. When early interactions with the primary 
caregivers are generally satisfying, the infant perceives the caregivers as whole people. 
When relations with the primary caregivers are frustrating, neglectful or abusive, the 
infant incorporates these failures as part of him/herself The images of the caregivers 
connected to the bad experiences are repressed and become unconscious, while the 
negative qualities associated with these experiences become consciously recognised self-
attributes for the infant (Fairbairn, 1986b, p.116). 
An urge towards self-destruction is therefore not a primary motivation of human beings, 
but a secondary product of the infant's relationship with unconscious internalised bad 
object representations (Fairbairn, 1986b, p.123). Emphasising object seeking as the 
primary drive in human beings allows Fairbairn to avoid the biological aspects of the 
classical drive model, as well as the innate adaptive capabilities of the ego, in order to 
focus on the infant's experience of interpersonal relations in the social world. It is 
adverse psychosocial relationships that produce unconscious mentation, rather than innate 
biological forces conflicting with the social adaptive functions of the ego. 
2.3.2 Sullivan: Interpersonal Anxiety Impacts Negatively on Biological Needs and 
Relational Patterns to Create Unconscious Mentation 
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For Sullivan (1953), biological needs produce prototypical emotions structured by the 
activity that the infant associates with the relief experience. The initial building block of 
emotional structure is an interpersonal relationship, consisting of the infant's expression 
of a biological need and its fulfilment mediated by the primary caregiver. The erotogenic 
zones of the classical psychosexual model are reconceptualised by Sullivan (1953) as the 
initial areas of interaction between the infant and the primary caregiver. Both biological 
and psychological existences are from the very beginning interpersonal in nature 
(Sullivan, 1953, p.41). 
When the primary caregiver is attentive to the expression of needs, biological and 
psychological development proceeds along healthy lines. However, this development is 
disturbed when anxiety states in the primary caregiver are empathically induced in the 
infant (Sullivan, 1953, p.41). Anxiety has neither a biological substrate nor a biological 
process of alleviation, the latter only being achieved through a mental experience of 
interpersonal security (Sullivan, 1953, p.42). Unlike biological needs, the anxious 
infant's distress does not lead to a reassuring response from the caregiver, because the 
source of the anxiety comes from the latter. Anxiety is the experience of interpersonal 
insecurity with the primary caregiver (Sullivan, 1953, p.43). 
Anxiety impacts negatively on biological need fulfilment and the emotional 
configurations developing around these satisfactions, because the caregiver' s anxiety 
interferes with her co-operation with the infant (Sullivan, 1953, p.59). Biological need 
interactions at the infant's mouth, anus and genitals become differentiated into 
pleasurable and anxious dimensions. Similarly the caregiver is divided into good and bad 
aspects associated with pleasurable and anxious interactions (Sullivan, 1953, p.75). 
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Sullivan's complex model of psychological development rejects the classical emphasis on 
drives, but retains the erogenous zones as sites where biological needs call forth 
interventions from the primary caregiver. Zonal interactions and sensory information 
associated with extreme anxiety lead to the formation of unconscious not-me experiential 
dimensions, i.e. experience is truncated and distorted by intense emotions of awe, horror, 
loathing or dread, and is unavailable to conscious awareness (Sullivan, 1953, p.163). In 
Sullivan's model, interpersonally mediated anxiety produces unconscious thought 
dimensions of the self-system and unconscious mental conflicts. 
2.3.3 Homey: Pathological Disturbances in Interpersonal Relations Produce Drive-Like 
Neurotic Trends 
Homey (1945) focuses specifically on the structure of neurotic conflicts, the latter being 
viewed as largely a consequence of disturbances in human relationships (p.12). The dual 
drive model misunderstood the origin of the compulsive, urge-like forces that provoke 
inner conflict in humans. Homey argues that the life and death drives should be 
understood as neurotic cravings for affection and power that are the consequence of 
disturbed human relationships (Homey, 1945, p.13). These experiences are not 
motivational forces underpinning all human behaviour, but are signs of neurotic conflict 
having roots in earlier disturbances (Homey, 1945, p.12). Neurotic conflicts are not 
caused by repressing agencies and repressed drive forces, but by contradictory sets of 
trends that were initially attitudes towards others, but that have become internalised self-
attributions (Homey, 1945, p.15). 
Contradictory sets of self-attributes constitute the self as a fundamentally neurotic, 
conflictual structure. Homey (1945) traces the origins of inner conflict to the experience 
of basic anxiety in the child (p.41). Anxiety is characterised by a sense of helplessness 
and isolation accompanying the child's perception of the contradictory nature of parental 
attitudes and responses towards him/her. Some of these adverse relations are consciously 
perceived, while others shape the child's perceptions in unconscious ways. 
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The child unconsciously develops strategies to cope with the specific constellation of 
relations constituting the family milieu (Homey, 1945, p.42). These strategies become 
lasting coping mechanisms, i.e. neurotic trends (Homey, 1945, p.42). Biological 
processes play no role in dynamic conflicts or unconscious thought processes~ instead the 
relational strivings for affection from and power over others are contained within the 
basic neurotic trends. 
2.3.4 Critical Comment 
The three theoretical approaches outlined above demonstrate the different emphases on 
the role of biological factors in shaping the psychosocial development of the child once 
classical drive theory is explicitly abandoned. For Fairbairn and Sullivan, the body is still 
an important site for the development of psychological structure, but these authors take 
opposite views in terms of how relations with others impact on the body. Fairbairn 
proposes an innate object-seeking drive that predisposes infants to seek out relations with 
others. Sullivan on the other hand proposes no such drive, but instead attempts to show 
how general physical needs allow for caregiver interactions that shape infant experience, 
and in particular how caregiver-mediated anxiety shapes unconscious mental structure in 
infants. While both theorists outline intriguing theoretical possibilities as regards how 
unconscious mentation is structured, neither provides any convincing empirical proof of 
the relationships they propose between biology and the development of mental structure. 
Homey rejects any biological or body-based component to the structure of unconscious 
mentation and mental conflict, instead outlining an exclusively psychosocial model. 
While this model provides an interesting angle on the social and familial dimensions that 
help constitute unconscious conflict, the author provides no empirical proof to give her 
model any more credibility than those proposed by Fairbairn, Sullivan, and countless 
other psychoanalytic authors. The exclusive reliance of these authors on clinical data to 
substantiate their theoretical claims simply illuminates the inability of this data to provide 
convincing evidence that one model is correct and another false (Grunbaum, 1993). 
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This lack of falsifiability means that, while many of these models of unconscious 
mentation may appear to be more convincing than the discredited biological speculations 
of the classical drive model, they offer no definitive empirical answers to the question of 
whether unconscious mentation actually exists, or how it is formed. What is lacking in 
these neo-Freudian and object relations approaches is an openness to developments in the 
biological sciences that might throw new light on the empirical status of key 
psychoanalytic concepts pertaining to unconscious thought. Examples of such biological 
findings include those relevant to the existence of repressed mental contents, unconscious 
wishes, primary process operations, the role of interpersonal interactions, and the role of 
the body. Bowlby (1986) does not directly address this issue of empirical proof criteria 
for unconscious mentation. He does nevertheless provide a precedent for psychoanalysts 
to engage in a dialogue with contemporary biological findings in the quest to empirically 
verify psychoanalytic concepts. 
2.3.5 Bowlby: Attachment Needs Shape the Development of Psychological Structure in 
the Context of the Infant-Caregiver Relationship 
Bowlby (1986) critiques the classical drive model, the object relations school and 
Sullivan's (1953) interpersonal model. He concedes that biologically derived survival 
needs concerned with food intake and waste elimination are important. The relevance of 
the oral, anal and genital zones is also acknowledged, but they are not understood in 
terms of 
i) The classical model's assumption that they are bodily localisations of generalised 
sexual drive energy. 
ii) The pure object relations approach of Fairbairn, which assumes that these zones are 
the main conduits whereby an innate object-related drive initially finds expression and 
connects with the primary caregiver. 
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Bowlby (1986) notes that contemporary biology has categorised species-specific patterns 
of behaviour. These instinctual behavioural sequences represent evolutionary adaptations 
to environmental conditions (Bowlby, 1986, p.178). In humans, observable patterns of 
behaviour - e.g. crying when hungry, sucking, manipulating the genitals and exploring 
the anus - are activated by specific conditions (Bowlby, 1986, p.179). Bowlby (1986) 
argues that it is not endogenous drives that produce these different responses (p.181 ), but 
specific systems that are evoked by environmental cues (p.183). Bowlby (1986) cites 
findings, based on direct observations of infant behaviour, which suggest a predisposition 
to respond to caregivers~ facial and vocal schemas (p .171 ). These schemas are the stimuli 
necessary for activating several primary responses in infants. When the specific 
environmental conditions evoking the infant behaviour are alleviated, the behavioural 
sequence is terminated - either by a different set of environmental stimuli (e.g. changes 
in the caregiver's behaviour) or by stimuli mediated by an endogenous regulatory system 
(e.g. a physiological feedback system that gauges satiation in relation to eating and 
drinking). 
As the primary caregiver initiates specific behavioural patterns, these are also regulated 
by her interventions. Bowlby (1986) proposes it is when primary behavioural patterns are 
impeded from reaching termination, e.g. by inappropriate caregiving, that the infant 
experiences anxiety, which may result in psychopathology. Such anxiety states would be 
the conditions necessary for the development of unconscious mentation and conflict. 
Bowlby (1986) critiqued the emphasis many object relations theorists placed on orality as 
the central determinant in early infant-caregiver interactions. Bowlby (1986) proposes 
that sucking, clinging, following, crying and smiling are equi-primordial instinctual 
responses that became integrated into attachment behaviour during the first year of life 
(p.186). In particular, crying and smiling elicit caregiving responses, indicating that 
emotional interactions with the caregiver can be ends in themselves, without a survival 
need being part of the agenda (Bowlby, 1986 p.186). All five behavioural sequences are 
components of a larger organisational and adaptive response to the primary caregiver, i.e. 
the attachment relationship. 
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Like Sullivan, Bowlby (1986) argues that biological needs and interpersonal interactions 
mutually interpenetrate one another to build complex mental processes in humans. But 
unlike Sullivan, Bowlby argues that biological needs do not initiate interpersonal 
transactions between infant and primary caregiver. Bowlby (1986) asserts that biological 
needs are only activated into expressive forms by cues originating with the caregiver' s 
presence. In his theoretical revisions, Bowlby ( 1986) stresses the importance of direct 
observation of human and primate infants, as opposed to the psychoanalytic tradition of 
exclusive reliance on child and adult clinical material. In doing so, he introduces new 
possibilities of verification for psychodynamic constructs. He shows how non-zonal 
biological predispositions and behavioural sequences are activated by caregiver cues, and 
suggests how these may contribute to the development of unconscious mentation. 
However, Bowlby's use of contemporary biological and infant research findings to verify 
psychoanalytic constructs has been criticised by another school of psychoanalytic 
thought. This school argues that psychoanalytic constructs cannot be validated by any 
non-psychoanalytic discipline, and that the mental operations corresponding to 
psychoanalytic unconscious mentation can only be explicated and verified by proof 
criteria internal to the discipline of psychoanalysis itself This third response to the 
problem of verifying the existence of unconscious mentation is critically appraised in 
section 2.4 below. 
2.4 Category Three: The Clinical Psychosexual Model and the Hermeneutic 
Emphasis on Meaning Affinities as Proof Criteria 
2.4.1 Grounds for the Separation of the Psychosexual Model from the Underlying Dual-
Drive Terminology 
A number of authors, including Habermas (1968/1972), G. Klein (1976), Gill (1976), 
Ricoeur (1981), Edelson (1988) and Grunbaum (1993) distinguish bet':"'een Freud's dual-
drive model of energy discharge, and his theories of repression, dream formation, slips, 
and sexuality derived from observations made in the clinical setting. 
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It is argued that the latter theories stem from clinical observations and inferences that 
have been integrated into the drive-discharge model, but that there is no inherent relation 
between these clinically derived findings and the drive-discharge concept (G. Klein, 
1976, p.67; Gill, 1976, p.103). As outlined in sections 1.2 and 1.3 of chapter one, the 
drive model's origins are neurological, a contention supported by Gill (1976) and 
Grunbaum (1993). In the context of Freud's psychosexual model, the earlier 
neuropsychological energy concept was reformulated as a mental wish having specific 
energy intensity. It is argued that this energy model of drives was then used to explain the 
clinical findings of sexuality, dream formation and so forth on a more abstract level 
(Ricoeur, 1981, p.259). Furthermore, clinical observations were thereafter reconstructed 
and explained in terms of the drive-discharge model (Habermas, 1968/1972, pp.244-245; 
Ricoeur, 1981, p.259). 
As outlined in chapter one, Freud's neurologically inspired energy model and the later 
Lamarckian cell biology speculations that underpin his theory of life and death drives are 
discredited by contemporary scientific findings. The present group of authors concur with 
this view, but argue that the drive-discharge model is therefore not a more abstract 
version of the clinical findings, but is derived from neuropsychological and evolutionary 
biological contexts that are intrinsically unrelated to the phenomenology of the clinical 
findings (G. Klein, 1976, pp.67-68; Ricoeur, 1981, p.259). The clinical findings are 
therefore intrinsically unrelated to the theoretical properties and origins of the drives. 
The drive aspect of the psychosexual model, together with the evolutionary drive 
formulations, have misrepresented and distorted Freud's clinical findings (G. Klein, 
1976; Gill, 1976). While Freud's dual drive formulations are incorrect, these authors 
argue that this is insufficient reason to discard Freud's clinical propositions. It is 
unjustifiable to replace Freud's theory of psychosexual development, primary process 
operations and repression, with relational, ego-adaptation, or attachment accounts of 
unconscious mentation (Edelson, 1988, p.161). 
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Once Freud's clinically derived theoretical propositions are separated from their drive 
theory reformulations, the former can be used to found a psychoanalytic theory purified 
of drive speculations (G. Klein, 1976, p.68). In this regard, a number of core propositions 
have been identified as the basis of a drive-free clinical theory of psychoanalysis 
(Edelson, 1988; Grunbaum, 1993; G.Klein, 1976). These propositions are listed in the 
following section. 
2.4.2 The Core Propositions of the Clinical Psychosexual Model 
In identifying the crucial tenets of a clinical psychoanalytic model, some debate is 
inevitable, but the following propositions, derived from G. Klein (1976), Edelson (1988), 
and Grunbaum (1993), illustrate the essential components of the clinical theory. 
i) According to Grunbaum (1993), the central pillar of clinical psychoanalysis is the 
theory of repression, devoid of its dual-drive terminology. Grunbaum refers to a model in 
which neurotic symptoms, dream contents, and parapraxes are all explained in terms of 
the concept of repression, but devoid of the language of energy and discharge ( 1993, p. 7). 
The reformulation of these three repression-related phenomena is exemplified in the 
propositions put forward by Edelson {1988) and G.Klein (1976) below. 
ii) Edelson (1988) proposes that where there are gaps or discontinuities in a patient's 
memory, experience or understanding, and/or overt symptoms that impinge on a patient's 
memory, experience or understanding, these are indicative of other phenomena that 
cause, i.e. produce, these gaps or symptoms (p.159). These causal phenomena are wishes 
and beliefs that in terms of their content, relations and significance may be partly or 
wholly unconscious. 
iii) These wishes and beliefs, which may or may not be primarily sexual in nature, are 
constituents of conflicts or dilemmas originating in the mental life of children (G. Klein, 
1976, p.36). 
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iv) The wishes that become components of conflicts are fulfilled in imagination rather 
than carried over into reality-accommodated thought or instrumental action. These 
fantasy solutions to wishes may, over time, shape and produce internal and external 
responses to objects and events (Edelson, 1988, p.160). 
v) The mind has two fundamentally different modes of operation: the primary and 
secondary process modes. 
a) The primary process mode involves the construction of mental representations of 
wishes and their fulfilment by means of the imaginative operations of condensation, 
displacement, secondary revision and iconic symbolisation (Edelson, 1988, p.182). 
Wishes and beliefs produced by these unconscious imaginative operations are 
intrinsically orientated towards an imaginative resolution in which considerations of 
reality and truth are irrelevant. When action becomes a manifestation of this thought 
mode, this is an enactment of an imaginative drama, not an act resulting from the 
conjunction of imaginative wish and reality-orientated instrumental belief (Edelson, 
1988, p.182). The operations of the primary process are intrinsically imaginative and 
symbolic, and are not based on the functioning of a primordial psychosomatic energy as 
proposed by Freud (Edelson, 1988, p.182). 
Imaginative operations may be connected to neuropsychological brain regions that 
function in terms of neurochemical events and chemico-energic reactions, but the nature 
of these connections is at present unknown. Furthermore, such neurochemical events are 
irrelevant to the level of analysis that attempts to map the gross functional characteristics 
of primary process operations, i.e. the psychoanalytic level of investigation (Edelson, 
1988, p.142). The unconscious wishes and their fantasy fulfilments produced by primary 
process operations are intrinsically the work and product of the imagination, not of 
neurological events (Edelson, 1988, p.160). An unconscious wish does not receive its 
intensity from an energy charge, but from the sum of the kinds of imaginative operations 
that construct it and its fantasy fulfilment, together with the nature of the affective 
conflict that it becomes a component of (Edelson, 1988, p.160). 
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In the clinical model, imaginative operations replace drive energy as the means for 
understanding how the primary process produces unconscious mental conflict and 
repression. Repression is reformulated as a fantasy, i.e. an imaginative operation of 
incorporating certain events, wishes or beliefs, rather than a content-free energy 
mechanism, operating outside of imagination, that manipulates mental contents (Edelson, 
1988, p.176). In this sense, repression is just another primary process operation among a 
number of others. 
b) In the secondary process mode of operation, wishes are fulfilled through instrumental 
action, achieved by a process of cognitive inferences exchanged between a wish and a 
reality-accommodated perception or belief (Edelson, 1988, p. 160). Traumatic events and 
the internalised vicissitudes of object relations form part of secondary process operations, 
because although they may be partly determined by or in tum influence primary process 
wishes and beliefs, they are intrinsically structured by reality-accommodated perceptions, 
beliefs and instrumental activity (Edelson, 1988, p.164). 
vi) G. Klein (1976) provides a detailed account of a clinical psychoanalytic theory of 
sexuality stripped of energy drive formulations. Sexuality is not a drive that can be 
measured in terms of energy quantities, but is a physiologically based appetite for sensual 
pleasures of variable quality, subject to qualitative changes in different psychosocial 
contexts (G. Klein, 1976, pp.40-42). The erotogenic zones of the mouth, anus and 
genitals, as well as other areas of the skin, are physiologically sensitive to arousing 
stimuli that activate appetitive experiences (p.22). Through repetition, memories of these 
experiences are organised into increasingly sophisticated cognitive schemas ( G. Klein, 
1976, p.62), including a network of associated meanings that are reactivated in other 
sexual and non-sexual contexts (pp.24-25). While the drive model reduces all wishes to a 
sexual origin, the clinical theory proposes reciprocity between sexual and nonsexual 
motives and information systems (G. Klein, 1976, p. 25). Sexual motives may shape 
nonsexual behaviours, but nonsexual motives may also shape sexual behaviours. 
2.4.3 Hermeneutics Misconstrues the Scientific Status of the Clinical Psychosexual 
Model 
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There has been considerable confusion concerning what kind of proofs are applicable to 
the core propositions of the clinical model. This has been the case particularly since 
Habermas (1968/1972) and Ricoeur (1981) argued that the clinical propositions should 
not be tested according to the conditions set for natural science hypotheses, because they 
do not embody the same kind of universal causal laws and relationships that pertain to the 
'hard' sciences such as biology, chemistry and physics (Habermas, 1968/1972, pp.271-
273~ Ricoeur, 1981, p.255). Habermas (1968/1972) proposes that no invariant causal law 
links a neurotic symptom in the adult via the mechanism of repression back to a 
childhood wish-fulfilment. The causal connection that pertains to clinical psychoanalysis 
is not a natural law, but a symbolic creation of the patient in the context of reconstructing 
a life narrative (p.271). The connections between a symptom in the present and a 
remembered childhood wish are causal only in a symbolic sense, i.e. in the meaning 
connections that the patient makes between the symptom, recovering the memory of a 
conflict-inducing wish, and the primal origin of that wish (p.271). Habermas (1968/1972) 
reduces all unconscious imaginative activity to linguistic symbols that have become 
disconnected from consciously accessible linguistic and grammatical operations (p.257). 
Repression is the process whereby symbolically encoded information previously 
available to consciousness has, due to conflicting need interpretations (i.e. wishes), 
become split off into an isolated idiosyncratic semantic format (Habermas, 1968/1972, 
p.241 ). This isolated format disrupts or creates gaps in conscious communication and 
activities, i.e. manifest dream contents, the content of slips, and neurotic symptoms. The 
split-off format can only be recovered through the patient's self-reflection in the analytic 
context (Habermas, 1968/1972, p.257), i.e. isolated symbolic contents are reconnected to 
consciously accessible linguistic systems via self-reflection. What is recovered in this 
process is not a causal chain of factual events occurring outside of the symbolic processes 
of the patient, but connections between linguistically encoded imaginative phenomena 
that are reintegrated into the patient's self-experience (Habermas, 1968/1972, p.271). 
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It follows from the above argument that the proofs for clinical propositions are to be 
found in the analytic situation, i.e. by examining the meaning connections that the patient 
and analyst agree have restructured the formers distorted self-narrative. The agreed-upon 
observations can be compared with other cases and, on the basis of multiple comparisons, 
general explanatory laws concerning self-formative processes and recurring mental 
configurations may be formulated (Habermas, 1968/1972, p.264). However, these general 
interpretations are not invariant causal laws, but more abstract descriptions of thematic 
interpretive connections made by individual patients and analysts. 
Ricoeur (1981) endorses the above position, but proposes that non-narrative connections 
apart from the patient's self-reflection can be systematically applied to individual cases 
(p.269). While general hypotheses concerning the drive model are not validated by 
clinical observations, it is still possible to construct law-like propositions applicable to 
typical categories of observed behaviour. This categorisation involves making inferences 
concerning how clinical events are either related to or actually embody unconscious 
motives and mechanisms of distortion (Ricoeur, 1981, p.269). For Ricoeur (1981), the 
traditional drive model does not offer a valid causal account of the thematic connections 
agreed upon by analyst and analysand. 
Instead he suggests that the application of a drive-free dream interpretation and symptom 
formation theory, i.e. primary process operations, may establish law-like psychoanalytic 
propositions in relation to clinically derived meanings (Ricoeur, 1981, p.272). However 
there is a central problem with this kind of proof procedure. The core clinical 
propositions outlined in section 2.4.2 above may provide a plausible causal account of the 
meaning affinities of an individual case, and so generate law-like propositions that make 
reference to unconscious motives. However, this does not prove that the core inferences 
made in relation to clinical observations are empirically correct, and therefore the 
resulting theory of causation remains a hypothetical model, not a framework of factual 
laws. 
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The meaning connections made in the analytic setting cannot validate the existence of the 
core propositions, for the latter are causal hypotheses generated to explain observed 
clinical phenomena in terms of other processes that remain hidden and hence 
unaccounted for. Furthermore, with reference to the narrative-hermeneutic and clinical 
case study methods, Grunbaum ( 1993) argues that a proximity in time between two 
events, or the fact that one event can explain a number of co-occurring events, is not 
evidence of a proven causal link between such events. Grunbaum (1993) maintains that 
inferences derived from thematic kinships between events, no matter how strong, do not 
suffice as proof of a causal link between such events (p.138). In the clinical setting, there 
is no way of proving that a certain remembered or re-enacted event is definitively related 
to an unconscious conflict which has in tum produced certain characteristic observable 
symptoms (Grunbaum, 1993, p.155). 
In regard to time-distant events, the understanding of the patient's resistance of his/her 
transference to the analyst as a re-enactment of earlier unconscious conflict is a 
misguided causal inference made on the basis of thematic affinities existing between the 
present analytic activity and certain earlier events (Grunbaum, 1993, p.152). Grunbaum 
( 1993) argues that the re-enactment of these themes in the transference does not 
necessarily mean that the earlier events caused the characteristics presently observed 
(p.155). Thematic relations do not automatically imply a causal relationship. Grunbaum 
(1993) concludes that scientific proofs for the clinical causal propositions are unlikely to 
be found using the clinical setting alone, because the latter can only generate thematic 
affinities. Grunbaum (1993) suggests that epidemiological and experimental studies are 
more likely to furnish proofs of core clinical propositions than observations and 
inferences derived from clinical case studies (p.162). Core psychoanalytic explanatory 
propositions cannot be validated by means of narrative-hermeneutic or case study 
accounts of clinical phenomena, but must be observed under certain clearly specifiable 
conditions in non-clinical contexts. 
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The following section provides a critical evaluation of both the theoretical assumptions 
underlying the core propositions and the methods proposed for their validation. In the 
light of this critique, the present study proposes a different set of criteria, potentially 
useful in proving or falsifying core psychoanalytic propositions. 
2.4.4 Evaluating the Assumptions Underlying the Core Propositions of Clinical 
Psychoanalysis 
Certain core propositions of the clinical theory, particularly some of those proposed by 
Edelson (1988), contain controversial assumptions about what concepts are relevant to 
psychoanalytic theory and research. In particular, the core concept of psychoanalysis as a 
science of the imagination founded on the operations of the primary process (Edelson, 
1988, p.190) includes assumptions in need of critical examination. Edelson (1988) 
assumes that psychoanalysis is intrinsically more concerned with the relation of wishes to 
imaginative operations, than with the relation of wishes to reality-accommodated beliefs 
and instrumental action (p.161 ). This assumption is controversial because it downplays 
Freud's (1900/199la) focus on how unconscious operations are initiated, viz., that reality-
based thoughts from everyday life provide the necessary material for primary process 
operations to begin to represent an unconscious wish (pp. 750-753). 
2.4.4.1 A Critique ofEdelson's Assumptions 
i) In the classical model, the raw material for dreams consists of secondary process 
contents such as thoughts, ruminations, and interactions with other people that were 
insufficiently attended to during the day. These thoughts are potentially accessible to but 
presently below the threshold of consciousness (Freud, 1900/199la, pp.751-752). This 
preconscious neutral material can be appropriated by an unconscious wish, the primary 
process operations then using this material to express a fantasy fulfilment of this wish 
(Freud, 1900/199la, pp.753-756). Unconscious wishes and primary process operations 
appropriate reality-based material for their own purpose of fantasy production. 
51 
Edelson (1988) assumes that childhood traumas and disturbed object relations 
experiences are not primary causes of unconscious mentation in psychoanalysis, because 
the relationship of fantasy wishes to imaginative operations has first priority (p.161). But 
the present study argues that it is unproven that disturbed object relations and childhood 
traumas do not play a primary role in creating unconscious fantasy-based mental 
processes. Edelson (1988) assumes that primary fantasy material is autonomous in 
relation to object-relational and traumatic material, but this assumption is not based on 
any empirical data. To make this assumption is a fundamental error, because reality-
based material may play a central role in producing unconscious mentation. 
ii) Edelson (1988) addresses the issue of central importance to the present study, viz. 
whether proofs for the core propositions of clinical psychoanalysis can be sought from 
the biological sciences. Edelson (1988) attempts to show that no basis for a dialogue 
exists between neuropsychology and psychoanalysis. He argues that for a causal 
connection to exist between a set of neurological correlates and a set of mental 
operations, each mental operation must be explainable in terms of an invariable set of 
neurological correlates. These correlates must in themselves conform to . a significant 
structure or function at the neuropsychological level of explanation (Edelson, 1988, 
p.137). 
Furthermore, Edelson (1988) proposes that two separate neurological functions are 
needed to ~xplain two different but conceptually related mental operations at the 
psychoanalytic level (p.142). If this can be achieved, then psychoanalysis will eventually 
be reduced to neuropsychology. Edelson (1988) argues that such a direct relationship 
between neurological and psychoanalytic concepts is extremely unlikely, because the 
kinds of regularities and patterns each discipline is looking for are qualitatively different, 
i.e. the two disciplines ask fundamentally different questions (p.139). For example, in 
studying memory the neuropsychologist focuses on the functions and processes 
constituting memory encoding, storage and retrieval, whereas the psychoanalyst is 
interested in why a certain event is consciously recalled at a certain time, and how this 
memory is causally connected to other unconscious mental states such as wishes. 
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Therefore psychoanalytic operations do not conform to a set of neurological functions 
that have conceptual and functional significance at the level of neuropsychology 
(Edelson, 1988, pp.141-142). 
The present study concurs with Edelson ( 1988) that psychoanalysis cannot be reduced to 
neuropsychology (p.142), but argues that causal connections between a 
neuropsychological function and certain unconscious dynamic operations may exist. A 
specific function or group of functions at a neurological level may be the necessary 
condition for the existence of psychoanalytic unconscious mental operations, despite no 
one-to-one correspondence between discrete functions existing across levels of analysis. 
For instance, the location of procedural and episodic memory systems in various limbic 
and cortical brain regions may lead to an understanding of how different encoding, 
storage and retrieval operations within these systems account for unconscious 
manipulation of encoded material. This manipulation of encoded material by memory 
processes may correspond to psychoanalytic unconscious mental processes. 
2.4.4.2 The Counter-Proposals of the Present Study 
Counter-proposal one. 
Contrary to Edelson (1988), the present study proposes that psychoanalysis needs to 
empirically verify whether primordial unconscious operations are endogenously created 
fantasy-based processes, or involve internalised encoding of real object-relational and 
traumatic experiential material. Reality-based material could be a necessary condition for 
the initiation of unconscious operations and the construction of fantasy wishes. 
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Counter-proposal two. 
While Edelson (1988) would concede that interpersonal relations material sometimes 
plays a constitutive role in generating unconscious conflict, he would argue that this 
material is always appropriated by the imaginative operations of the primary process and 
reworked according to the rules of psychic reality (p.161). In anticipating ideas put 
forward by the fourth psychoanalytic response category, the present study proposes that 
interpersonal relations material encoded by infants may play a central role in the 
production of unconscious mentation. Secondly, the present study disputes Edelson's 
(1988) claim that endogenous primary process operations appropriate interpersonal 
material. The present study proposes a different view of the origins of unconscious 
mentation based on empirical evidence from fields outside psychoanalysis. By 
demonstrating that interpersonal relations material contributes to the formation and 
functioning of unconscious mental operations, it cannot be regarded as having only a 
secondary role in the constitution of this mental category. 
Counter-proposal three. 
It is premature for Edelson ( 1988) to dismiss the idea that no causal connections exist 
between neuropsychological findings on memory encoding, storage and retrieval on the 
one hand, and the role of memory in producing unconscious events, beliefs and wishes on 
the other (p.156). Dismissing the idea that psychoanalytic unconscious mental operations 
may be causally connected to significant neuropsychological processes appears to be 
denying a potentially fruitful grounding for these operations before any real inquiry has 
even begun. 
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2.4.5 Formulating a New Approach 
The critical appraisal of the hermeneutic proof criteria for the clinical model of 
psychoanalysis reveals that data from the analytic situation cannot validate the causal 
laws encapsulated by the clinical model's propositions. It emerges that extra-clinical 
methods and sources of information are needed to substantiate or refute the empirical 
existence of these propositions. The present study' s critical examination of the clinical 
model highlights the shortcomings of approaches to unconscious mental functions that 
remain isolated from other contemporary disciplines dealing with mental functions in 
humans, e.g. neuropsychology and infant research. The definition of psychoanalytic 
unconscious operations as a category of mental processes apart from neuropsychological 
constructs, together with the exclusive reliance on clinical data for conceptual 
verification, has ultimately led to a crisis concerning how the core clinical propositions 
may be validated (Grunbaum, 1993, p.162). 
Contrary to the clinical model, the present study proposes that it is methodologically 
necessary for psychoanalytic psychology to engage in a dialogue with biological fields 
such as neuropsychology and infant development, insofar as these areas contain new 
information relevant to the nature of unconscious mental processes. These non-
psychoanalytic domains may thus act as external, independent forms of verification for 
the formulation of a more accurate psychoanalytic model of unconscious mentation. The 
counter-proposals set out in section 2.4.4.2 suggest alternative ways of conceptualising 
the nature of unconscious operations and relevant proof procedures to those traditionally 
advocated by the clinical model. In the discussion of the fourth psychoanalytic response 
to Freud's work outlined in section 2.5 below and in chapter three, it will become 
apparent that some of the conjectures contained in the counter-proposals have already 
been pursued by psychoanalytic theorists (Lacan, 1966/1992, 1973/1977, 1993; Ragland-
Sullivan, 1986; Lichtenberg, 1983; Lichtenberg, 1989; Lichtenberg, Lachmann and 
Fossage, 1992). 
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In particular the clinical model proposition, which views primary process operations as 
the ultimate causes of unconscious mentation, is shown to be highly questionable. In the 
final section of the present chapter, the fourth psychoanalytic response to the problem of 
unconscious mentation posed by Freud's drive terminology will be outlined. This 
response proposes that psychoanalytic unconscious operations are discontinuous from 
underlying biological processes. However, unlike the clinical model, this does not imply 
that there is no relationship between these operations and biological processes. Indeed, 
the relationship between unconscious mental operations and biological-perceptual 
processes articulated in this fourth response has important implications for the present 
study' s contention that external reality-based material is crucial to the formation of 
unconscious mentation. This fourth response is an essential psychoanalytic precursor to 
the infant behaviour and neuropsychological memory research findings to be outlined in 
chapter three - findings that will ultimately contribute to the construction of a new model 
of unconscious mentation. 
2.5 Category Four: Lacan's Reformulation of the Freudian Field 
The work of Jacques Lacan (1966/1992, 1973/1977, 1993) constitutes a detailed 
alternative to the three previous psychoanalytic attempts, outlined above, to circumvent 
Freud's drive terminology when accounting for unconscious mentation. According to the 
Lacanian School, these attempts represent misunderstandings of Freud's original texts 
(Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, pp.5-6), and Lacan re-reads Freud in order to correct these 
misunderstandings (Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, p.ix). This reinterpretation proceeds in the 
light of early research on animal imprinting and infant behaviour (Ragland-Sullivan, 
1986, p.17-18), structural linguistics and the mathematisation of space (Leupin, 1991, 
p.2) that was being done when Lacan was writing and presenting seminars. For the 
purposes of the present study, an account of Lacan's work is restricted to the role that 
drives, biological processes and perceptual identification play in regard to the origins of 
unconscious mentation in young infants. In the Lacanian theory of infant development up 
to 18 months of age, it becomes apparent that these three issues enable Lacanian 
psychoanalysis to: 
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i) Incorporate new findings in biology and infant research that were unavailable to Freud, 
in order to show that, paradoxically, there is a disparity between the development of 
neurobiological systems and psychoanalytic unconscious operations. The key Lacanian 
assumption is that biological immaturity with regard to motor skills during the first 18 
months of life forces the infant to encode perceptual information that cannot be fully 
processed or understood at the time (Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, p.13). This initial biological 
immaturity so constrains information processing that the first mental operations are 
unconscious misrecognitions of events that take place between infant and primary 
caregiver (Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, p.19). 
ii) Establish the importance of primitive perceptual identificatory processes initiated in 
response to external visual and auditory/verbal material impacting on the neonate prior to 
the maturation of the relevant sensory receptor systems (Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, p.19). 
Contrary to both Freud and the proponents of the clinical theory - Edelson (1988) in 
particular - Lacanians propose that unconscious operations are not innate properties of 
human beings, but are initiated as inadequate neonatal and infantile responses to the 
complex visual and linguistic material mediated by the social world, i.e. initially the 
primary caregiver (Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, p.13). 
It is precisely these concerns, i.e. the nature of the relationship between psychoanalytic 
constructs and neurobiological processes, and the empirical constitution and status of the 
first unconscious mental operations, that have been identified as key areas in need of 
investigation by the present study. It is therefore imperative to investigate the way in 
which Lacanians configure these issues. This can best be achieved via an outline of the 
Lacanian account of how infants acquire successive dimensions of mental structure as 
they develop between birth and 18 months of age. 
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2.5.1 The Relationship between Biological Processes and Unconscious Mentation 
2.5.1.1 Biological Immaturity Facilitates the Emergence of Unconscious Operations 
According to Lacan (1966/1992), during the first six months of life the infant is 
physically helpless and has immature sensory-motor capacities (p.4). This physiological 
prematuration constrains the infant, who is embedded in the social world, from efficiently 
processing incoming visual and auditory/linguistic material (Lacan, 1966/1992, p.18, 
p.68). Given the inescapable presence of these stimuli, and this biological immaturity, the 
infant registers sensory information with immature perceptual systems (Lacan, 
1966/1992, p.18). Perceptual abilities are present from birth, but the infant is unable to 
distinguish the perceiving activity from the properties of the external data perceived 
(Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, p.18). There is also a lack of bodily motor co-ordination with 
respect to the infant's dealings with the external world (Lacan, 1966/1992, p.18). 
The assimilation of external material (Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, p.19) takes the form of 
sensory identification (Lacan, 1966/1992, p.18). The infant merges with, i.e. literally 
becomes, the material that it experiences (Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, p.18). This form of 
perceptual processing exists before there is any cognitive capacity to represent visual and 
auditory material as discrete properties separate from the infant's activity (Lacan, 1993, 
p.148, p.165). In other words, identification is a presymbolic unconscious mental 
operation. During the first six months it is the maternal primary caregiver who mediates 
most of the visual and auditory material used in the identification process (Ragland-
Sullivan, 1986, p.25). The identificatory process has a bodily component, i.e. tactile, 
visual and auditory (linguistic) material mediated by the caregiver impacts on the 
perceptual surfaces of the body via the skin, ears and eyes (Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, 
p.20). 
Identification is a result of the infant's non-distinction between bodily responses to the 
stimuli and the information itself (Lacan, 1966/1992, p.18). 
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Touching, seeing and hearing don't discriminate between internal and external stimuli 
from the infant's perspective. The sensations are the infant (Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, 
p.18). Areas of particular sensitivity and significance include the mouth, anus, genitals, 
ears and eyes (Lacan, 1973/1977, p.200). These areas are differentiated from adjoining 
bodily regions because of their specific sensitivity due to the functions they perform, and 
the greater extent to which they have contact with externally mediated stimuli (Ragland-
Sullivan, 1986, p.20). The stimuli leave physical traces on these body surfaces, traces that 
are perceptually encoded in a non-representable presymbolic form of memory (Ragland-
Sullivan, 1986, p.22, p.177). 
2.5.1.2 Environmental Stimuli Condition Unconscious Operations Occurring in the Light 
of Neurobiological Immaturity 
Neonates perceptually encode external stimuli in association with specific body surfaces 
rich in perceptual sensitivity (Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, p.177). This fusion of endogenous 
sensitivity with external sensory stimuli occurs because of a lack of co-ordination 
between sensory and motor systems in the first six months of life. This non-co-ordination 
is facilitated by neurological immaturities affecting the symbolic encoding of visual and 
auditory/ linguistic material (Lacan, 1966/1992, p.19). The first unconscious operations 
involving visual imagery and linguistic sounds emerge due to the relative failure of the 
neonate's neurobiological perceptual capacities to adequately distinguish the discrete 
properties belonging to environmentally mediated material (Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, 
p.18). 
2.5.1.3 The Mirror Stage: maturing Motor Co-ordination Increases the Efficiency of 
Perceptual Processing. Engendering a Transformation in Unconscious Mental Operations 
At six months the infant passes from relative helplessness and biological immaturity to a 
state where it can alter its own spatial relationship to its environment. This is due to the 
development of sensory-motor co-ordination skills that enable control over some 
movements (Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, p.21). 
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This initiates major changes in the infant's bodily perception. From perceiving different 
body surfaces in a disjointed fashion, the different perceptual aspects of the body are 
experienced as a single, interconnected whole (Lacan, 1966/1992, pp.2-3). There is a 
"species-specific active identification with body form" (Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, p.21). 
The infant is able to co-ordinate the disjointed perceptual identification of different 
sensory stimuli with different sensory modalities into a unified :framework of senses and 
motor responses. This enables the body to be perceived as a single, unified entity (Lacan, 
1966/1992, p.21; Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, p.22, 80). 
2.5.2 The First Unconscious Mental Operations: Primary and Secondary Identification 
2.5.2.1 The Constitution of Primary Identificatory Memories 
Ragland-Sullivan (1986) writes that identification involves a fantasy component (p.24). 
The indistinguishable intermixing of external sensory stimuli with the body's perceptual 
activity is encoded and stored without the infant being consciously aware of the resulting 
associational memory network (Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, p.44, 72). In this connection, 
Ragland-Sullivan (1986) writes, "the first act of cognition, then, is a perceptual merger 
with image and sound. The mergers leave behind representational traces forming the 
foundation of a memory bank (p.177)." Visual and auditory/linguistic elements are 
initially encoded as environmental-perceptual fusions lacking the property of conscious 
recognition. This encoding is fantasmatic, i.e. not real, because there is no differentiation 
for the infant between external stimuli and internally generated activity. The encoding 
and storage of this perceptual fusion is the first unconscious presymbolic operation 
performed by the infant. 
2.5.2.2 The Constitution of Secondary Identificatory Memories 
By six months, primary identifications are overlaid by the perception of a cohesive body 
that is nevertheless still undifferentiated :from the tactile, acoustic and visual elements of 
the caregiver (Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, p.26). 
60 
This process of perceptual-motor co-ordination is called secondary identification (p.35). 
Secondary identifications occur due to the formation of connections between previously 
isolated primary identificatory memory networks during their co-ordinated use in the 
performance of new motor skills (Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, p.141). Both forms of 
perceptual identification result in different levels of memory encoding and storage that 
persist in unconsciously conditioning adult perception (Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, p.141). 
These two knowledge systems together constitute what Lacan (1966/1992) refers to as 
the imaginary order (p.35). After six months of age the infant's transactions with the 
primary caregiver are characterised by both forms of perception-based memory encoding 
and storage (Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, p.146). 
2.5.3 The Lacanian Theory of Drives 
2.5.3.1 Drives are not Innate Biological Constructs. but Products of Environmental 
Information 
Lacan (1966/1992) locates the origin of drives in primary identificato~ experiences 
(pp.16-19). In the context of infant need fulfilment the auditory, visual and tactile 
interventions mediated by the primary caregiver give rise to identificatory experiences. 
According to Ragland-Sullivan ( 1986), it is the satisfactory or frustrating nature of these 
perceptual experiences that engenders drive demands, not underlying biological needs 
(p.72). Lacan (1966/1992) distinguishes between a biological need and the mental drive 
demand engendered by infant identificatory experiences when the caregiver satisfies or 
frustrates this need (p. 311 ). Drives are therefore the products of physical needs and 
caregiver-related affective information processed by infants in the context of their 
sensory-motor immaturity (Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, pp.73-74). 
Unlike Freud's drive formulations, the essential component for Lacanians is not a 
somatic or chemical source, but environmental cues emanating from the primary 
caregiver that the infant inefficiently encodes into visual-tactile-acoustic memory traces 
(Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, p.20). 
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Drives are not innate mechanisms as Freud and the object relations theorists maintain, but 
perceptually encoded aspects of interaction information that unconsciously condition 
later responsiveness and behaviour in subjects (Ragland, 1995, pp.42-43). 
2.5.3.2 The Central Importance of the Primary Caregiver in Lacan's Drive Theory 
Lacan fundamentally reformulates drives so they are no longer innate entities having 
neurophysiological origins. Drives do not exist from birth in the neonate, but are built up 
from sounds, smells, images, and objects that are woven into associational memory 
networks through primary identification (Ragland, 1995, p.95). The complex interaction 
between the real responses of the primary caregiver and the real biological needs of the 
infant results in an imaginative, fantasmatic encoding of this experience on the part of the 
infant (Ragland, 1995, p.35). The difference between what really occurs on the level of 
biological need and what the infant imaginatively experiences as satisfaction or 
frustration constitutes the trajectory of a drive. Drives therefore only come into existence 
as a consequence of the infant's immature perceptual encoding of real characteristics of 
the primary caregiver (Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, pp.73-74). 
2.5.3.3 Lacan's Drives do not resemble the Endogenous Entities Described by Freud. 
Lacan's reformulation of drives bears no resemblance to the innate forces defined by 
Freud. Much of Lacan's work presents complex innovations in the guise of Freudian 
concepts with the claim that the meaning of the innovation is really contained in Freud's 
original formulation. However, by understanding drives as encoded sensory-affective 
material derived from the infant's interactions with the primary caregiver, Lacan subverts 
the idea that drives have innate origins. In conclusion, Lacan's drives do not involve 
innate biological forces as they did for Freud, but rather the infantile perception of 
external relational cues. 
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2.5.5.4 Conclusion: Drive Themy is Peripheral to the Core Propositions Contained in the 
Lacanian Account of Early Infant Development 
The core propositions ofLacan's theory of infant development include the following: 
i) Sensory-motor immaturity coupled with perceptual sensitivity to incoming data 
engenders the first unconscious mental operations. 
ii) These operations include presymbolic primary and secondary perceptual 
identifications. 
iii) Both identificatory operations include the encoding and storage of unconscious 
perceptual information into memory networks. 
These propositions can be adequately explained and their validity investigated without 
any reference to drive terminology. In fact, the Lacanian conception of partial and unified 
drives can be entirely formulated in terms of biological needs, interpers~nal relations 
data, affects and perceptual memory encoding, without any direct use of or reference to 
drive terminology. Drive terminology is therefore peripheral to the core concerns of 
Lacan's theory of early infant development. 
2.6 The Relevance ofLacan's Model of Early Infant Development for the Present 
Study 
In section 2.4.4 it was concluded that the proponents of the clinical model of 
psychoanalysis were unable to find adequate proof criteria for their core propositions, for 
the following reasons. Firstly, the establishment of causal relationships is not identical to 
the establishment of thematic affinities between events occurring within the clinical 
context. Secondly, the assumptions underlying some of the core clinical propositions are 
problematic. The present study therefore engages in a critique of the assumptions 
underlying these core propositions, and emerges with counter-proposals. These include: 
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i) That reality-based material may be a necessary condition for the initiation of 
unconscious mental operations. 
ii) That interpersonal relations material encoded in early infant life could initiate the 
earliest unconscious operations, and shape later-maturing symbolic unconscious 
operations. Inasmuch as this early material has a bearing on unconscious mental 
operations, it cannot be regarded as irrelevant or peripheral to the core causal 
psychoanalytic propositions concerning the existence of unconscious operations. 
iii) That it is premature to dismiss the possibility that no causal connections exist between 
neuropsychological findings on memory and linguistic/visual neurocognitive functions on 
the one hand, and psychoanalytic unconscious mental operations involving the 
manipulation of mnemonic material (i.e. wishes, events) on the other. 
It is clear that Lacan makes important and controversial claims relevant to the 
abovementioned three proposals. These claims concern: 
i) The relationship between biological development and unconscious mental operations. 
ii) The early structure of unconscious operations, VIZ. primary and secondary 
identificatory memory encoding and storage of perceptual data in infants. 
The Lacanian positions related to these two key areas are outlined below in order to 
illuminate the resulting lines of investigation pursued by the present study. 
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2.6.1 The Relationship between Biological Development and the Earliest Unconscious 
Mental Operations 
2.6.1.1 Lacanians Propose that Neuropsychological Sensory-Motor Immaturities at Birth 
Shape the Mechanism of Primary Identification 
Lacan, like Edelson (1988), argues that psychoanalytic operations cannot be reduced to 
biological processes, but unlike the latter author he maintains that the two levels are 
related to one another. Biological functions, viz. sensory and motor skills, are crucial to 
the development of unconscious operations from the Lacanian perspective. In chapter 
three the present study investigates the relationship between neuropsychological sensory-
motor functions and unconscious mental operations in neonates, as outlined in the infant 
research literature (Bremner, 1995; Lichtenberg, 1983, 1989; Lichtenberg et al., 1992). 
The aim is to discover if infant research findings can verify the relationship between 
biology and the earliest unconscious mental operations proposed by Lacan - in particular, 
whether immature sensory-motor processes, in response to environmental cues, indirectly 
produce unconscious mental operations in infants (Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, p.19). 
Lacanian psychoanalysis re-opens the debate concerning the relationship between 
unconscious mental operations and underlying neuropsychological constructs 
prematurely foreclosed by the proponents of the clinical model. 
2.6.1.2 Lacanians propose that despite Sensory-Motor Immaturity. Infants are attuned to 
Actively Perceive Environmental Stimuli 
Environmental material processed by immature neuropsychological sensory-motor 
receptors accounts for the initiation of imaginary operations (Lacan, 1966/1992, p.4, 
pp.18-19). Lacan argues that the infant is attuned to the environment from birth, and 
therefore to reality-based material. This material forms the basis of primary 
identifications - the first kind of unconscious mental operation (Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, 
p.13). 
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In chapter three, the validity of the concept of a primordial neonatal attunement to 
environmental stimuli will be assessed with reference to infant research findings 
(Bremner, 1995; Fernald, 1992; Lichtenberg, 1983, 1989; Lichtenberg et al., 1992), given 
that this concept is central to Lacan's account of the formation of unconscious 
identificatory operations. 
2.6.2. The Structure of the Earliest Unconscious Mental Operations 
2.6.2.2 Lacanians propose that the Neonate's Initial Perceptual Encoding of Sensory 
Information Involves an Identificatory Merger 
In the context of survival needs the neonate is forced to assimilate external data, thus 
initiating the first instance of an unconscious mental operation, viz. an identificatory 
merger (Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, p.19). With reference to the infant research literature 
(Bremner, 1995; Fernald, 1992; Lichtenberg, 1983, 1989; Lichtenberg et al., 1992), 
chapter three will attempt to ascertain whether the infant's initial encoding of external 
sensory material embodies an identificatory merger, or another kind of memory encoding 
and storage process. 
2.6.2.3 Lacanians propose that the Primitive Perceptual Encoding of Real Information 
Initiates Primary Identification in Neonates 
From the Lacanian perspective, external material forms the content of the newborn's 
unconscious mental operations. Lacanians claim that primary identification is an 
immature attempt to accommodate sensory material (Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, p.19). In 
chapter three, the present study will attempt to verify the existence of primary 
identificatory encoding, thus substantiating the claims made in counter-proposals i and ii 
concerning the central role that reality-based material may play in the formation of 
unconscious mental operations. 
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2.6.2.4 Lacanians propose that Primary Identification Involves a Presymbolic Memory 
Encoding and Storage Format that is Fundamentally Unconscious 
Lacanians connect primary identification to the evolution of discrete memory networks, 
and in this sense unconscious mental operations and memory traces imply a mutual co-
existence from the time of the infant's initial perceptual mergers with external data 
(Ragland, 1995, p.108). In chapter three the present study will investigate whether 
memory encoding and storage systems in infants persist as unconscious mental processes, 
as the proponents of primary identification claim. Memory is a major neuropsychological 
construct, and neuropsychological studies of memory in developing infants may clarify 
whether structures exist that enable neonates to encode experience in formats akin to the 
perceptual formats of primary and secondary identification (Johnson & Morton, 1991 ; 
Butters and Squire, 1992; Lichtenberg, 1983, 1989; Lichtenberg et al., 1992). 
2.6.2.5 Lacanians propose that Immaturities in Memory Contribute to the Inaccessible 
Nature of Information Encoded During Primary Identification 
If it can be verified that immature neuropsychological memory processes in neonates 
contribute to a distorted encoding and storage process, this finding would support 
Lacan's view that immature biological functions account for the fantasmatic nature of the 
first mental operations and memories. With reference to the literature on 
neuropsychological studies of memory and memory distortions (Ceci, 1995; Squire, 
1995), chapter three will investigate the evidence for memory encoding and storage 
distortions in young infants. 
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2.6.2.6 Lacanians propose that Sensory-Motor Skill Co-ordination. Perceptual Processing 
Efficiency and Memory Processing Efficiency Co-evolve to Produce Secondary 
Identification 
Memory traces derived from primary identifications are gradually co-ordinated into an 
associational memory network by developments in motor co-ordination. This enables the 
perceptual-motor encoding of the body as a cohesive form, and this encoding operation 
constitutes secondary identification (Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, p.21). Emerging sensory-
motor co-ordinations enable corresponding changes in processing efficiency and mutual 
linking of discrete traces to occur in perceptual and memory systems, resulting in 
secondary identificatory encoding and storage (Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, pp.21-22). 
Sensory and motor memory traces that formerly would have received isolated storage are, 
after six months of age, linked into more complex sensory-motor trace networks. In 
chapter three references are made to the infant research and neuropsychological memory 
literature in order to examine the evolving relationship between sensory-motor skills, 
perceptual processing, and memory systems from birth to 18 months of age (Bremner, 
1995; Ceci, 1995; Lichtenberg, 1983, 1989; Lichtenberg et al., 1992; Squire, 1995). The 
nature of the links between these three aspects of the developing infant will be assessed 
in order to ascertain whether they contribute towards a mental operation akin to 
secondary identification. 
2. 7 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined how the problematic relationship within psychoanalysis 
between unconscious mental processes and biological processes, initiated by Freud, has 
generated: 
i) A multitude of different post-Freudian discourses on appropriate ways of formulating 
unconscious constructs. 
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ii) A nwnber of debates over the role biology may play in relation to both conceptualising 
and validating unconscious mental processes in psychoanalysis. 
Despite the inevitable conceptual and epistemological modifications that have occurred 
within the psychoanalytic field concerning adequate proof criteria, these have not ruled 
out the possibility that the biological sciences may yet contribute towards the validation, 
refutation or modification of psychoanalytic unconscious mental constructs. In this 
regard, the proposals contained in the Lacanian perspective on early infant development 
have clearly demonstrated that there is little consensus within psychoanalysis in general 
concerning how biological functions and reality-based material enter into the formation of 
unconscious mental operations. Lacanian psychoanalysis re-opens the debate concerning: 
i) The relationship that exists between biological development and reality-based material. 
ii) The relationship that exists between biological functions, unconscious mental 
operations and reality-based material. 
In relation to these two concerns, seven core proposals have been extracted from the 
Lacanian infant development theory. That a combination of biological functions and 
reality-based material may engender the formation of unconscious mental operations 
necessitates an investigative dialogue between the relevant Lacanian proposals and 
findings in the biological sciences that may validate, refute or modify these asswnptions. 
This position of dialogue in order to validate or modify current psychoanalytic knowledge 
and debate is adopted by the present study. Chapter three begins by investigating whether 
the seven proposals on unconscious operations outlined in section 2.6 above can be 
validated or modified by comparing these concepts to relevant infant observation and 
neuropsychological research findings. 
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This investigative dialogue addresses the issue of biological development in relation to 
brain functions and perceptual-motor activity, how the developing human infant encodes 
external perceptual material into memory, and whether these memories are related to the 
development of unconscious mental processes. 
CHAPTER THREE: LACAN, INFANT RESEARCH, NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 
AND THE IMPORTANCE OF MEMORY FOR A NEW MODEL OF 
UNCONSCIOUS MENTATION 
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Chapter two concluded that the Lacanian theory of early infant development contained a 
number of controversial proposals concerning: 
i) The relationship between biological development and reality-based material. 
ii) The relationship between biological functions, unconscious mental operations 
(primary and secondary identifications), and reality-based material. 
In sections 3 .1, 3 .2, and 3 .3 below, the seven Lacanian proposals covering these two 
issues will be critically examined in relation to findings in the fields of infant research 
and neuropsychological memory studies (Bremner, 1995; Ceci, 1995; Fernald, 1992; 
Janowsky, 1993; Lichtenberg, 1983, 1989; Lichtenberg et al., 1992; Nelson, 1993; 
Parkin, 1993; Squire, 1995). In particular, attention will be paid to the roles that memory 
encoding and storage functions play in regard to the constitution of unconscious mental 
processes. Infant research and neuropsychological memory constructs are used in order to 
evaluate, and where applicable modify, the ideas contained in the Lacanian proposals. 
The second part of chapter three outlines Lichtenberg's (1989, 1992) model of 
presymbolic unconscious mentation, which draws explicitly on infant research and 
neuropsychological memory constructs. While this model accords with the Lacanian 
proposals in stressing the importance of infant perceptual and mnemonic processes for 
the constitution of unconscious mentation, it represents a more explicit integration of 
psychoanalytic constructs with infant research and neuropsychological memory findings. 
In particular, this theory explicitly connects the neuropsychological concepts of episodic 
and procedural memory with the development of presymbolic unconscious operations. As 
such, it represents a more contemporary integration of many of the ideas contained in the 
Lacanian proposals. 
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An outline of Lichtenberg et al's (1992) theory will illustrate the use made of episodic 
and procedural memory constructs in accounting for unconscious mentation. These 
constructs are imported from neuropsychology, but are not explicitly connected to 
specific anatomical brain locations by Lichtenberg (1989). There are no explicit links 
made between unconscious mental operations, memory constructs, and anatomical 
systems in the brain, although these links are indirectly inferred in Lichtenberg's model 
(1989, Lichtenberg et al., 1992). The section concludes with an outline of the present 
study's original contributions to be presented in chapters four, five and six. 
3.1 The Relationship between Biological Development and Reality-Based Material 
3 .1.1 Lacanians propose that Neuropsychological Sensory-Motor Immaturities at Birth 
Shape the Mechanism of Primary Identification 
The infant research findings appear to focus more on the sensory-motor abilities of 
neonates than on their immaturities. However, researchers acknowledge that the neonate 
is characterised by sensory-motor immaturity and lack of co-ordination in relation to 
external stimuli. Gaining motor control and co-ordination is a gradual process, and 
locomotion is an important step in the infant's development of spatial perception 
(Bremner, 1995, p.34). According to Lichtenberg (1989), sensory-motor co-ordination 
begins to occur when the infant is able to track both the internal information arising from 
its own actions, and the sensory feedback of the object world acted upon (p.24). 
Bremner ( 1995) states that motor development and spatial orientation gradually improve 
between six and 18 months (p.163). Motor control over bodily rotation precedes bodily 
displacement, the latter kind of motor control only being mastered in the act of crawling 
(p.163). The two types of motor co-ordination are only co-present at approximately 18 
months of age. 
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Bremner (1995) argues that the spatial transformations that occur once infants can crawl 
and sit up by themselves mean that they process more sensory information about the 
world in different ways, and that their spatial orientation abilities mature once underlying 
motor co-ordination has been achieved (p.162). It is therefore accurate to describe the 
infant between birth and at least six months as lacking sensory-motor co-ordination. 
Motor events leading to locomotion facilitate the infant's perceptual abilities by matching 
proprioceptive and visual information (Bremner, 1995, p.175). This implies that the lack 
of motor co-ordination at birth contributes to the limitations in the infant's perception of 
sensory stimuli. The sensory-motor immaturity of the infant up to at least six months, 
noted in observations of infant development, provides initial support for the above 
Lacanian proposal. However, it still needs to be verified whether neonatal environmental 
information extraction (perception) and encoding (memory) processes function according 
to the concept of primary identification proposed by Lacanians. 
3 .1.2 Lacanians propose that Despite Sensory-Motor Immaturity, Infants are attuned to 
Actively Perceive Environmental Stimuli 
The existence of a primordial attunement to various forms of sensory data, particularly 
visual and acoustic data, is unambiguously supported by the infant research literature. In 
regard to visual attunement, neonates have poor visual acuity (Bremner, 1995, p.102~ 
Mehler and Dupoux, 1990, p.49), but they are able to discern the true shapes of objects 
(Bremner, 1995, p.102), classify colours (Mehler and Dupoux, 1990, p.59), and use 
dynamic depth cues to spatially situate the objects perceived (Bremner, 1995, p.99). 
Research shows that neonates can hear better than they can see (Mehler and Dupoux, 
1990, p.51 ). Auditory skills include attending to certain prosodic cues in speech, 
orientating towards and recognising the primary caregiver' s voice and preferring it to a 
stranger's, and being affected by the alterations in intonation in the primary caregiver's 
vocalisations (Fernald, 1992, pp.402-404). Mehler and Dupoux (1990) state that neonates 
organise acoustic material into rhythmic groupings, i.e. distinct "sound streams", as 
opposed to discerning an unstructured cacophony (pp.68-69). 
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Furthermore, Bremner (1995) cites evidence that neonates are able to make audiovisual 
matches, i.e. intersensory links, in relation to specific speech sounds and facial imagery 
(p.113). There is also evidence that tactile sensations may be matched with visual cues 
from as early as the first month of infancy (Bremner, 1995, p.116). The above findings 
support the Lacanian proposal of a primordial neonatal attunement to environmental 
stimuli. However, they do not necessarily validate Lacan's concept of primary 
identification with regard to the perceptual processing and encoding of auditory, visual, 
and tactile information prior to six months of age. 
3.2 The Relationship between Biological Functions, Unconscious Mental Operations 
and Reality-Based Material 
3 .2.1 Lacanians propose that the Neonate's Initial Perceptual Encoding of Sensory 
Information Involves an Identificatory Merger 
3.2.1. l Perception 
The evidence concerning how infants initially perceive external stimuli is incomplete. 
Research indicates that infants younger than six months perceive objects as permanent 
entities, understand that objects can move relative to each other, and that objects can 
obstruct one another (Bremner, 1995, p.142). However, there are limitations to the young 
infant's perceptual abilities. For example, infants under four months do not understand 
the laws of gravity in relation to objects, and tend to treat two objects in proximity as if 
they were a single unit (Bremner, 1995, p.144). Nevertheless, neonates' perceptual 
systems are more sophisticated than originally thought, for they are able to extract three-
dimensional visual cues inherent in environmental information (Bremner, 1995, p.175; 
Mehler and Dupoux, 1990, pp.95-96). 
There is now evidence that visual three-dimensionality is constructed by the initial 
perceptual analysis of the retinal image, rather than by a higher cognitive interpretation of 
a two-dimensional retinal image (Bremner, 1995, p.118). 
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According to Bremner (1995), infants have to learn to construct the social meanings and 
functions of objects, not their three-dimensional realities (p.176). Young infants also 
appear to have cross-modal perceptual abilities. Chugani, Phelps and Mazziotta (1993) 
used positron emission tomography measures of local cerebral metabolic rates for 
glucose (LC:MRG) to show that, between two and three months of age, there are increases 
in LCMRG in brain structures connected to visuospatial and visuo-sensorimotor 
integration (p.138). These brain structures include the parietal cortex, primary visual 
cortex, and the cerebellar hemispheres (p.138). The evidence indicates that infants under 
six months have considerably developed connections between visual and other 
sensorimotor modalities. 
The Lacanian proposal of primary identificatory fusions with discrete audio, visual, and 
tactile sensory details may underestimate the young infant's ability to combine audio, 
visual and tactile data when perceiving three-dimensional objects. However, the concept 
of primary identification needs to be re-evaluated from the perspective of the new 
evidence, rather than summarily dismissed. Young infants still have to learn the social 
meaning of what they perceive, and these meanings change continuously in line with 
evolving perceptual abilities such as visual acuity, visual contrast sensitivity, and 
auditory localisation during the first six months of life (Bremner, 1995, p.60, p.108). 
While perception of three-dimensional objects may exist from birth in rudimentary form, 
the physical, perceptual and social properties of objects evolve as new adjustments in 
visual, spatial and auditory orientation become possible. 
Bremner (1995) argues that the spatial transformations that occur once infants can crawl 
and sit up by themselves means that they process more information about the world from 
different perspectives, and that spatial orientation abilities depend upon underlying motor 
co-ordination (p.162). The ability to sit up (six months) and to begin crawling (10 
months) facilitates change in perceptual abilities because the ·infant is able to match new 
proprioceptive and visual information. Changes in postural and locomotive abilities 
therefore mediate changes in the quality and meaning of perceptual input. 
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Up to six months of age, infants have blurred vision and their other perceptual abilities 
are limited by their locomotive, visual and postural inadequacies.Infants can focus on and 
co-ordinate the audio, visual, and tactile aspects of three-dimensional objects within their 
limited visual field (Bremner, 1995, p.58). However, once these objects are removed 
from their field of vision this co-ordination falls away. As the primary caregiver enters 
and leaves the visual field of the neonate, moments of audio-visual-tactile co-ordination 
in relation to the sensory aspects of the caregiver are followed by complete sensory 
absences, or by absences in one or more sensory modality, e.g. vision, that result in the 
disruption of the earlier experience. Temporary identificatory mergers with the three 
main sensory inputs from the primary caregiver are followed by moments where different 
sensory mergers occur, viz. where one or more sensory modality is temporarily 
withdrawn. For example, the primary caregiver can be heard but not seen or felt. A 
sensory merger can also be replaced by a moment of sensory absence in relation to the 
specific object being focused upon, e.g. when the primary caregiver leaves the room. 
Infant research findings therefore suggest that primary identificatory mergers may 
include co-ordinations of all three sensory modalities, or inputs from only one or two 
modalities. 
Lichtenberg (1989) notes that young infants not only possess an inter-modal perceptual 
capability, but that perception occurs in concert with motor activities and emotional 
reactions (p.26). Perceptual experience is always integrated into an activity and an affect 
context, so that in infant experience there is no clear distinction between perceiving an 
object and the actions performed in relation to the object (Lichtenberg, 1983, p.100). 
Lichtenberg maintains that young infants respond to external stimuli in terms of 
integrated perceptual-affective-action patterns (1989, p.26). This lack of differentiation 
between affect, motor reactivity, and perceptual co-ordination of sensory stimuli suggests 
that these different types of data are merged in infant experiences of moments of 
interaction with the primary caregiver. Primary identifications therefore need to be 
reformulated as perceptual-affective-action sequences that are encoded by infants during 
their ongoing encounters with the primary caregiver and other objects. 
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This type of perceptual processing dominates experience prior to six months of age, after 
which motor developments mediate changes in the quality and efficiency of perceptual 
data processing. The encoding of experience in terms of fused perceptual-affective-motor 
action sequences represents a more detailed description of the infant perceptual encoding 
process than that originally described by the Lacanian concept of primary identification. 
3 .2.1.2 Memory 
Bremner (1995) reports that by three months infants encode the properties of various 
stimuli (p.67), and that evidence exists that newborns encode auditory information for a 
few hours, or possibly even days (p.68). Parkin (1993) notes that neonates can recognise 
and learn a particular stimulus, but recall is something that only emerges in late infancy 
(p.150). Furthermore, early memory is highly context-dependent, for a similar activity in 
a different context will not be recognised in relation to the previous learning situation 
(p.150). Memories cannot be recalled unless adequately encoded and stored, and initial 
encoding depends on the state of the cognitive neuro-architecture functioning at any 
given age (Ceci, 1995, p.95). In neonates and young infants, this neuro-architecture is 
apparently immature. Infant development studies have found evidence from habituation 
that young infants encode perceptual stimuli, but it appears this occurs without any 
reflective or recollective capacity in relation to the perceptual contents (Janowsky, 1993, 
p.669). This ties in with the Lacanian perspective on primary identification, where 
perceptual mergers resulting in memory traces cannot be recognised or reflected upon by 
the young infant. 
It has been suggested that early perceptual encoding in neonates and young infants 
involves a single generic memory system that initially records all perceptual stimuli, and 
then proceeds to retain those that recur while discarding those that do not (Nelson, 1993, 
p.363). Experiential events in young infants are only stored temporarily because the long 
term storage for this type of memory depends on areas of the neocortex (Squire, 1995, 
p.214) which only function efficiently after myelination of this region occurs at 18 
months of age (Lichtenberg et al., 1992, p.47) .. 
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Infant memory stores therefore consist of generic schemas extracted from many 
individual perceptual experiences. Discrete perceptual-motor-affect mergers with the 
primary caregiver and the surrounding world are initially encoded as separate episodes. 
These episodes are transformed into common schemas, i.e. nonconscious generic 
knowledge, if similar experiential sequences recur (Nelson, 1993, p.379). This concept of 
infant memory encoding appears to coincide with the Lacanian position on primary 
identif;ication, viz. that the infant cannot differentiate itself from the information it 
encodes and stores as memory. In terms of the infant research memory model, this lack of 
differentiation occurs because perceptual stimuli are encoded as nonconscious sensory-
motor skills, habits (Squire, 1995, p.207) or generic schemas (Nelson, 1993, p.379), 
rather than discrete perceptual episodes which the infant can consciously recognise. From 
this perspective, individual perceptual-action-affect sequences either decay or are 
reorganised into a nonconscious, impersonal memory system. 
3.2.1.3 Fantasy 
Memory encoding is an outcome of perceptual analysis (Squire, 1995, p.199), and 
therefore the infant's perceptual-motor immaturities will contribute to distortions in 
memory encoding. For example, encoding will reflect the neonate's poor visual acuity 
and lack of sensory-motor co-ordination. These perceptual distortions will in tum become 
part of the infant's initial generic knowledge schemas. Inasmuch as generic memories 
contain limitations in perceptual processing, they represent distorted fantasy 
reproductions of external perceptual cues. Therefore Lacanians are correct in proposing 
that perceptual processing limitations, amounting to fantasmatic distortions, permeate the 
infant's initial memory schemas. 
3.2.2 Lacanians propose that the Primitive Perceptual Encoding of Real Information 
Initiates Primary Identification in Neonates 
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The outline of infant perceptual and memory processes in section 3 .2.1 above appears to 
support the Lacanian concept of identificatory mergers, although infant research findings 
enable a more precise reformulation of this concept in terms of perceptual-activity-affect 
sequences. It is found that early infant constraints in perceptual, motor, and memory 
processing account for distortions in the encoding of environmental material consistent 
with the Lacanian concept of primary identificatory mergers. Furthermore, it is clear from 
the infant research findings that environmental cues form the basis of memory content 
and initiate the memory encoding process in young infants. This view accords with the 
Lacanian contention that real external information acts as the catalyst that initiates the 
primary identification process. Finally, the nonconscious, generic perceptual memory 
networks that receive permanent storage in young infants are compatible with the 
Lacanian concept of presymbolic unconscious memory networks encoded as a result of 
primary identifications. 
3 .2 .3 Lacanians propose that Primary Identification Involves a Presymbolic Memory 
Encoding and Storage Format that is Fundamentally Unconscious 
Generic knowledge schemas correspond to data abstracted from discrete perceptual and 
motor responses and are completely nonconscious (Squire, 1995, p.207), i.e. they are 
unavailable at the time or later as discrete events or facts (p.218). Generic schemas are 
expressed as nonconscious behaviour without any conscious sense of memory being 
involved (Squire, 1995, p.207). Storage of individual events cannot occur given the 
immaturity of the relevant neocortical structures (Squire, 1995, p.214), and there is no 
representation of self or sense of autobiographical continuity inherent in the infant's 
generic knowledge schemas (Squire, 1995, p.219). Therefore this presymbolic infant 
memory system accords with the Lacanian concept of primary identifications that are 
inaccessible to the conscious autobiographical memory system operative in older children 
and adults. 
3 .2.4 Lacanians propose that Immaturities in Memory Contribute to the Inaccessible 
Nature of Information Encoded During Primary Identification 
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The immaturities in perceptual processes, coupled with the abstract nature of generic 
memory encoding in young infants, are responsible for the inaccessible nature of early 
infant experiences. Memory encoding occurs on the basis of perceptual analysis (Squire, 
1995, p.199), and generic memory schemas will to some degree preserve the early 
distortions in perceptual abilities, e.g. poor visual acuity and lack of stereoscopic vision 
(Bremner, 1995, p.102), because memory can only encode what perceptual analysis 
provides. Therefore the Lacanian contention that immaturities in infant memory 
processes contribute to the inaccessibility of information encoded during primary 
identificatory mergers is supported by current findings on generic memory in infants. 
3.2.5 Lacanians propose that Sensory-Motor Skill Co-ordination, Perceptual Processing 
Efficiency and Memory Processing Efficiency Co-evolve to Produce Secondary 
Identification 
According to Bremner (1995), motor development and the spatial orientation dimension 
of perception both gradually improve between six and 18 months of age (p .163). Bremner 
(1995) argues that once infants begin to crawl and sit up by themselves, they are able to 
process more visuospatial information about the world in different ways, i.e. their spatial 
orientation abilities mature once underlying motor co-ordination occurs (p.162). Bremner 
(1995) concludes that motor events leading to locomotion facilitate the infant's 
perceptual abilities by prompting co-ordination between proprioceptive and visual 
information (p.175). By six months, infants sit up using their arms as supports, enabling a 
major change in spatial orientation to surrounding stimuli to occur (Bremner, 1995, p.33). 
New proprioceptive and visual matches become possible based on this innovation in the 
infant's posture. 
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Given that memory encoding depends on the underlying complexity of perceptual 
analysis, new matches of proprioceptive with visual data enabled by sitting up will not 
only facilitate changes in visuospatial processing, but also in memory encoding (Squire, 
1995, p.199). According to Squire (1995), procedural memory consists of patterns of 
similarity and change registered by perceptual systems, these patterns being encoded as 
new skills or habits (p.207). 
Changes in motor and perceptual abilities will be initially encoded as novel episodes 
before being re-organised into generic memory schemas, providing they are repeated. 
New generic memories reflect new information regularities encapsulated by developing 
motor and perceptual co-ordination skills. New generic memories in tum facilitate further 
co-ordination of sensory and motor data processing. The changes in postural and 
perceptual abilities at six months means that the infant experiences a shift in relating to 
his/her body and the primary caregiver. Changes in perception and locomotion will be 
reflected in the infant's ongoing emotional encounters with the primary caregiver. The 
generic memory knowledge system enables the infant to automatically compare current 
perceptual-affective-action sequences to existing schemas, and to construct new 
associations and co-ordinations within and between different schemas (Nelson, 1993, 
pp.372-373). 
For instance, infants at five months are able to detect mismatches between proprioceptive 
and visual stimuli in relation to limb movement, indicating that they have begun to 
discriminate between and co-ordinate different modes of sensory data in relation to 
bodily movement (Bremner, 1995, p.206). These new perceptual and motor data co-
ordinations condition the encoding of new generic memory schemas. In turn, these new 
generic schemas, once stored, will enable improved co-ordination between visual, 
proprioceptive and motor data. Current generic memory schemas will reflect innovations 
in sensory and motor processing, and enable these co-ordinations and comparisons to be 
consolidated in long-term storage. 
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The co-ordinations enabled by the earliest generic memory schemas allow the infant at 
five months to match limb movement patterns with the visual experience of their own 
limbs in action, and this eventually facilitates visual self-recognition (Bremner, 1995, 
p.206). Furthermore, at six months infants are able to take account of bodily rotation due 
to their improving spatial orientation with regard to perceptual stimuli (Bremner, 1995, 
p.163). These new perceptual-motor co-ordinations achieved at six months suggest that 
memory- as an outcome of perceptual analysis (Squire, 1995, p.199)-will reflect these 
changes in its encoding and storage operations. 
Based on these findings, the present study contends that, between five and six months, 
disparate body parts are integrated into a whole body schema, as visual information 
pertaining to body movement is connected to proprioceptive sensations stemming from 
whole body rotation and limb movements. In tum, these co-ordinations are encoded and 
stored as a generic memory schema representing a map of the infant's body as a whole. 
There is therefore a co-ordination between maturing perceptual, motor, and memory 
processes that accounts for an emergent body-based self-concept by six months of age. 
This accords well with the Lacanian concept of the six-month-old infant shifting from a 
fragmented body-experience to a cohesive experience of having a whole body, and hence 
being a unified, cohesive person (Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, p.21, p.25). Infant research 
findings indicate that infant self-perception also develops in relation to the behaviour of 
others, specifically the primary caregiver. The infant begins to perceive the behaviour of 
others as being directed towards his/her body-self (Bremner, 1995, p.206). 
This appears to contradict the Lacanian assumption that secondary identification with a 
whole body-self does not involve any differentiation between the infant and the primary 
caregiver as separate people {Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, p.24). Research shows that young 
infants readily perceive people, differentiate objects from people, and are capable of 
detecting the emotions of others, but these abilities do not necessarily depend on any 
reflective awareness of the difference between self and others (Bremner, 1995, p.207). 
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There is a need to distinguish between infants' social interactive abilities, whereby they 
give the appearance of treating the caregiver as a separate person, and a later knowledge 
of self and other within the context of social relationships. The latter knowledge is made 
possible only by symbolic representation (Bremner, 1995, p.207). Between 18 and 21 
months of age infants perceive their mirror image as an indicator of cohesive selfhood, 
for they connect the activity in the mirror image to their own actions (Lichtenberg, 1983, 
p.105~ Howe and Courage, 1997, p.506). This mirror test corresponds to the development 
of a representational self-concept that supersedes the earlier perceptually orientated body-
self image (Bremner, 1995, p.256). 
Prior to 18 months infants may engage in purposeful interactions with the primary 
caregiver, but there is no representational or self-reflective ability on their part (Howe 
and Courage, 1997, p.507). The infant's body-based self at six months includes neither a 
symbolic referent, nor a sharp differentiation between the infant's activity and the 
caregiver's interventions. The infant's initial responsiveness to others is framed in terms 
of imitating and mirroring others' activities, without yet making a conceptual distinction 
between itself and others as separate entities (Howe and Courage, 1997, p.507). In this 
sense, the development of a bodily self-concept at six months initially exists without any 
sharp conceptual differentiation between self and other in relation to the infant's ongoing 
interactions with the caregiver. This infant research finding accords with the Lacanian 
idea that secondary identification involves a lack of a formal differentiation between the 
infant's experience of itself and of the caregiver. 
3.3 Summary: The Central Importance of Memory Constructs in Constituting 
Unconscious Mental Operations 
The present study uses neuropsychological research on memory in concert with infant 
research findings to throw light on the veracity of the seven proposals put forward in the 
Lacanian account of the development of the first unconscious mental operations. The 
main findings of this comparative analysis are presented below. 
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i) Firstly, the Lacanian account of the relationship between biologically immature 
sensory-motor functions and the development of the first unconscious mental operations 
coincides with infant research accounts of immaturities in early sensory-motor data 
processing systems. These sensory-motor limitations are carried over into the subsequent 
memory encoding and storage of external information. 
ii) Se~ondly, the Lacanian concepts of primary and secondary identification coincide with 
infant research and neuropsychological memory accounts of infant perceptual-action-
affect sequences that undergo significant perceptual-motor and memory reorganisation at 
six months of age. 
iii) Thirdly, and most importantly for the present study, the connection between 
perceptual response systems and the development of unconscious memory implicit in the 
Lacanian approach to unconscious mental operations is reiterated by the infant and 
neuropsychological memory research conception of a nonconscious generic memory 
system in infants. 
Lichtenberg (1989) and Lichtenberg et al. (1992) have used infant research and 
neuropsychological memory findings to develop a memory model of unconscious 
mentation that supersedes all previous drive, object relations, and hermeneutic/clinical 
psychoanalytic models of unconscious mentation. In the following section this memory 
model is described, with particular attention given to how it fits with the perception-
memory model of unconscious mentation that has taken shape in relation to the seven 
Lacanian proposals outlined above. The Lichtenberg model accords with the Lacanian 
proposals in stressing the importance of early perceptual and mnemonic processes in 
generating unconscious mentation. However, it represents a more explicit integration of 
psychoanalytic constructs with infant research and neuropsychological memory findings. 
In particular, this model connects the neuropsychological concepts of episodic and 
procedural memory systems with the development of presymbolic unconscious 
operations. As such it represents a more contemporary formulation of many of the ideas 
contained in the Lacanian proposals. 
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3.4 Lichtenberg: Unconscious Processes and Memory Encoding 
Lichtenberg (1989) uses infant research findings to identify five classes of basic activity 
into which neonates' pre-adaptive behaviours can be divided (p. l). These categories are: 
the psychic regulation of physiological requirements such as sleeping, eating and waste 
elimination; attachment-affiliative activities, including clinging, crying, and following; 
exploratory and assertive activities; aversive activities of antagonism and withdrawal; and 
activities bound up with sensual enjoyment and sexual excitement (Lichtenberg, 1989, 
p. l). In line with contemporary neuropsychological memory studies, Lichtenberg 
concludes that these five basic classes of activity facilitate sets of stereotypical 
experiences that are encoded from birth as unconscious procedural memories 
(Lichtenberg, 1989, p.276). Procedural knowledge is not directly accessible to 
consciousness because it consists of skills abstracted from the residues of common 
schematic activities rather than individual autobiographical events (Baddeley, 1992, 
p.311). This concept is similar to Nelson's (1993) model of generic schemas (p.363). 
Simultaneously, singular events, i.e. schematic activity sequences occurring on possibly 
only a single occasion, are coherently structured by episodic memory (Baddeley, 1992, 
p.311 ). Infantile schematic activities in combination with caregiver responses form 
perceptual-affective-action sequences, and these constitute the earliest discrete affective 
events (Lichtenberg et al, 1992, p.67). Episodic encoding occurs when a single sequence 
is characterised by intense affects (Lichtenberg et al., 1992, p.70). When similar events 
are repeated, they form a generalised schema from which all idiosyncratic event features 
are discarded (Nelson, 1993, p.363). According to Lichtenberg, isolated traumatic events 
are special situations that despite only occurring once or twice in infancy may receive 
long-term encoding in procedural and/or episodic memory because of their affective 
intensity (1989, p.281). 
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3.4.1 The Presymbolic Dimension of Unconscious Mentation 
Infant research findings prompted Lichtenberg et al. (1992) to define a realm of 
unconscious thought that in some ways parallels, but also differs from the Lacanian 
concept of primary and secondary identification (p.67). The five-system model identifies 
a number of different dimensions of presymbolic unconscious mentation. 
3. 4 .1. 1 Unconscious Information Processing Rules 
Lichtenberg et al. (1992) propose that there is a level of fundamental unconscious 
mentation (p.67). This consists of innate rules or pattern regulators that structure the way 
in which raw sensory-experiential data is selected, organised and encoded as procedural 
and episodic memory (Lichtenberg et al., 1992, p.67). These rules of organisation 
actively structure the environmental information that infant's process in terms of the five 
schematic activity classes (p.67). According to Lichtenberg et al. (1992), as action 
sequences for each class of activity unfold, so positive or aversive affects are triggered 
(p.69). Innate rules govern the infant's re-creation of familiar affect states, whether these 
are positive or aversive (p.69). Other rules include information-processing principles that 
govern maintenance of interest in the light of the novelty or familiarity of external stimuli 
(Lichtenberg, 1989, p.276). Lichtenberg et al (1992) conclude that uncoded rules 
determine which action sequences will be encoded as procedural memory and which as 
episodic memory, while another rule codes for different motivational choices, e.g. 
prioritising the repetition of familiar affect states (p. 70). In tum the outcomes of the 
motivational selection process are encoded as either procedural, episodic knowledge, or 
both. 
This system of innate information processing rules appears to conflict with the Lacanian-
infant research view of unconscious mentation outlined above. Lacanians would deny 
that primordial unconscious mental operations are innate. 
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They would argue that it is precisely because the innate biological perceptual processing 
capacities of the infant are immature that the distorted perceptual processing and 
encoding of sensory experience typical of unconscious primary and secondary 
identifications occur at all. It could be argued that Lichtenberg et al (1992) gloss over the 
fact that i) the innate processing rules are initially very primitive, ii) they are prone to 
distorting incoming data, and iii) incoming data actively organises these rules in tum. On 
the other hand, because Lacanians stress that innate processes are immature, they tend to 
undervalue the degree to which these processes do contribute to the distorted encoding of 
external data associated with primary and secondary identifications. While environmental 
information constitutes the vital raw material of the first unconscious operations, innate 
information processes - the sensory and motor attunement characteristics of neonates -
encode this raw material. In tum this encoded raw material proceeds to organise and 
shape the encoding rules in the perceptual and motor areas of the brain, something that 
Lichtenberg et al. (1992) concede (p.70). 
It is important to stress that these pattern regulators are not stored unconscious memory 
contents, but conform to episodic and procedural information processing principles -
empty in themselves - that are instrumental in the perceptual and memory analysis of 
environmental inputs. These pattern regulators coincide to some degree with the primary 
and secondary identi:ficatory mechanisms of the Lacanian School. Both schools agree, 
unlike other psychoanalytic models, that presymbolic perceptual-mnemonic encoding and 
storage mechanisms are central to an understanding of unconscious mental operations. 
These nonconscious information processes are permanently unavailable to symbolic 
representation and consciousness (Lichtenberg et al., 1992, p.91). 
3. 4 .1.2 Presymbolic Procedural Memories 
Lichtenberg et al. (1992) state that procedural memory contents encoded and stored prior 
to the linguistic and imagistic modes of symbolic representation are remote from 
awareness, but as nonconscious habits and emotional dispositions they can influence 
symbolic behaviour and emotional expressiveness (p.91). 
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Lichtenberg et al. (1992) neglect to add that procedural memories, whether developing 
prior to or after symbolic representation, are inaccessible to conscious recall, because 
they are nonconscious skills, habits and dispositions that manifest behaviourally rather 
than as representable knowledge systems (Squire, 1995, p.207). This is true even for 
procedural memories that are only encoded once symbolic representation is operating. 
For instance, the rules governing the correct use of language are procedural in the sense 
that the user is completely unconscious of their existence but nevertheless embodies their 
use in spoken discourse. Procedural schemas develop in relation to activities regulating 
physiological requirements, attachment/affiliation needs, exploration/assertion needs, 
sensual/sexual sensations and aversive responses. 
3. 4 .1. 3 Presymbolic Episodic Memories. 
Perceptual-activity-affect sequences in infants, encoded as episodic memories, often find 
expression as bodily or sensory experience if they are not re-coded into symbolically 
organised memories (Lichtenberg et al., 1992, p.91). Episodic memories refer to the 
encoding of perceptual, motor, and affect information into a coherent event structure. 
Positively toned episodic memories encoded prior to symbolic representation will be 
actively sought and repeated by infants, leading to their reorganisation into abstract 
generic memory schemas. Generally speaking, positive events encoded prior to 18 
months of age will not be individually stored on a long-term basis, but will be 
amalgamated into nonconscious generic schemas once similar instances recur. 
According to Lichtenberg et al. (1992), the myelination of the cerebral hemispheres, 
beginning at 18 months, is a necessary condition for linguistic and visuospatial 
processing in cortical association areas to begin (Lichtenberg et al., 1992, p.67). These 
formats reorganise current procedural and episodic memories into new representational 
forms. However, the transformation to efficient symbolic functioning is a gradual 
process, and as a result both positive and aversive episodic memories occurring prior to 
and during this reorganisation period are very inefficiently encoded and stored in terms of 
the new formats. 
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In effect, most pre-existing presymbolic episodic memories are not successfully 
reformatted, and remain unavailable to linguistic and complex visuospatial symbol 
systems. 
Apart from positive presymbolic episodic memories, which are generally reorganised 
into generic schemas, presymbolic aversive events may occur that have a high affective 
impact (Lichtenberg, 1989, p.281). Lichtenberg (1989) suggests that prior to 
symbolisation these events may be stored in two different ways. Either the event is 
particularised, in the sense that it pre~ipitates a narrow response such as aversive 
withdrawal from the stimulus, or it is generalised into a global behavioural procedural 
schema that shapes infant responses to a wide variety of experiential stimuli apart from 
similar aversive events (Lichtenberg, 1989, pp.281-282). The concept of particularisation 
implies that isolated aversive episodes may in some cases receive long-term storage 
outside of the infant's generic memory network. Lichtenberg et al (1992) affirm this 
implication when they state that fundamental unconscious mentation consists of both 
episodic and procedurally encoded presymbolic material (p.74). 
3.5 Developing a Memory Model of Presymbolic Aversive Unconscious Mentation 
The outline of presymbolic unconscious mentation presented above has many features in 
common with the perspective outlined in relation to the Lacanian proposals. Firstly, while 
Lichtenberg et al's (1992) model does not emphasise the initial limitations of 
unconscious information processing rules, these limitations are implicit in their 
distinction between presymbolic perceptual-affective-activity sequences and the symbolic 
reorganisation of experience in children and adults. Secondly, understanding the 
perceptual and affective dimensions of infant activity sequences in terms of raw material 
for presymbolic memory encoding operations accords with the Lacanian view on sensory 
information and perceptual processing being integral to primary and secondary 
identifications. 
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Thirdly, in accordance with the Lacanian School, Lichtenberg explicitly acknowledges 
the importance of memory systems in structuring presymbolic unconscious operations 
and information systems. Unconscious mental operations are inseparable from perceptual 
processing, memory encoding, and long-term storage functions. However, the use of the 
procedural and episodic memory constructs enables the emergence of a more detailed 
understanding of presymbolic unconscious mentation than that contained in the critical 
appraisal of the seven Lacanian proposals. In particular, the proposed presence of 
presymbolic aversive episodic memories in addition to a generic memory system in 
infants suggests a new specificity in demarcating different categories of unconscious 
mental process having significance for human motivation. In this context, Lichtenberg et 
al. (1992) identify an aversive knowledge system integral to the structure of human 
subjectivity (p.153). 
It follows that presymbolic aversive memories form a component of this system. Both 
acute and chronic aversive episodic material has an important role to play in structuring 
memory systems in young infants. However, Lichtenberg et al's (1992) theory of 
unconscious aversive presymbolic memories exists only in a provisional, speculative 
form. The theory is supported in a general way by the myelination of the cerebral cortex 
after 18 months, and neuropsychological theories of episodic/generic and procedural 
knowledge encoding in young infants and toddlers (Lichtenberg et al., 1992; Nelson, 
1993; Squire, 1995). In the context of this ongoing attempt to integrate a psychoanalytic 
view of unconscious mentation with relevant knowledge from the biological sciences, the 
present study attempts three original contributions. 
i) The Lichtenberg model will be used as a starting point for the empirical grounding of 
presymbolic aversive unconscious mentation via reference to neuropsychological studies 
of memory. In chapter four the present study will demonstrate how aversive episodic and 
procedural memories are encoded and stored by an array of anatomically distinct brain 
functions embodying the diverse components and processes making up these memory 
formats. 
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The brain regions responsible for regulating presymbolic procedural and episodic 
encoding and storage of aversive knowledge will be described via reference to 
neuropsychological studies of memory. The present study intends to show how cortical 
and sub-cortical brain regions responsible for encoding and storing externally mediated 
aversive information in infants engender a fundamental level of presymbolic unconscious 
processes in human subjects. 
ii) The grounding of a presymbolic aversive memory system in diverse brain regions may 
establish how aversive events and their procedural responses are stored in different brain 
regions so that they come to have long-term motivational significance for the subject. 
Chapter five demonstrates that the presymbolic memory model enables a new 
understanding of how presymbolic, and later symbolic, aversive events interact to create 
dynamic unconscious operations that accord with the psychoanalytic conception of 
unconscious mental dynamics. The memory model developed in the present study 
therefore aims to provide a reconceptualisation of psychoanalytic unconscious mentation 
that is more empirically viable than those offered by the other psychoanalytic paradigms 
discussed. 
iii) The study concludes in chapter six with an exploration of how the presymbolic 
memory model may contribute towards an understanding of different types of memory 
distortion. This exploration includes a) applying the presymbolic memory model to 
understand how false memories of infant trauma may arise, and b) applying the model to 
more adequately explain the dissociation of true memories of abuse and their later 
involuntary recall within the context of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). By 
offering new insights into these memory distortions, the present study attempts to 
demonstrate the explanatory efficacy of the presymbolic memory model beyond the 
theoretical parameters within which it was originally developed. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: IBE NEUROLOGICAL MECHANISMS OF PRESYMBOLIC 
MEMORY 
In chapter three the memory research literature was cited in order to show that memory 
encoding and storage in infants under 18 months of age conforms to a nonconscious 
system of generic schemas that cannot be consciously recalled (Nelson, 1993, p.363). 
However, later in the same chapter it was stated that in addition to this form of 
unconscious memory, isolated aversive events with a high affective valence might be 
encoded into a particularised trace containing information about the context (the episode) 
and the associated fright response (procedure) in presymbolic infants (Lichtenberg, 1989, 
p.281 ). In fact a major debate exists within the neuropsychological memory research 
literature concerning whether infants under 18 months actually encode anything that 
corresponds to a discrete episode or event structure, and whether such episodes are 
maintained in long-term storage as discrete entities. 
In the present chapter it is argued that infants do encode information into event episodes, 
and that this is particularly likely to happen when unusual, aversive incidents occur. 
Furthermore, the aversive quality of the stimulus ensures that such events receive long-
term storage. The present study considers aversive affect to be a key encoding and 
storage property of events in infancy and it is therefore integral to the establishment of a 
presymbolic unconscious memory system. The debate concerning encoding and storage 
of events in infancy, and the role of aversive affect in this process is outlined in section 
4.1 below. This section is an essential precursor to section 4.2 in which the present 
study's main task of constructing a developmental model of presymbolic memory is 
presented. Presymbolic memory is defined as an unconscious, non-linguistic event and 
corresponding procedural response memory system that develops in infants between birth 
and 28 months of age. The present study contends that this event and procedural response 
system in turn influences later symbolic functioning in a number of different ways. These 
are described in the following two chapters. 
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4.1 The Debate Concerning Infant Memory 
4.1. l Early Infant Memory Episodes Are Not Stored 
Lichtenberg maintains that infants encode and store experiential sequences as event-
episodes due to their highly aversive content that does not fit into any pre-existing 
positive memory schema (1989, pp.45-47). Furthermore, the aversive affect may ensure 
encoding of traces representing individual episodes rather than generic schemas even if 
similar events reoccur during the presymbolic stage of development (Lichtenberg, 1989, 
p.283). Therefore, a class of early episodic memories and corresponding procedural 
responses are created because of the aversive affects integral to the original infant 
experiences (Lichtenberg, 1989, p.283). Stein (1996) argues in support of this view that 
children younger than 24 months encode emotional nonverbal event memories (p.173). 
When an event is unusual or violates prior knowledge schemas as occurs with preverbal 
aversive affects, the event structure is tagged as differing from other generic schemas, 
and so is stored in discrete episodic form (p.184). 
However, the idea of aversive episodes receiving long-term memory storage in infancy 
has until recently been rejected by most neuropsychological memory researchers. The 
prevailing view proposes two distinct memory encoding and storage systems in the brain 
that correspond to declarative (explicit, episodic, event-centred) and nondeclarative 
(implicit, procedural, habit-based) memories (Squire, 1995, p.207). Episodic/event 
encoding depends on the activation of the Medial Temporal Lobe (MTL), viz. the 
hippocampus and adjacent cortical areas. These traces are in tum relayed to multiple 
regions of the neocortex where long term storage occurs (Squire and Zola, 1996a, p.186). 
The dual systems model argues that while MTL episodic encoding occurs in infants, the 
neocortical storage regions are comparatively slow to mature and so encoded episodes 
cannot be placed into long-term storage in these regions (Squire, 1995, p.214). Therefore 
infantile episodic traces decay and this explains the absence of permanent 
autobiographical event memories prior to two years of age. 
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This model argues that nondeclarative-procedural memory encoding does not involve the 
MTL system. but includes a number of different brain regions that encode and store 
motor conditioning rules, emotional response conditioning rules, habit schemas, 
perceptual schemas, and cognitive skills outside the neocortex (Poldrack and Gabrieli, 
1997, p.304, p.306; Squire, 1995, p.192; Squire & Zola, 1996a, p.192). Squire (1995) 
maintains that no direct interaction or information exchange occurs between event and 
procedural memory systems, and that only non-declarative/procedural memories receive 
long-term storage in neonates and young infants (p.209). 
4.1.2 Early Infant Memory Episodes are Stored but cannot be Retrieved 
The argument opposing infant memory episodes focuses on infantile amnesia. This 
concept describes the absence of consciously recalled events for the period between birth 
and 36 months of age, and is cited as proof that pre-verbal infants lack the capacity for 
long-term episodic storage. However, a careful analysis of the properties of infantile 
amnesia reveals that immature linguistic, visuospatial, and strategic memory retrieval 
functions account for the lack of consciously recalled autobiographical memories from 
the infancy period, not the absence of stored pre-verbal memory episodes per se. In 
section 4.1.2.3 below the main properties of infantile amnesia are briefly outlined in order 
to distinguish between verbal event memories that can be consciously retrieved, and the 
potential existence of preverbal event memories that may persist in long-term storage 
despite lacking the information parameters required for conscious retrieval. 
4.1.2.3 The Case for the Retrieval Failure of Early Infant Memories 
Tessler and Nelson (1996) argue that the advent of verbal discourse abilities enables a 
spatio-temporal narrative construction of events to be encoded after 36 months of age 
(p.102). The authors concede that infants encode preverbal episodic memories but these 
are unavailable to the later developing autobiographical storage system (p.113). 
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Non-aversive episodes are generalized into generic schemas, while isolated aversive 
episodes decay, as they cannot be integrated within the later developing parameters of 
verbal discourse (p.116). Events encoded prior to three years lack the verbal narrative 
structure necessary for their rehearsal and subsequent integration into long-term 
autobiographical memory storage. 
The present study argues contrary to this view that verbal autobiographical memory co-
evolves with efficient memory retrieval functions, and has no relationship to long-term 
storage capacity. Autobiographical events are not stored differently from preverbal 
episodes; rather the former possess retrieval codes that the latter do not have. Therefore 
amnesia for events occurring prior to 36 months of age is caused by the absence of viable 
retrieval codes for episodic traces stored up to this age, not an absence of stored episodes 
per se. The present study contends that the emergence of verbal skills in toddlers is a 
product of prefrontal cortex maturation. These verbal skills in turn facilitate the prefrontal 
cortical ability to develop retrieval strategies for episodes in cortical storage. The 
temporal and spatial markers contained in verbally formatted memory episodes serve as 
retrieval parameters for the prefrontal cortex. 
Many linguistic information processes occur in the prefrontal cortex (Buckner, 1996, 
p.156; Nyberg, Cabeza, and Tulving, 1996, p.145; Passingham, 1993, pp.260-261), in 
areas identical or adjacent to those responsible for strategic memory retrieval (Poldrack 
and Gabrieli, 1997, pp. 300-301; Fletcher, Frith, and Rugg, 1997, p.217; Tulving and 
Markowitsch, 1997, p.212). This indicates that verbal discourse and memory retrieval 
abilities mutually implicate one another, and are located in adjacent or overlapping 
prefrontal regions that mature at roughly the same age (Fuster, 1997, pp.453-455). The 
ability of toddlers aged 36 months to verbally recall events in contrast to younger infants 
who lack verbal recall (Tessler and Nelson, 1996) suggests that competent language use 
coincides with the prefrontal strategic memory ability to use temporal and spatial cues as 
retrieval markers for memory episodes at the time of their storage. 
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While the prefrontal cortex is crucial for the development of verbal skills and memory 
retrieval, it does not play a significant role in the storage of many memories. The present 
study accepts that prefrontal-mediated verbal skills and memory retrieval abilities are 
collectively involved in the conscious recall of autobiographical episodes after 3 years of 
age. This does not preclude the possibility that prior to the evolution of prefrontal verbal 
retrieval strategies, non-verbal memory episodes receive long-term storage. Such 
episodes would merely lack the information parameters necessary for concurrent or 
future retrieval into a conscious verbal format. The following section explores problems 
pertaining to the storage.of pre-verbal episodes during the infancy period. 
4.1.2.4 Problems with Long-term Episodic Storage in Infants 
Episodes encoded in infancy are reorganised into generic memories. 
The late onset of episodic memory in comparison to procedural memory proposed by the 
dual systems infantile amnesia model has recently been challenged by a number of 
researchers (Nelson, 1993; Howe and Courage, 1997; Rovee-Collier, 1997). Research 
conducted by Rovee-Collier (1997) refutes the assumption that episodic memories 
develop later than implicit-procedural memories. At three and six months specific details 
concerning the context of a learning situation are retained by infants, implying that 
specific episodes are encoded from at least three months of age (p.486). By six months of 
age infants form associations between independent episodic memories on the basis of a 
common or similar context (Rovee-Collier, 1997, pp.489-490). The linked memories are 
thereafter integrated into a common generic memory network (Rovee-Collier, 1997, 
p.490). 
Nelson (1993) similarly proposes that infants encode activity-affect sequences into 
episodes, but once these re-occur, common features are abstracted and re-organised into 
script-like schemas corresponding to a generic memory system (p.373). 
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According to Nelson (1993) non-recurring events are maintained in a separate, temporary 
episodic format before decaying due to their lack of common features and adaptive 
significance (p.373). Therefore episodic memories in infants are temporary holding 
patterns, rather than long-term memory traces (p.373). While some researchers no longer 
dispute the encoding of event episodes during infancy, the above authors do not endorse 
the long-term storage of such representations. 
The "where" oflong-term aversive episode storage 
According to Howe and Courage (1997) traumatic pre-verbal episodes persist as separate 
traces because their uniqueness enhances encoding and storage, while non-aversive pre-
verbal episode traces decay because they have less emotive impact as individual 
occurrences (p.514). The latter are integrated into generic schemas that are stored long-
term. It is only with the development of gestural, visual, and linguistic processes that 
non-aversive events are more easily encoded, stored and retrieved as discrete episodes 
(Howe and Courage, 1997, pp.513-516). In preverbal children aversive episodes are 
encoded but are inaccessible to conscious recall because they lack t.he necessary 
visuospatial and linguistic information parameters (Howe, Courage, and Peterson, 1996, 
p.140). In these cases the central details of aversive episodes are nonconscious but remain 
in storage, as evidenced by their long-term expression as nonconscious behaviours 
(p.140). 
The present study maintains that isolated aversive events receive long-term episodic 
storage because their emotional consequences have greater adaptive significance for the 
subject than non-aversive events. The role of aversive affect in the long-term storage of 
preverbal infant memories is corroborated by findings that independently verified infant 
traumas occurring prior to 28 months cannot be recalled as explicit events (Goodman, 
Quas, Batterman-Faunce, Riddlesberger, and Kuhn, 1996, p.4), but remain available as 
nonconscious behavioural memories (p. 7). 
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Despite aversive affect enhancing the encoding and storage of pre-verbal episodes, the 
question must still be asked where and how such information can be stored, given that 
neocortical association and prefrontal areas involved in linguistic episode storage are not 
sufficiently operational prior to 28 months of age. 
4.2 Expanding the Theory: How Infant Memories are Stored 
4.2.1 Overview 
4.2.1. l Neocortical Primary Sensory and Motor Networks Store Memories from Birth 
The answer to the question of where presymbolic aversive event traces are stored lies in 
identifying anatomically differentiated processing hierarchies in the brain for both 
procedural and episodic memory systems (Fuster, 1997, p.452). The onset of efficient 
function in different anatomical layers at different developmental ages is influenced by 
maturational factors in the brain. Developmentally and anatomically speaking the first 
memories are encoded and stored in simple neural networks in the respective sensory and 
motor areas of the cortex (Fuster, 1997, p.452). It is feasible that preverbal aversive 
episodes could receive long-term storage in these primary sensory and motor neocortical 
receptor areas. Cortical functions in the first month of life are limited to the primary 
sensory (auditory, visual and tactile) and motor areas (Chugani et al., 1993, p.137). 
There are anatomically separate sensory areas for processing auditory, visual, and tactile 
data in the deeper cell layers of the posterior cortex, and these same areas are responsible 
for storing single sense component memory traces (Fuster, 1997, p.454). Similarly, the 
simplest and developmentally the earliest motor responses are initiated and stored in the 
brainstem, cerebellum, and primary motor area of the frontal lobe cortex (Fuster, 1997, 
p.455). 
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4.2.1.2 The Role of the Medial Temporal Lobe (MTL) in Presymbolic Episode Storage 
The MTL serves as an intermediary between the unimodal sensory memory traces of the 
sensory cortical areas and the multi-sensory trace networks of the association cortical 
areas (Fuster, 1997, p.452). Fuster (1997) stresses that the MTL is pivotal in integrating 
unimodal sensory information into an episodic trace prior to transmitting this information 
to the neocortical association areas (p.452). It is the contention of the present study that 
prior to the maturation of the multi-sensory association cortical areas in pre-verbal 
infants, the MTL encodes unimodal sensory and motor information into an event episode 
and then relays this representation back to the primary sensory-motor cortex. The 
individual data components constituting the trace receive long-term storage in the 
relevant sensory and motor networks of the primary layer of the cortex. 
4.2.1.3 The Limbic System Co-ordinates Episodic and Procedural Memory Organization 
in Infants 
There are reciprocal connections between the lower areas of the motor cortex and the 
sensory areas of the posterior cortex, indicating that there is ready communication 
between sensory and motor functions (Fuster, 1997, p.455). A vital link between the 
primary sensory input and motor output areas of the brain is the limbic system, including 
MTL structures, the amygdala, and parts of the basal ganglia, thalamic nuclei, and 
cerebellum (Braak, Braak, Yilmazer, and Bohl, 1996, pp.266-267). The present study 
maintains that from shortly after birth the limbic region integrates disparate sensory-
motor information components and encodes these into episodic and procedural memory 
representations. Furthermore, this region is instrumental in facilitating the long-term 
storage of both types of memory. 
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4.2.1.4 Objectives of the Presymbolic Memory Model 
In the light of the above three points, the present study firstly intends to provide a 
detailed description of the neurological mechanisms that are operative during the 
encoding and long-term storage of episodes in infants up to 28 months of age. This will 
enable the present study to offer a detailed solution to the problem of where pre-verbal 
episodes are stored and why verbally competent subjects cannot consciously retrieve 
them after the fact. Secondly, in the course of the above description certain connections 
are outlined between episodic and procedural memories. In terms of the model described 
episodic and procedural memory traces are viewed as different processing records of the 
same external stimulus. Episodic event encoding constitutes a record of an aversive 
stimulus experience, whereas the procedural skill sequence constitutes the record of the 
adaptive or maladaptive response to this experience. Therefore the model critiques the 
idea of dual memory systems operating separately from one another. Instead it proposes a 
single interactive cortical memory storage system consisting of episodic and procedural 
information components that are encoded and reactivated by different processing 
modules in the limbic system. 
Thirdly, the present study describes how presymbolic memory traces stored in the 
primary sensory-motor cortex unconsciously shape the storage, retrieval, and behavioural 
responses to later-occurring stressors in verbally competent subjects. It will be 
demonstrated in chapter five that this function of the presymbolic memory system has 
important implications for reconceptualising unconscious dynamic processes in the 
discipline of psychoanalysis. Section 4.2.2 below describes the neurological mechanisms 
involved in the encoding and storage of presymbolic episodic memory, while section 
4.2.3 outlines the mechanisms involved in the organization of presymbolic procedural 
memory. 
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4.2.2 Presymbolic Episodic Memory 
From evidence outlined in section 4.1 it appears that aversive affect possesses properties 
that facilitate encoding and long-term storage of events in young infants (Howe and 
Courage, 1997; Goodman et al., 1996; Stein, 1996). Re-occurring non-aversive 
presymbolic events are generally transformed into generic schemas and thereafter decay 
in their episodic forms prior to the advent of linguistic and visuospatial encoding 
parameters. The present study therefore argues that i) aversive affect is the most 
important cue for maintaining preverbal episodic traces in individualized storage, and ii) 
individual presymbolic episodes in long-term storage represent aversive events. 
4.2.2.1 The Amygdala and Presymbolic Aversive Episodes 
The amygdala activates hormones that enhance the encoding and storage of 
aversive information. 
The amygdala is a limbic system processing region involved in the modulation of all 
emotionally charged stimuli (McGaugh, 1995, p.259). The amygdala modulates the 
encoding of aversive environmental cues (Ledoux and Muller, 1997, p.1724), including 
fear and anxiety based information (Davis, Walker, and Lee, 1997, p.1675; Ledoux and 
Muller, 1997, p .1719). Despite distinguishing between these different kinds of aversive 
information, it is not the long-term storage site for aversive episodes (Davis et al., 1997, 
p.1685). The amygdala responds to aversive information by activating noradrenergic 
systems, which in turn enhance long-term storage of aversive events in other brain 
regions (McGaugh, .1995, p.265). This hormonal evidence supports the present study's 
contention that aversive affect enhances encoding and storage of information, thereby 
acting as an important presymbolic memory cue. 
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The amygdala is connected to the MTL region responsible for e_pisodic encoding. 
The amygdala is connected to both the hippocampus and the entorhinal cortex (Braak et 
al., 1996, p.272), both of which form part of the MTL system. McGaugh, Cahill, and 
Roozendaal (1996, p.13512) maintain that the amygdala influences the encoding and 
temporary storage of aversive information in the hippocampus via mediating changes in 
the plasticity of neuronal connections in the latter region. This strongly suggests that the 
amygdala enhances the hippocampal encoding of aversive episodic memories. The 
release of noradrenergic hormone cascades by the amygdala in response to an aversive 
stimulus may contribute to the robust encoding of the stimulus into an event by the MTL 
system. In order to explore how aversive presymbolic episode encoding and long-term 
storage occur in the aftermath of amygdala modulation, it is necessary to outline the role 
of i) the hippocampus, ii) the adjacent MTL regions, and iii) their transactions with the 
primary sensory and motor cortical receptor networks. 
4.2.2.2 The Medial Temporal Lobe (MTL) Circuit 
The MTL is divided into a number of substructures, including the hippocampus, 
entorhinal cortex, perirhinal cortex, and parahippocampal cortex (Eichenbaum, 
Schoenbaum, Young, and Bunsey, 1996, p.13500). The last three cortical regions mature 
prior to neocortical association layers, and provide the main connecting pathways 
between the hippocampus and the different areas of the cortex, including the primary 
sensory and motor regions. Recent findings show that separate regions of the MTL 
process different aspects of memory, so in the present outline the functions pertaining to 
each substructure and their connections with other substructures will be presented in sub-
sections for the sake of clarity. 
The hippocampus. 
As noted in section 4.2.2.1 above the amygdala modulates hippocampal encoding and 
neuroplasticity (McGaugh et al, 1996, p.13512). 
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Arnygdalar neuromodulatory responses to affective stimuli facilitate the release of 
plasticity-related proteins in the hippocampus that stabilize memory and result m 
prolonged temporary storage for emotional events in the hippocampal template (Morris 
and Frey, 1997, p.1489). Discrete event episodes are encoded and temporarily stored as 
changes in synaptic weights (Morris and Frey, 1997, p.1489). The modulatory role of the 
amygdala suggests that aversive episodes are retained for longer periods in the 
hippocampal template than emotionally neutral events because they trigger greater 
changes in synaptic plasticity. While positive events initially receive equally robust 
encoding, the greater likelihood of their routine re-occurrence means they are not retained 
in the event template for very long. The fate of positive presymbolic events is outlined in 
the description of the functions of the parahippocampal and perirhinal cortices below. 
The hippocampus has three mam functions pertaining to the general encoding and 
organisation of episode traces. Firstly it detects novel stimuli (Morris and Frey, 1997; 
Knight, 1996), in other words it distinguishes which incoming stimuli are unfamiliar in 
amongst those that match with previously encoded episodes. Secondly, the hippocampus 
automatically encodes simplified, compressed representations of events in specific 
contexts (Morris and Frey, 1997, p.1489), i.e. it integrates disparate sensory and motor 
data components into a unified episode trace. Separate cortical sensory inputs including 
visual-spatial, auditory, and tactile information components are combined with body-
rotation and movement information from the frontal and parietal motor cortices to form 
episodes (Eichenbaum et al., 1996, p.13500; Berthoz, 1997, pp.1443-1446). 
Thirdly, the hippocampus reactivates presymbolic episode traces and transfers them to 
the neocortex for long-term storage. Hippocampal traces degrade because new traces 
disrupt the synaptic weights constituting an earlier episode (McClelland, McNaughton, 
and O'Reilly, 1995, p.441). The hippocampal storage system has a limited capacity that 
cannot maintain a record of all the information it continuously encodes, so traces are re-
directed for long-term storage elsewhere as soon as possible. According to Murre ( 1996) 
the hippocampus initiates and directs the long-term storage of episodes in the neocortex 
via spontaneous reactivation (pp.676-677). 
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During reactivation a trace ts transferred from the hippocampal template and 
decompressed into its sensory and motor components in the entorhinal cortex 
(McClelland et al., 1995, p.452). These components are thereafter relayed to anatomically 
distinct areas of the cortex for long-term storage (Murre, 1996, p.677). Once relocated in 
the cortex, the discrete sensory, motor, and affect components of an episode are initially 
linked via a few weak connections spanning great distances between different cortical 
areas (Murre, 1996, p.677). Further spontaneous hippocampal reactivations consolidate 
these cortical associations between the different trace components until the trace network 
is sufficiently robust that continued hippocampal storage of the episode is unnecessary 
(Murre, 1996, p.677). In pre-verbal infants, only primary sensory and motor areas of the 
cortex would be involved in storing the reactivated components of presymbolic episodes. 
The entorhinal cortex. 
The entorhinal cortex lies between the parahippocampal and perirhinal cortices, and 
receives most of its sensory-motor inputs via these regions, which it in tum passes on to 
the hippocampus (Squire and Zola, 1996b, p.13518). When a hippocampal trace is 
reactivated for neocortical storage, the entorhinal cortex is involved in re-inscribing the 
trace back into its sensory-motor components (McClelland et al., 1995, p.452). 
The perirhinal and parrahippocampal cortices: Presymbolic generic memory 
schemas. 
Mishkin, Suzuki, Gadian, and Vargha-Khadem (1996) maintain that the perirhinal and 
parahippocampal cortices are responsible for primitive semantic memory encoding, i.e. 
factual data schemas are derived from generalisations of individual episodes encoded by 
the hippocampus (p.1465). The parahippocampus encodes schemas representing general 
spatial properties (Eichenbaum et al., 1996, p.13505), while the perirhinal cortex 
integrates visual, auditory, and tactile information to encode object schemas (Gaffan and 
Hornak, 1996, p.1484). 
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The parahippocampal and perirhinal cortices analyse new sensory features in order to 
differentiate between familiar and novel spatial properties and object schemas. Non-
matching information is relayed to the hippocampus, which encodes data into novel 
episodes. Matching features are integrated into pre-existing schemas in the 
parahippocampal and perirhinal cortices. Parahippocampal-perirhinal encoding supports 
the concept of generic memory schemas for re-occurring events in preverbal infants as 
outlined in chapter three (Nelson, 1993). Due to the greater likelihood of non-aversive 
presymbolic events being sought after and purposely repeated by infants in comparison to 
aversive events (Lichtenberg, 1989, p.280), the present study maintains that non-aversive 
episode traces are shunted out of hippocampal novelty storage and into the 
parahippocampal-perirhinal generic system once they re-occur. 
Aversive presymbolic episodes, because of their unusual affective valence, generally 
unwelcome presence, and intrinsic adaptive significance, are more resistant to generic 
reorganisation even once they re-occur. Aversive traces are therefore likely to remain in 
hippocampal storage long enough for repeated reactivations to ensure their transferral and 
storage in multiple cortical regions. The participation of the perirhinal and 
parahippocampal cortices in the re-distribution of episodic memory components to 
neocortical sensory-motor areas during hippocampal reactivation (McClelland, et al., 
1995, p.452) suggests that generic schemas are reactivated and re-distributed to 
neocortical sensory-motor areas in the same way. In young infants the long-term storage 
of generic memories will be confined to networks spanning the functional sensory and 
motor areas of the neocortex. Presymbolic aversive episodic and non-aversive generic 
memories therefore receive long-term cortical storage via the mediation of the 
hippocampal and parahippocampal-perirhinal regions. 
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4.2.2.3 The Role of Cortical Regions in Presymbolic Episodic Mem01y 
The role of the prunary sensory and motor cortex m presymbolic aversive 
episodic storage. 
Research reveals that the cortical areas involved in perceptual analysis also function as 
memory storage facilities (Gaffan and Hornak, 1997, p.1484). Modality-specific auditory 
and tactile sensory cortical networks involved in analysing incoming information store 
memories of elementary sensations (Fuster, 1997, p.454), while polymodal sensory areas 
analyse, encode, and store co-ordinations of all three sensory modalities (Fuster, 1997, 
p.454; Zola, 1997, p.452). That unimodal cortical sensory cell layers are fully functional 
from birth (Chugani et al., 1993), suggests that these areas together with later maturing 
polymodal layers respectively store discrete sensory components and more complex 
sensory co-ordinations of pre-verbal episodes during infancy. 
The MTL system acts as the control centre for episodic encoding and long-term storage 
(Murre, 1996, p.676). During encoding the MTL integrates disparate information 
components from the sensory cortex with an affective analysis of the same information 
from the amygdala. The MTL initiates and directs the long-term storage of episodic and 
generic memories in the neocortex via the reactivation process (Murre, 1996, p.677). The 
present study contends that when presymbolic aversive episodes are spontaneously 
reactivated, their individual components are redistributed to the primary sensory and 
motor cortical areas. Repeated MTL reactivations ensure that many robust point-to-point 
associative connections are established between isolated sensory components in order to 
consolidate an episodic trace network in long-term cortical storage (Murre, 1996, p.677). 
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Presymbolic episodic memories are unavailable to prefrontal cortical retrieval 
strategies. 
In adults and older children the prefrontal cortex performs a variety of executive 
functions in relation to episodic memory organisation including the voluntary conscious 
retrieval of stored events. It is important to ascertain when this retrieval function occurs 
in order to understand the implications it has for the conscious accessibility of previously 
stored presymbolic aversive episodes. The mature prefrontal cortex is responsible for the 
temporal ordering and retrieval of autobiographical episodes (Badderly, 1992, p.26; 
Moscovitch, 1992, p.9; Poldrack and Gabrieli, 1997, p.301). 
Research on verified instances of traumatic events that occurred before 28 months of age 
indicates that the resulting episodic memories remain unavailable to conscious voluntary 
retrieval once the infants involved became competent verbal discourse users after this age 
(Howe, Courage, and Peterson, 1996, pp.140-141; Terr, 1996, p.74). Prefrontal retrieval 
functions only reach a degree of observable efficiency in toddlers between 28 and 36 
months of age, for episodes encoded during this later period were verbally recalled in a 
proficient and routine manner (Terr, 1996, p.74; Tessler and Nelson, 1996, p.103). 
Therefore the prefrontal cortex is only mature enough to ensure consistent conscious 
verbal retrieval of events after 28 months of age (Terr, 1996, p.74; Tessler and Nelson, 
1996, p.103; Zola, 1997, p.453). 
In the light of these findings, it appears that Lichtenberg's assumption that presymbolic 
memories begin to be reformatted into linguistic and sophisticated visuospatial 
parameters from around 18 months of age (1983, 1989, Lichtenberg et al., 1992), may be 
retained as long as it is recognised that this process is more gradual than anticipated. By 
18 months visuospatial processing has progressed to the point where infants have 
developed a visual sense of self illustrated by the mirror-rouge test (Bremner, 1995; 
Howe and Courage, 1997; Lichtenberg, 1983). Howe and Courage (1997) argue that 
visual self-recognition at 18 months is a necessary prerequisite before episodes can be 
organised into an autobiographical memory system (p.506). 
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The present study accepts this observation, and contends that in the 18 to 36 month 
period infants normally undergo a gradual re-organisation from presymbolic (i.e. 
preverbal) to symbolic (i.e. verbal discourse) processing of memory episodes. At 28 
months verbal reorganization is normally still so incomplete that episodic memories 
encoded and stored up to this age are essentially presymbolic, for they are unavailable to 
later voluntary prefrontal retrieval as verbally formatted autobiographical memory 
episodes (Terr, 1996, p.74). 
4.2.2.4 Summaiy: Presymbolic Episodic Memory 
In light of the above findings, the present study argues that the prefrontal memory 
retrieval system appears to operate primarily in terms of linguistic processes that underlie 
both its own functioning and that of verbal discourse. The above findings on absence of 
recall for traumatic incidents occurring prior to 28 months of age illustrate that prefrontal 
retrieval is essentially a verbal memory recall system. In contrast, presymbolic episodes 
consist mainly of raw sensory data, and therefore the prefrontal system cannot access 
these memories stored in this pre-linguistic format. Episodes encoded after .18 months of 
age rapidly accumulate linguistic data components, but up until 28 months there are 
usually still too few components in individual trace networks to enable the prefrontal 
cortex to re-organize episodes into a linguistic-verbal format. The present study contends 
that it is only when the number of linguistic data components in an episodic trace 
network reach a certain critical number that the prefrontal retrieval system is able to 
reformat the memory. This critical number of operative linguistic information 
components usually occurs in the period between 28 and 36 months of age. Prior to this 
critical accumulation of linguistic information components, episodic memones are 
essentially presymbolic and unavailable to conscious verbal recall. 
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4.2.3 Presymbolic Procedural Memory 
Procedural memory systems include the generation of habits, dispositions, skills, and 
behavioural responses, which are nonconsciously expressed in presymbolic infants, 
verbal toddlers and adults alike. A number of distinct neocortical and limbic brain regions 
are involved in the encoding and storage of these fundamentally unconscious memories. 
The present study maintains that a procedural memory system consisting of 
complementary responses to aversive episodes develops between birth and 28 months of 
age. The origins and development of this system will be outlined in the following 
sections. To begin with, the present study describes the roles of the amygdala and basal 
ganglia structures in encoding and storing procedural stimulus context traces during the 
presymbolic period. 
4.2.3.1 The Amygdala Modulates Basal Ganglia Encoding of Aversive Procedural 
Memory Sequences 
As noted in section 4.2.2 on presymbolic episodic memory, the amygdala modulates the 
encoding of aversive environmental cues (Ledoux and Muller, 1997, p.1724). This 
modulation includes the conditioning of fear responses, a form of procedural memory 
(Poldrack and Gabrieli, 1997, p.305). However, the amygdala does not itself encode these 
aversive responses, but instead regulates the basal ganglia encoding of the context and 
rule components of aversive procedural memories. Projections from the amygdala enable 
aversive information to be simultaneously relayed to the caudate nucleus and the ventral 
striatum regions of the basal ganglia for procedural memory encoding (Davis, 1997, 
pp.385-386; Evered and O'Connor, 1984, p.109). 
4.2.3.2 The Basal Ganglia Encode Procedural Responses to Aversive Events 
The basal ganglia are involved in generating responses to motor, perceptual, and 
cognitive stimuli (Poldrack and Gabrieli, 1997, pp. 303-304; White, 1997, pp.165). 
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They process new associations embodying consistent relationships between incoming 
motor, perceptual, and cognitive stimuli and thereafter generate appropriate responses to 
these (White, 1997, p.165). In adults and children over three years of age the basal 
ganglia form an information processing circuit with the prefrontal cortex that includes 
connections between frontal cortices, caudate nucleus, globus pallidus, and thalamus, the 
latter having return connections to the frontal areas (Heilman, 1997, p.445). 
Basal ganglia automatically encode procedural memory traces prior to their goal-
directed use by the frontal lobes. 
When an aversive stimulus occurs, the caudate region integrates the relevant sensory and 
motor information received from the cortex with affective information from the amygdala 
in order to encode a map depicting the associations between the different kinds of data. 
Sensory and motor stimuli are transferred from the primary cortical receptor layers to 
specific sites in the ventral and medial regions of the caudate nucleus (White, 1997, 
p.164; Passingham, 1993, p.214). Specific sensory and motor cortical inputs are 
connected to multiple segments of the caudate, each segment containing a different 
combination of cortical inputs (White, 1997, p.166). The complex mapping of these 
inputs with aversive data from the amygdala results in a representation of the aversive 
context. This context trace is then compared with previous context traces stored in the 
striatum. 
Once the current context trace is encoded by the caudate and fails to be matched with 
previous context traces in the striatum, the caudate generates a singular response to the 
novel context trace (White, 1997, p.166). In tum the striatum formalizes the association 
linking the response to the specific context and ensures that appropriate motor behaviour 
guided by this response occurs (White, 1997, p.166). When a new aversive stimulus 
occurs in children three years of age and over the basal ganglia effectively trains the 
prefrontal cortex to recognise the associative relationship between context and response, 
and to carry out the latter when the context initially reoccurs (White, 1997, p.167). 
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In contrast, a familiar aversive stimulus activates the relevant matching context trace 
stored in the striatum. In response to the recurring stressor, the striatum re-activates the 
context-response association, which results in a familiar motor behaviour output 
sequence, e.g. avoidance or withdrawal. 
4.2.3.3 Presymbolic Procedural Memories are Encoded and Stored in the Absence of 
Prefrontal Cortical Functions 
According to Passingham (1993) the prefrontal cortex-basal ganglia system encodes and 
executes new procedural context-response skills prior to these becoming automatically 
triggered when the stimulus re-occurs (p.198). The prefrontal cortex is activated only 
when new response decisions need to be made (p.212). Therefore in verbally competent 
subjects there is a stage where a new behaviour response to a stimulus is under voluntary 
control. The subject is aware of learning a new skill and enacting a cognitive-behavioural 
schema. Once the sequence becomes automatic, the prefrontal cortex is no longer 
involved, and the response, if triggered, is performed without conscious awareness or 
volition. 
The present study contends that in presymbolic infants procedural responses are encoded 
by the basal ganglia in parallel with MTL episodic encoding. The basal ganglia are 
functional from early after birth (Howe and Courage, 1997, p.504), while the cerebellum 
is involved in the automation of procedural memories once the initial response selection 
process has occurred (Passingham, 1993, p.198). The immaturity of the pre:frontal cortex 
prior to 28 months of age with regard to the conscious retrieval of episodic memories 
noted in section 4.2.2 above suggests that volition and awareness will not be components 
of learning a new goal-directed procedural response until after this age. This implies that 
prior to 28 months of age the basal ganglia encoding of procedural memories must 
somehow be relayed to the cerebellum for storage and future automated activation 
without the involvement of the pre:frontal cortex. 
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The basal ganglia and cerebellum are indirectly connected via the premotor area of the 
frontal cortex (Passingham, 1993, p.220). The premotor cortex is functional before the 
prefrontal cortex (Fuster, 1997, p.455) and interacts with the basal ganglia during the 
encoding of behavioural response. traces and thereafter with the cerebellum in the 
automatic performance of movement-related skills (Passingham, 1993, p.220). This 
suggests that the premotor region connects the basal ganglia with the cerebellum in terms 
of relaying behavioural information. The present study proposes that in infants under 28 
months of age, procedural response traces encoded by the basal ganglia are automatically 
relayed to the premotor cortical area where they are transformed into a motor output 
sequence. Thereafter the procedural response memory trace is relayed from the premotor 
cortex to the cerebellum. In the following section the cerebellum is identified as the long-
term storage site for the behavioural response component of procedural memory. 
However, the basal ganglia store the context aspect of procedural memories on a 
permanent basis in the GABA containing neurons of the striatum (White, 1997, p.166). 
4.2.3.4 Presymbolic Procedural Response Traces are Stored in the Cerebellum 
In the presymbolic period premotor cell networks respond to a procedural response 
encoding relayed from the basal ganglia by producing motor output resulting in 
behavioural change, e.g. an eye blink in response to a an external stimulus. The present 
study maintains that the association created between the stimulus context and the 
response in the process of the premotor cell activation is relayed to the cerebellum where 
it is stored as a procedural response memory trace. The cerebellum automatically 
activates a stored response memory script when a similar aversive stimulus reoccurs, but 
it does not generate new responses (Passingham, 1993: p.198). 
Thompson and Kim (1996), in accordance with the present study, propose that the 
cerebellum is the long-term storage site for procedural· memory sequences. Specific 
neural networks in the cerebellum encode information related to aversive stimulus 
contexts (Thompson and Kim, 1996, p.13441). 
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There is evidence that the long-term storage of aversive procedural skills, habits, and 
cognitive dispositions occurs in a localized region of the cerebellum, viz. the anterior 
interpositus and overlying cortex (Thompson and Kim, 1996, p.13442). Long term 
depression (LTD), a memory storage mechanism, has been identified in the cerebellar 
cortex, indicating that this region is crucially involved in the long-term storage of skill 
response memories (Thompson and Kim, 1997, p.13442). Therefore, it is plausible that 
aversive procedural response information transferred from the basal ganglia and premotor 
cortex receives long-term storage in the anterior interpositus and adjacent cortex regions 
of the cerebellum. 
4.2.3.5 Summary: Presymbolic Aversive Procedural Memory 
The present study proposes that from at least shortly after birth the infant encodes 
aversive procedural memory traces, because the impact of aversive stimuli demands a 
response that will facilitate coping with both the present context and future stressors. The 
infant by 28 months of age possesses a complex procedural memory system consisting of 
response scripts containing sensory, motor, and cognitive information components stored 
in the cerebellum. Specifically matching environmental cues can automatically activate 
these scripts. However, evidence from priming studies in verbally competent subjects 
indicates that procedural responses to environmental cues do not only include complex, 
multi-sensory behavioural scripts stored in the cerebellum. Procedural responses also 
include isolated aversive reactivity to individual sensory and motor stimulus features 
present in otherwise non-aversive contexts. Section 4.2.3.6 below presents an outline of 
the cortical encoding and storage of these reaction components and examines the 
implications for the presymbolic infant memory model. 
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4.2.3.6 Cortical Encoding and Storage of Procedural Response Components 
Priming studies suggest that in addition to procedural response scripts stored in the 
cerebellum, the discrete perceptual and motor information components co-activated 
during the behaviour output stage of a procedural response are stored in the sensory and 
motor cortices. Sensory cortical layers activated in perceptual priming tasks indicate that 
discrete sensory response data is stored in these regions (Verfaellie and Keane, 1997, 
p.157). Similarly, frontal, temporal, and parietal association cortices activated during 
conceptual priming tasks indicate that cognitive, meaning-based response components are 
stored in these areas (p.157). These cortical areas are respectively involved in the initial 
perceptual and cognitive analysis of incoming data, and thereafter store the outcomes in 
the same neural networks responsible for these analyses (Verfaellie and Keane, 1997, 
p.157). For example, incoming visual, auditory, and tactile features of a stimulus 
analysed in the corresponding sensory areas, are encoded and stored in the same localised 
neural networks (Squire and Zola, 1996a, p.192~ Ungerleider, 1995, p.771). 
Cortical priming of a single component response versus procedural memory 
mediated cortical co-activation. 
The present study contends that in both presymbolic infants and verbally competent 
subjects individual cortical response outputs activated by discrete aversive cues on their 
own can on other occasions form part of larger co-ordinated cortical outputs activated by 
procedural memory scripts. Procedural memory scripts stored in the cerebellum are 
triggered by familiar aversive stimulus contexts. A single stimulus feature will only 
activate the corresponding cortical storage node during perceptual analysis. However, the 
reoccurrence of an entire stimulus context co-activates many data storage nodes that 
together succeed in activating the basal ganglia complex. The caudate integration of these 
sensory and motor inputs is relayed to the striatum for comparison with previously stored 
stimulus context traces. When a context match is found, the striatum reactivates the 
relevant procedural response information and relays this via the premotor cortex to the 
cerebellum where the behaviour sequence script is stored. 
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In tum this procedural memory script co-activates the many cortical sensory and 
premotor nodes that together constitute the complex behavioural output of the procedural 
response. The present study therefore maintains that individual sensory and cognitive 
features in cortical storage can be co-activated by a complex aversive procedural 
memory, or individually primed by a matching aversive feature present in an otherwise 
non-aversive stimulus. 
4.2.4 Conclusion: Presymbolic Episodic and Procedural Memory 
The model of presymbolic episodic and procedural memory outlined above demonstrates 
that unconscious mentation in human beings is a product of developing memory systems. 
Individual cortical networks store information units that embody both stimulus 
presentation (episodic component) and appropriate response output (procedural 
component) representations. The hippocampus is responsible for binding together the 
diverse data components of a stimulus into a cohesive presymbolic episode, and for co-
ordinating its cortical storage in component form. Similarly the cerebellum binds 
response output information received from the basal ganglia and premotor cortex into a 
memory trace, and co-ordinates the cortical activation of sensory-motor behavioural 
output when the procedural memory is activated in future. 
The present study contends that when a procedural memory script is activated, the 
sequence template is relayed from the cerebellum back to the basal ganglia and the 
diverse cortical networks responsible for the storage of the original sensory, motor, and 
cognitive response output information. The template activates the appropriate basal 
ganglia context trace, which in tum co-activates the premotor and sensory cortical 
networks representing the behavioural output sequence. The present study proposes that 
in the presymbolic context the cerebellar template reactivates basal ganglia and cortical 
information components into a complete behaviour output sequence. 
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This role is similar to the one the hippocampus is thought to play in reintegrating 
information stored in discrete cortical networks into a coherent episode, prior to relaying 
this to the prefrontal cortex for episodic retrieval in subjects over three years of age 
(Fletcher et al., 1997, p.215). 
Furthermore, discrete sensory and cognitive feature traces stored in cortical networks can 
be unconsciously activated in isolation if the associated aversive cues reoccur in 
otherwise unfamiliar environmental contexts. In contrast, when a multi-sensory aversive 
stimulus occurs, anatomically distinct brain regions (the MTL, basal ganglia, and 
cerebellum) combine the many simultaneously activated cortical information components 
in order to co-ordinate different categories of presymbolic knowledge. These include 
aversive episodes, aversive stimulus contexts, and behavioural response scripts. 
The current model therefore proposes that a common cortical information input and 
storage system is used to encode and reactivate presymbolic episodic and procedural 
memories. This model differs from earlier approaches that viewed episodic and 
procedural memory systems as completely separate from one another (Squire, 1995). In 
the following chapter it is explored how the different kinds of presymbolic aversive 
memory outlined in the present model serve as the basis for rethinking psychoanalytic 
unconscious mentation. The present model will attempt to reconceptualise psychoanalytic 
unconscious mentation in terms of stored presymbolic memories that react to the episodic 
encoding and storage of aversive events in verbally competent subjects. 
CHAPTER FIVE: PRESYMBOLIC MEMORY AND PSYCHOANALYTIC 
UNCONSCIOUS MENTA TION 
5.1 Introduction: Summary of Argument 
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In chapter four it was argued that aversive stimuli have features that make them highly 
amenable to robust event encoding and long-term storage in preverbal infants. 
Presymbolic episodes in long-term storage are generally the outcome of aversive stimulus 
contexts, whereas non-aversive events are transformed into generic schemas prior to their 
incorporation of sufficient linguistic data components at around 28 months of age. 
Linguistic cues are necessary for non-aversive stimuli to receive long-term storage as 
singular episodes, because they enable the identification of novel features during 
encoding that are missed by a presymbolic perceptual-affect analysis of the same stimuli. 
The present study argues that despite the increasing functionality of the prefrontal cortex 
between 18 and 28 months of age, aversive episodes encoded by the hippocampus and 
stored in sensory-motor cortical areas during this period lack the linguistic data 
components required for their retrieval as verbally formatted autobiographical memories. 
Verbally competent subjects cannot consciously retrieve aversive episodes stored during 
the preverbal period of infancy (Howe and Courage, 1997, p.511). Aversive episodes 
stored prior to 28 months therefore constitute a presymbolic layer of unconscious content 
intrinsically unavailable to the verbal recall strategies of the prefrontal cortex. In addition, 
chapter four argued that aversive presymbolic stimuli are not only encoded as event 
episodes, but elicit matching procedural responses that receive long-term storage as 
memory traces. By definition procedural memories refer to behavioural activity responses 
as opposed to experiential contents. They are therefore intrinsically unavailable to 
consciousness whether they occur in infants or verbally competent subjects. Despite 
being intrinsically unconscious, the present study contends that presymbolic episodes and 
their associated procedural responses indirectly influence memory processes and 
behaviour in verbally competent subjects. 
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In the present chapter the influence of presymbolic memory on the behaviour of verbally 
competent subjects is explored in terms of the implications it has for a psychodynamic 
view of unconscious mentation. 
5.2 Implications for a Psychodynamic Model of Unconscious Mentation 
The model of presymbolic memory has a number of implications for a psychoanalytic 
conception of unconscious mentation. Freud (1915/1957) describes dynamic unconscious 
processes as drive related experiences, ideas, wishes, and emotions that are prevented 
from becoming conscious due to the mechanism of repression (p.152). These 
unconscious contents are actively prevented from entering consciousness by a censoring 
agency, viz. the repressive mechanism (Freud, 1915/1957, p.173). However, these 
repressed unconscious memories persist, and can enter consciousness provided similar 
cues are presented to the subject's conscious awareness. For example, if the analyst 
makes an interpretation in some way reminiscent of a repressed memory trace in a 
patient, this interpretive cue may form a connection to the unconscious memory trace, 
enabling it to become conscious and thereby lifting the repression (Freud, 1915/1957, 
pp.175-176). 
Apart from dynamic unconscious contents, Freud (1915/1957) also describes a second 
kind of unconscious content, the nucleus or core of the unconscious system that cannot 
become conscious under any conditions. The primary process consists of drive impulses 
existing side by side in isolation from one another prior to the operation of the repressive 
censorship (Freud, 1915/1957, p.186). This primordial unconscious content exists from 
birth. Freud (1923/1961) describes the id as including both dynamically repressed 
unconscious contents and the unrestricted operation of drive impulses that are 
fundamentally unconscious and not subject to repressive forces (pp.24-25). Freud 
therefore makes a distinction between fundamental or primordial unconscious content 
that cannot be brought to consciousness under any conditions, and a repressed dynamic 
unconscious content that can potentially become conscious under the appropriate 
conditions. 
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Despite having critiqued Freud's drive terminology in chapters one and two~ his 
distinction between a fundamental level of unconscious mentation and dynamically 
repressed unconscious mentation still has relevance for the presymbolic memory model. 
The present model reformulates this distinction in terms of its own concepts by proposing 
that: 
i) Presymbolic aversive episodic and procedural memory traces are fundamentally 
unconscious as they cannot be consciously retrieved or experienced under any conditions. 
ii) Aversive presymbolic memones unconsciously influence the consc10us experience 
and recall of aversive episodes in verbally competent subjects. Specifically, presymbolic 
memories can dynamically prevent aversive episodes encoded in verbally competent 
subjects from being available to conscious retrieval. 
These two points are a more specific reformulation of Lichtenberg's concept of a 
fundamental level of unconscious mentation consisting of presymbolic memories that 
shape later symbolic representation by contributing their own processing rules 
(Lichtenberg et al., 1992, pp.67-69). Chapter four has already demonstrated that 
presymbolic memories coincide with a level of unconscious mentation fundamentally 
unavailable to conscious experience and verbal retrieval. The present chapter outlines 
how presymbolic memories may nevertheless be able to dynamically influence the 
experience and recall of later occurring aversive events in verbally competent subjects. 
5 .2.1 The Psychoanalytic Concept of Empathic Failure and its Relation to the 
Presymbolic Aversive Memory Model 
According to Lichtenberg et al. (1992) fundamental unconscious mentation consists of 
episodic and procedural memories of positive and negative infant experiences (p.69). The 
present study has linked presymbolic episodic memories exclusively with aversive infant 
experiences, and has therefore focused on building a model of aversive presymbolic 
episodes and their related procedural responses. 
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According to Lichtenberg et al. (1992) every infant inevitably experiences heightened 
aversive moments involving physical distress, minor injury, interactive anger and fear, 
task frustration and excessive stimulation (p.140). These stressors will only be encoded as 
aversive episodes if caregivers fail to affirm the infant's search for cohesion and vitality 
in the context of these distressing moments (pp .140-141). The caregiver's lack of 
affirmation of the infant in distress constitutes an empathic failure. The present study 
contends that empathic failures as defined above are the basic criteria for the encoding 
and storage of aversive episodes in presymbolic infants. Empathic failures do not include 
instances of caregiver-initiated physical or sexual abuse, or prolonged neglect. Empathic 
failures refer to acute experiences of the caregiver being absent, or the caregiver 
substituting an inappropriate physical stimulus such as food or a finger to suck on, in 
place of the emotional response required to alleviate the infant's distress (Lichtenberg et 
al., 1992, pp.141-142). 
Furthermore, the present study maintains that presymbolic empathic failures also occur 
when caregivers display aversive affect dispositions during routine infant-caregiver 
interactions. For example, a depressed or angry caregiver may communicate aversive 
affect in his/her unusually tense handling and strained vocal intonations accompanying a 
feed. This affect conflicts with the infant's current non-aversive generic memory schema 
derived from earlier instances of unambiguously pleasurable feeds. The dissonance 
between the memory schema and the caregiver's current behaviour creates a complex, 
ambivalent situation that the infant cannot adequately understand due to immaturities in 
sensory-motor and emotional processing. Therefore the situation is encoded as an 
aversive episode that in turn triggers either a fear-related response of behavioural 
withdrawal, or a breakdown in approach-avoidance behaviour in the infant (Main and 
Morgan, 1996, pp.112-115). 
In general, a mismatch between the infant's current distress experience and the caregiver's 
response results in heightened aversive arousal which enhances episodic encoding and 
triggers a procedural response which effectively embodies avoidant behaviour or 
behavioural disorganisation. 
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Presymbolic cortical memory traces containing empathic failure data influence the 
organisation of episodic memories, procedural reactions, and mood dispositions in 
verbally competent subjects (Lichtenberg et al., 1992, pp.164-165). The present study 
argues that while traumatic abuse and neglect episodes are encoded and stored as 
presymbolic episodes in infants before 28 months of age, these events are relatively 
uncommon. Less severe empathic caregiver failures are more commonly the building 
blocks of aversive presymbolic memories. 
5.2.2 Presymbolic Procedural Memories Dynamically Influence Behaviour and 
Experience in Verbal Subjects 
Studies with children where there was independent verification for traumatic incidents 
occurring prior to 28 months of age, demonstrate that although no conscious verbal recall 
of the events occurred once subjects became verbally competent, almost all of them 
displayed indications of nonconscious behavioural memory storage, including personality 
changes, trauma-related fears, and post-traumatic play (Goodman et al., 1996, p.7; Terr, 
1996, p.75). The present study argues that post-traumatic behavioural changes in 
verbally competent children illustrate how previously stored presymbolic procedural 
memories (the responses to traumatic events) can be elicited by aversive cues in the 
present. The result is a dynamic unconscious response where the child's verbally 
processed conscious thoughts, emotions, and behaviour are unconsciously shaped by a 
preverbal procedural memory. In summary, presymbolic episodes are unavailable as 
consciously retrievable memories, but their associated, equally unconscious procedural 
memories trigger involuntary behaviour in verbally competent subjects faced with a 
current stressor. In this sense presymbolic procedural memory acts psychodynamically on 
conscious symbolic experience. 
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5.2.2.1 Between Eight and Twenty-Eight Months of Age Procedural Memory Encodes 
Visuospatial and Linguistic Material into Aversive Response Scripts 
When the prefrontal cortex begins to function after eight months of age (Chugani et al., 
1993, p.138), motor output sequences gradually become integrated with linguistic and co-
ordinated visuospatial processing of sensory material to form complex goal-directed 
behaviour scripts (Fuster, 1997, p.455). These procedural reaction scripts no longer only 
consist of simple motor, somatic, and sensory changes in arousal. The onset of a 
visuospatial imaging capacity at nine months of age enables infants to incorporate visual 
imaging methods including imagined withdrawal from a visual stimulus, as integral 
components of an avoidant procedural memory script (Lichtenberg et al:, 1992, pp.44-
46). A new ability to visually scan and evaluate the affect states of others by attending to 
their facial expressions enables infants to imaginarily visualize positive or neutral 
expressions in place of actual aversive encounters (Lichtenberg et al., 1992, p.46). This 
may be used in conjunction with physically averting the gaze or switching visual focus to 
a neutral stimulus. 
After eight months of age, procedural responses triggered by aversive cues gradually 
begin to combine word recognition with visuospatial skills and motor gestures during the 
enactment of avoidant behaviour (Chugani et al., 1993, p.138; Fuster, 1997, p.455; Howe 
and Courage, 1997, p.509). For example, attending to or vocalising specific word sounds 
may be used in conjunction with avoidant motor gestures and non-aversive visual 
imagery to distance the infant from the immediate experience of a painful stressor. 
Infants between 18 and 28 months of age, who are capable of more sophisticated 
linguistic skills may vocalise whole words and phrases together with the use of non-
aversive visual imagery to comfort and/or distract themselves fr.om an aversive stimulus. 
The use of verbal and imaging distraction techniques is integrated with motor and 
sensory cues to form a complex procedural response memory. A stressor possessing 
verbal, visuospatial, and sensory-motor features similar to the original presymbolic 
stimulus could automatically trigger the associated procedural memory in verbally 
competent subjects. 
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In summary, the present study maintains that between eight and 28 months of age infants 
encode increasingly complex cognitive processing components in order to achieve 
aversive procedural response goals. 
5.2.2.2 Presyrnbolic Procedural Memories Function as Unconscious Defence 
Mechanisms in Verbally Competent Subjects 
Referring to symbolic unconscious mentation in verbally competent subjects, Lichtenberg 
et al. (1992) describe the concept of unconscious model scenes that develop in response 
to events containing conflict related, aversive elements (p.77). The aversive information 
results in some or all of the contents being "encoded as symbolic representations of 
affect-laden memories, fantasies, and beliefs " (Lichtenberg et al., 1992, p. 77), that are 
sequestered in an unconscious altered state, i.e. a model scene. The present study argues 
that symbolic model scene representations are unconscious because they include stored 
episodic memories that are prevented by presymbolic procedural memories from having 
access to prefrontal retrieval strategies in verbally competent subjects. 
In the preceding section it was argued that presymbolic procedural memory scripts 
consolidated between eight and 28 months of age include co-ordinated visuospatial and 
verbal behaviour components. These memory scripts are re-triggered if stressors occur 
that possesses sensory, imagistic, and verbal features reminiscent of the original aversive 
stimulus. Once the original presymbolic data features stored in cortical networks are co-
activated by the perceptual analysis of a current stressor, the corresponding stimulus 
context trace and procedural memory script are reactivated by the basal ganglia and 
cerebellum respectively. The resulting procedural output may include unconscious 
involuntary use of sensory-motor data, visual imagery, and verbal skills that distract the 
verbally competent subject from consciously attending to the current stressor. The subject 
with fully developed verbal skills remains unaware that concentrating on specific non-
aversive stimulus features, or imagining and saying certain things, are in fact behavioural 
techniques used to manage an unconsciously recognized aversive stimulus. 
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The present study contends that presymbolic procedural memories consolidated between 
eight and 28 months of age include verbal expressive and visual imaging skills that are 
unconsciously used by verbally competent subjects to effectively divert their conscious 
attention away from aversive stimuli. 
If a presymbolic procedural memory is triggered in a verbally competent subject by a 
current stressor, the script may use a combination of sensory, verbal, and co-ordinated 
visuospatial focusing strategies to divert conscious attention away from the unfolding 
event during its automatic encoding by the hippocampus. The resulting memory episode 
does not receive a prefrontal retrieval code while being transferred into cortical storage 
by the hippocampus, because the prefrontal memory system is diverted towards non-
aversive cues by the operation of the procedural script during the storage period. The 
episode therefore cannot be voluntarily retrieved as an autobiographical memory at a later 
stage. In effect, the episode is stored in an "altered state" inaccessible to conscious 
prefrontal retrieval. The episode is blocked from consciousness because its aversive 
valence conflicts with the subject's presymbolic memory objective, viz. to avoid or 
withdraw from aversive situations where possible. 
In summary, presymbolic procedural memory scripts function as psychodynamic defence 
mechanisms that are automatically and unconsciously triggered by symbolic stressors. 
Symbolic stressors become temporarily inaccessible to voluntary retrieval, because recall 
depends on the prefrontal working memory system focusing on them as they are encoded 
by the hippocampus. When prefrontal attention is diverted from events, cortical storage 
of the memory episodes proceeds under the sole mediation of the hippocampus, with no 
prefrontal working memory organization of the episodes occurring. The stressful 
episodes are dynamically unconscious, because they may still be involuntarily recalled to 
consciousness via cue-mediated hippocampal reactivation if subjects experience similar 
stressors in the future (Krystal, Bennett, Bremner, Southwick, and Charney, 1996, p.172). 
These aversive episodes can therefore become available to consciousness under the right 
conditions. This concept is similar to Freud's description of the recovery of dynamically 
repressed memories. 
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However, presymbolic procedural memory activation and cue-dependant hippocampal 
involuntary recall represent a better explanation of how previously unconscious 
memories are recovered in verbal subjects, in comparison to Freud's hypothetical concept 
of repression. 
In summary, the attention refocusing activities performed by presymbolic procedural 
memory scripts in response to stressors are unconscious in relation to the subject's 
conscious intentions. In this sense, presymbolic procedural memories can function as 
defence mechanisms. The present study argues that this unconscious manipulation of 
aversive symbolic episodic memories by presymbolic procedural memories in verbally 
competent subjects enables the psychoanalytic concept of dynamic unconscious 
mentation to be reformulated. The levels of unconscious mentation encompassed by the 
presymbolic memory model are outlined in section 5.3 below. 
5.3 Two Unconscious Memory Systems 
5.3.1 Fundamental Unconscious Mentation 
The presymbolic aversive episodic and procedural memories stored in neural connections 
across diverse neocortical, basal ganglia, and cerebellar regions embody a fundamental 
unconscious memory system. Fundamental unconscious mentation can be defined as the 
layer of stored memory traces that are permanently inaccessible to voluntary prefrontal 
retrieval and conscious verbal organisation, due to the inherent absence of certain 
information parameters. Presymbolic episode traces are not blocked or prevented from 
entering conscious awareness by other cognitive processes, but inherently lack sufficient 
linguistic information attributes necessary for prefrontal retrieval to access and re-format 
these networks. Although presymbolic episode traces cannot be directly integrated into 
the later developing autobiographical memory system, their sensory networks can be 
unconsciously activated by later symbolic stressors possessing sensory features 
reminiscent of presymbolic contexts. 
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In turn, this presymbolic episodic network activation automatically triggers the associated 
presymbolic procedural memories, including somatic sensations, vocal tones, facial 
expressions, gestures, and symptomatic acts (Lichtenberg et al., 1992, p.26). 
Presymbolic procedural memories are unconscious whether activated in presymbolic or 
verbal subjects, because they encapsulate learned behaviour sequences, not records of 
expenence. The automatic changes in visual, verbal, somatic, and motor functioning 
noted by Lichtenberg (1989) in therapeutic settings, indicate that verbal subjects often 
unconsciously respond to stressors instead of consciously attending to and 
acknowledging their presence (pp.285-287). The present study has argued that 
presymbolic procedural memory scripts produce nonconscious changes in sensory, 
verbal, and visuospatial reactivity that can effectively prevent conscious attention and 
strategic memory retrieval from focusing on and integrating current stressors into the 
subject's ongoing autobiographical narrative. Presymbolic procedural memories function 
as defence mechanisms that effectively prevent verbally competent subjects from 
consciously attending to and verbally recalling specific symbolic episodes. In these cases, 
presymbolic procedural memories dynamically divert conscious attentio,n and block 
verbal recall of symbolic aversive episodes, so giving rise to symbolic unconscious 
mentation. 
In summary, stored presymbolic aversive episodic and procedural memory traces 
conform to a fundamental level of unconscious mentation, because this information 
cannot be consciously retrieved in either an involuntary or voluntary sense, even if the 
relevant memory traces are activated. Presymbolic episodic and procedural memories 
correspond to information contents stored in and across synaptic connections, but the 
present study does not claim that this content "hard-wires" the internal architecture of 
synapses and their connections. In fact, multiple memory traces are stored in the same 
synaptic connections, while individual neurons form part of many different memory trace 
networks. The same neuronal networks are therefore used repeatedly to store new 
memories. Individual memories do not fix synaptic architecture or neuron networks. 
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5.3.2 Dynamic Unconscious Processes 
The unconscious activation of presyrnbolic episode traces triggers their associated 
procedural memory responses, and can result in the dynamic suppression of conscious 
attention to and voluntary recall of the activating stressor. Presyrnbolic procedural 
memories are fundamentally unconscious, but when operationalised they can dynamically 
influence other memories so that the latter are temporarily unavailable to conscious 
retrieval. Therefore the distinction made by Freud (1915/1957) between a fundamental 
unconscious system and dynamic unconscious processes governed by defence 
mechanisms (pp.180-181), appears to be valid, despite the evidence and conceptual 
framework used by the present model differing from the biological paradigm subscribed 
to by classical psychoanalysis. 
The present developmental model of presyrnbolic episodic and procedural memory 
rooted in neuropsychological and infant research provides for a more circumscribed 
reformulation of fundamental and dynamic unconscious mentation in comparison to 
earlier psychoanalytic models that employed intrapsychic, interpersonal, or attachment 
relational concepts to understand unconscious mental processes. Unlike the present 
model, these earlier attempts failed to align their concepts in relation to i) specific 
maturation rates in different brain areas, ii) the onset and maturation of sensory-motor 
functions, and iii) how these co-evolve with memory processes in the developing human 
being. 
5.4 Implications for Psychotherapy 
The present model of presyrnbolic unconscious memory has implications for the practise 
of psychodynamic psychotherapy. In a psychotherapeutic context, the client cannot 
ameliorate his/her symptoms by recalling the corresponding aversive event if the latter is 
of presyrnbolic origin. In verbally proficient toddlers where external verification of a 
presyrnbolic trauma exists, there is no subsequent verbal recall of the gist of the trauma 
{Terr, 1996, p.74). 
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Therefore the therapeutic goal of psychodynamic psychotherapy needs to shift away from 
attempting to uncover or re-create early infantile memories that encapsulate aversive 
Oedipal or pre-oedipal experiences. Up until now this has been the modus operandi 
adopted by the classical and object relations psychoanalytic models. 
Therapy should also not be solely concerned with the task of forging a positive 
attachment relationship between client and therapist to replace the hypothetical poor 
attachment scenarios, early deficits, or bad internal object relationships that may have 
characterised the client's developmental history. The present study proposes that therapist 
and client need to discover what kind of procedural memory scripts are being 
unconsciously used by the latter when dealing with current and past aversive contexts. In 
other words, from the perspective of the presymbolic memory model, the goal of 
dynamic psychotherapy centres on the client piecing together the cognitive and 
behavioural rules that he/she habitually uses in an unconscious fashion in order to cope 
with aversive life events and relationships in the present. On the basis of these rules, 
therapist and client may jointly reconstruct aversive presymbolic model scenes depicting 
how procedural scripts may have arisen in response to infantile stressors and thereafter 
evolved into the unconscious routines presently used by the client. 
On the one hand there is an empirical element to such a therapeutic approach, viz. 
identifying and describing the aversive procedural scripts routinely used by clients in 
their present-day contexts. On the other hand this therapy also involves a hermeneutic-
interpretive approach, viz. a reconstruction of how such scripts may have arisen in the 
course of the client's life, which is always a speculative endeavour. The third and final 
phase of therapy involves the therapist and client engaging together in the systematic 
disruption of aversive, maladaptive behaviour scripts, and the systematic experimentation 
with non-aversive behaviour sets in place of the aversive procedural scripts. The 
behaviour experimentation process unfolds in the context of the evolving interactions 
characterising the relationship between therapist and client. 
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In the concluding chapter of this study, the presymbolic memory model will be deployed 
in order to provide an original contribution to the theoretical understanding of two 
specific areas of clinical psychology and psychotherapeutic practise: 
i) The false recollection by adults and children of traumatic sexual abuse memories 
allegedly occurring in pre-verbal infancy. 
ii) The dissociation and involuntary recall of real traumatic memories as found in Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). 
The explanatory utility of the presymbolic memory model in relation to these memory 
phenomena will add to its robustness as a conceptual tool useful to psychologists working 
in both clinical and forensic contexts. 
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CHAPTER SIX: THE PRESYMBOLIC MEMORY MODEL IN EXPLAINING 
FALSE TRAUMATIC MEMORIES AND THE DISSOCIATION OF TRUE 
MEMORIES 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter five concluded with a description of fundamental and dynamic unconscious 
mentation from the perspective of the presymbolic memory model. In the present chapter 
these two types of unconscious mentation will be shown to be integral to the theoretical 
understanding of false traumatic childhood memories, dissociation of true memories, and 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). The present study contends that the presymbolic 
memory model can provide a unified theoretical understanding of these phenomena, 
currently characterised by an assortment of apparently contradictory and piecemeal 
findings. In the course of the present chapter it will become apparent that a model of 
presymbolic aversive memory is a necessary conceptual tool for understanding how these 
memory phenomena are constituted. 
6.2 The Influence of Presymbolic Aversive Memory 
6.2.1 Presymbolic Aversive Events are Inevitably Distorted Due to Processing 
Constraints 
Stein (1996) argues that children younger than 24 months encode pre-verbal emotional 
events, and that the appraisal of an event as emotional leads to its encoding as a causally 
coherent memory episode (pp.173-174). When an event is unusual or violates prior 
knowledge schemas, for instance by containing aversive elements, the encoded trace is 
tagged as differing from other generic schemas and is stored as a discrete episode (Stein, 
1996, p.184). This coincides with the present study's emphasis on the importance of 
aversive stimuli for the encoding and storage of presymbolic episodes. While aversive 
affect ensures that presymbolic events are encoded and stored, this in no way implies that 
the resulting episodic traces are accurate records of what actually occurred. 
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According to Stein (1996) encoding accuracy depends on the structure of the input 
registered, the subject's initial level of knowledge, and the ability to organise incoming 
information into a causally coherent episode (p.176). The logical implication for infants 
younger than 28 months, who lack mature prefrontal strategic retrieval and verbal 
competence skills, is that encoding of incoming information is compromised by these 
constraints, while prior stored knowledge is often lacking. Hence presymbolic episodic 
memories are encoded and stored in terms of these limitations. 
6.2.2 Presymbolic Aversive Memories Dynamically Influence the Encoding and Storage 
of Stressors in Verbally Competent Subjects 
In chapter five it was argued that presymbolic aversive memory episodes are inherently 
unconscious due to the absence of certain information parameters that facilitate the 
operation of prefrontal retrieval strategies in older subjects. Furthermore, it was 
contended that presymbolic procedural memories dynamically manipulate the encoding, 
storage, and recall of stressors in verbally competent subjects. Evidence of presymbolic 
manipulation of later memories was observed in subjects who experienced pre-verbal 
traumas prior to 28 months of age, but who could not later recall the episodes in the form 
of verbally coherent narratives (Goodman et al., 1996, p.7; Cameron, 1996, p.59; Terr, 
1996, p.74). Despite the lack of conscious recall, these verbal children displayed 
persistent procedural memory responses relating to the trauma. These responses included 
posttraumatic play activities, personality changes, and trauma related fears (Cameron, 
1996, p.59; Terr, 1996, p.75). Therefore, presymbolic trauma memories can indirectly 
continue to influence verbally mediated experience, including the encoding of verbal 
memory episodes and associated emotional reactions. 
In addition, the dynamic influence of aversive presymbolic memories on verbally 
mediated experience is supported by research on disorganised infant attachment states. 
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When a caregiver displays alarm or is directly frightening, the infant's ability to shift 
attention away from this aversive stimulus breaks down because this coincides with the 
infant's normal source of stress alleviation, i.e. the attachment to the caregiver (Main and 
Morgan, 1996, p.120). As a result, the infant's regulation of attention is derailed by the 
ambiguous, aversive caregiver behaviour, and there is a lapse into a temporary 
disorganised state characterised by a breakdown in ongoing attention and self-monitoring 
(Main and Morgan, 1996, p.122). The authors suggest that such temporary collapses of 
attention and approach-avoidance behaviour in the pre-verbal period of infancy have 
long-term consequences for the subsequent symbolic organisation of memory, attention, 
and behaviour in the individual concerned (pp.129-131). 
The findings on disorganised infant responses coincide with the view advanced by the 
present study, viz. that not only presymbolic physical or sexual traumas, but also more 
modest aversive caregiver responses can exert dynamic unconscious influences on later 
conscious self-monitoring, attention, and memory recall processes in verbally competent 
subjects. The present chapter focuses on how presymbolic aversive episodic and 
procedural memories actively influence some verbal subjects to create false memories of 
infant abuse, while predisposing others to dissociate in response to traumatic events. 
6.3 Presymbolic Memory and False Memories of Abuse 
6. 3 .1 Defining False Memories of Sexual Abuse 
The alleged recovery of childhood sexual abuse memories in adults who previously had 
no knowledge of such memories has lead to an intense debate concerning their accuracy. 
Researchers argue that many of these memories are false, and are fabricated in response 
to suggestive questioning techniques employed by irresponsible psychotherapists or 
criminal investigators (Ceci, Huffinan, Smith, and Loftus, 1996, pp.227-228; Toglia, 
1996, p.317). 
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Others argue that the conditions giving rise to false memories need to be enumerated, and 
that this will facilitate discrimination between verified abuse memories and those that are 
mostly false (Fiwsh, 1996, p.165; Stein, 1996, p.189; Ornstein and Myers, 1996, p.219; 
Saywitz and Moan-Hardie, 1996, p.259; Schooler, 1996, pp.292-293). Saywitz and 
Moan-Hardie (1996, p.245) note that the research and clinical findings reveal three basic 
patterns of early traumatic memories: 
i) Continuous memory of the trauma. 
ii) Memory loss for some but not all aspects of the trauma with later recovery and 
corroboration of all aspects. 
iii) Temporary memory loss for the entire event. 
It is the recovery of the third category of memory that is debated, primarily when there is 
no independent source of verification for the trauma outside of the subject's recovered 
memories themselves. 
6.3 .2 The Roles of Suggestion and the Prefrontal Cortex in the Creation of False Aversive 
Memories 
Research on false recollections of sexual trauma has focused on the role of suggestion 
(Saywitz and Moan-Hardie, 1996, p.246). It is alleged that suggestions lead to the 
creation of experientially plausible false episodic memories because they prime 
fragments of real, albeit less aversive episodic memories stemming from childhood that 
are thereafter placed within a fabricated abuse context (Schacter, 1995, pp.22-23; Toglia, 
1996, p.318). It is argued that these childhood memories have decayed to the extent that 
they cannot be retrieved in the form of intact episodes, so suggestions succeed only in 
priming the discrete visual, tactile, auditory, or olfactory components of these traces. 
Subjects may experience these sensory reactions as inexplicable, because they contain no 
conscious memory of the original childhood event. 
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In response to these retrieval restrictions, the prefrontal cortical strategic memory system 
creates a false episode that accounts for subjects' involuntary aversive reactions to 
interviewer suggestions (Squire, 1995, p.219). The prefrontal strategic memory system 
responds to the subject's need to organize an autobiographical memory that will 
meaningfully contextualise these inexplicable behavioural responses to the suggestion 
(Ceci, 1995, p.118). Prefrontal strategic memory is therefore thought to be instrumental 
in creating false episodic memories of childhood sexual abuse. 
6.3 .3 The Presymbolic Memory Contribution to the Suggestion Model of False Memories 
The present study contends that suggestions about early abusive events cail facilitate the 
creation of a false memory of abuse in two ways. Firstly, an aspect of the suggestion may 
nonconsciously prime a discrete feature of a presymbolic aversive episode in cortical 
storage (Ungerlieder, 1995, pp.771-772; Verfaellie and Keane, 1997, p.157). This results 
in a modality-specific behavioural response, e.g. a visual, auditory, tactile or olfactory 
startle, without conscious recall of any specific event. Secondly, suggestions may include 
a number of sensory and cognitive features reminiscent of stored presymbolic 
information. These features of the suggestion may activate an entire presymbolic episode 
network and trigger the associated procedural memory response script. The activation of 
the script would in turn produce an involuntary behaviour sequence without the subject 
consciously recognising a specific memory episode. 
In both cases the presymbolic feature( s) primed or co-activated by the suggestion may 
prompt the prefrontal cortex to create a false aversive episodic memory. Suggestions of 
abuse can be explicit or implicit depending on the nature of the subject's personal 
material in relation to which the suggestion is made. In either case the content of the 
suggestion may succeed in priming or co-activating presymbolic memory components. 
The present study contends that interviewer suggestions of abuse could activate 
nontraumatic but nevertheless aversive presymbolic memory components stored in the 
cortex. The activation results in the involuntary behaviour responses that subjects find 
inexplicable. 
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The suggestions in tum provide subjects with a context within which to consciously 
evaluate their involuntary behaviour. This goal-directed evaluation activates a prefrontal 
strategic memory search for an appropriate autobiographical context. However, because 
there are no prefrontal retrieval co-ordinates for presymbolic memory episodes, the 
prefrontal cortex responds to the search goal by "retrieving" a fictional spatiotemporal 
episode. This episode is created from a combination of data derived from the subject's 
involuntary response and the therapist/ interviewer's suggestion. The prefrontal cortex 
cannot detect its own retrieval error, because the real presymbolic episode that is 
associatively linked to the subject's response bias is irretrievable to consciousness. 
The prefrontal working memory system responds to subjects' need to understand their 
involuntary behaviour in an autobiographical context (Ceci, 1995, p.118). The structure 
of the false episode encoded by the prefrontal cortex is derived from the specificity of the 
suggestion in combination with the sensory and affective characteristics of the individual 
response bias. The present study argues that suggestions can plausibly account for the 
creation of false memories of abuse in some cases, because they inadvertently activate 
presymbolic procedural responses to empathic failure episodes in verbally competent 
subjects. False memories of abuse are created when subjects mistakenly attribute an 
autobiographical memory to a presymbolic procedural response bias elicited by a 
suggestion of abuse. The dynamic influence of aversive presymbolic memories can 
therefore lead to the creation of false verbal memories of sexual trauma in the presence of 
suggestions. 
6.3.4. The Presymbolic Memory Contribution to the Creation of False Abuse Memories 
in the Absence of Suggestion 
The presymbolic model argues that false memories of childhood abuse may also arise 
outside of suggestive therapeutic or forensic interview contexts. Aversive presymbolic 
episodic memories are stored in sensory-motor cortical receptor networks that double as 
memory storage facilities (Fuster, 1997, p.454). 
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Therefore, moderate life stressors with sensory features similar to those contained in a 
presymbolic episode will activate the receptor network combinations involved in the 
storage of the earlier event during the initial perception process. The inadvertent 
perceptual activation of a nontraumatic aversive presymbolic episode results in the 
triggering of the associated procedural memory script. The activation of the script 
produces an involuntary emotional response that verbally competent subjects may 
experience as inexplicable in their current life contexts. 
The present life stressor is felt by subjects to be an inadequate explanation for their 
involuntary behaviour. The prefrontal working memory system as part of its executive 
function, organizes a search for an autobiographical context that would account for the 
involuntary behaviour. The lack of prefrontal retrieval parameters for the activated 
presymbolic episode constrains the prefrontal system to fabricate a plausible context for 
the involuntary behaviour. Given the current high profile of sex abuse in the mass media, 
this phenomenon may provide a plausible context into which verbally competent subjects 
can meaningfully organise involuntary, highly distressing behaviour typical of responses 
to preverbal empathic failures. The resulting false trauma memory provides an 
unambiguous autobiographical explanation for subjects' behavioural responses to current 
life stressors. 
6.4 Recovered Memories of True Abuse and the Phenomenon of Temporary 
Memory Loss 
The contribution of presymbolic procedural memory reactions to the formation of false 
memories of child abuse should not obscure the fact that some recovered memories of 
childhood abuse may be true. In some cases, recovered memories of child abuse have 
been verified by independent sources of information (Harvey and Herman, 1996, p.30). 
Interest has accordingly shifted to an examination of the conditions necessary for child 
abuse to be forgotten in cases where verbally competent children experienced the abuse. 
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The literature suggests that true trauma memories can be distorted by a lack of support or 
manipulative suggestions from caregivers and perpetrators (Tessler and Nelson, 1996, 
p.116). Schooler (1996) suggests that lack of discussion, shame, and embarrassment may 
lead individuals to actively avoid thinking about traumatic memories, and so results in the 
temporary inaccessibility of the memory to conscious recall (p.288). However, some 
verbally competent victims of childhood abuse remember part or all of the abuse episodes 
throughout their lives without any social acknowledgement from primary caregivers, 
family, and friends (Cameron, 1996, p.60). Therefore, lack of social acknowledgement 
cannot be the main reason why symbolic abuse episodes are sometimes temporarily 
unavailable to conscious recall. 
Subjects with continuous memories of childhood abuse tend to have a) been abused by 
individuals other than family members who were easier to avoid if the subject was 
attentive and vigilant, b) been abused in a relatively undisguised, less intrusive manner by 
family members, and c) deliberately remembered their abuse in order to be unlike their 
abuser (Cameron, 1996, p.60). These criteria indicate that trauma memories are 
accessible not because they are positively reinforced, but for two other reasons. Firstly, 
the absence of certain types of negative reinforcement, e.g. coercive suggestions that the 
abuse never occurred, enables the memory to be recalled. Second, deliberate attention to 
the abuse when it occurs enables uninterrupted retrieval of the memory. 
Severe abuse, perpetrated covertly by family members on an ongoing basis, and 
involving attempts to deceive the victim about the nature of the acts is more likely to 
result in dissociative amnesia for the abuse episodes (Cameron, 1996, pp.59-60). In 
contrast, the ability of the person to consciously attend to the abuse despite a lack of 
social acknowledgement facilitates its immediate and long-term recall. The conscious 
availability and voluntary recall of a trauma memory appears not to be solely dependent 
on its original social contextualisation and affective attributes, but also on the integrity of 
the subject's conscious attention system during the abuse episode. 
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In addition to attentional focus, the accessibility of abuse/trauma memory episodes in 
verbally competent subjects may depend on how these interact with earlier knowledge 
and emotional disposition (Stein, 1996, p.185). The present study argues that verbally 
skilled subjects' prior knowledge includes aversive presymbolic episodic and procedural 
memories. In chapter five it was argued that presymbolic aversive procedural memories 
may dynamically react to stressors encoded in verbally competent subjects by diverting 
conscious attention away from current aversive stimuli. As a result the current stressor is 
not encoded by the prefrontal working memory system, and so cannot be voluntarily 
retrieved into consciousness. In the case of childhood trauma/abuse where the victim is 
verbally competent, the trauma episode encoded by the hippocampus receives cortical 
storage, and yet remains unavailable to prefrontal memory retrieval due to this 
presymbolic memory intervention. Therefore, verbal-symbolic trauma memories may be 
effectively excluded from the subject's autobiographical memory system. This 
presymbolic memory theory of traumatic event dissociation will be systematically 
developed in later sections of the chapter once an initial investigation of the properties of 
dissociation as it occurs in the context of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is 
completed below. 
6.5 PTSD and the Dissociation-Involuntary Recall of Traumatic Memories 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) consists of two alternating phases. In the initial 
phase a subject responds to a trauma by becoming emotionally numbed and avoiding 
trauma-related cues, while in the second phase he/she displays high emotional arousal, 
florid symptoms, and involuntarily recalls traumatic material (Cameron, 1996, p.43; 
Courtois, 1996, p.359; Foa and Hearst-Ikeda, 1996, pp.207-209). Initially, subjects avoid 
remembering or recognizing traumatic episodes and related stimuli; while in the second 
phase they involuntarily orientate towards and recall trauma-related cues and episodes 
(Cameron, 1996, p.44; Courtois, 1996, p.359). When the onset of the second PTSD phase 
occurs in verbally competent subjects, memories recovered include fragmented images, 
smells, emotions, and visceral pains instead of a coherent event (Cameron, 1996, p.59). 
In other words, discrete sensory components of the trauma memory episode are recalled. 
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Dissociated memories are a core phenomenon in PTSD, and may be defined as a) the 
initial loss of certain events to consciousness, and b) the related behavioural avoidance of 
ongoing stressors. The recovery of dissociated memories involves two components. 
Firstly an orientation towards cues possessing some features structurally similar to the 
original trauma(s), and secondly, the consequent involuntary recall of components 
belonging to the trauma episode(s). Cameron (1996) notes that dissociative amnesia in 
PTSD victims affects the explicit recall of trauma episodes, but not the implicit 
procedural memory responses to traumas. These responses continue to manifest as 
involuntary behavioural and emotional reactions to ongoing stressors in the victims' 
environments (Cameron, 1996, p.60). 
6.6 Properties of PTSD-Related Dissociation 
6.6.1 Dissociation Involves a Lack of Co-ordination Between Sensory, Affective, 
Attentional and Self-Monitoring Systems During the Trauma Experience 
Spiegel (1995) speculates that the narrowing of attention during a traumatic experience 
results in fewer associations within the stored memory network (p.137). For example, 
somatic, olfactory, visual, and auditory information components may be automatically 
encoded and stored during an incident of intrusive sexual abuse, while higher order 
cognitive processes, including conscious attention to the event, are lacking. Alternatively, 
the subject may recall a sanitized verbal account of the event devoid of emotionally 
disturbing sensory, motor, and somatic details. Spiegel (1995) proposes that in both cases 
the trauma memory trace possesses few neural connections to other memories, and few 
associative links connecting cognitive self-monitoring and strategic memory retrieval 
processes with the sensory and affective trauma components (p.137). Trauma episodes 
can be wholly or partly unconscious, suggesting that the unavailable components are not 
processed by the self-monitoring and memory integration/retrieval functions of the 
prefrontal cortex at the time of their encoding (Moscovitch, 1995, p.242). 
6.6.2 Involuntary Recall indicates that the Prefrontal Cortex is Not Involved in the 
Encoding and Storage of Dissociated Trauma Episodes 
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There is evidence that the involuntary recall of previously unavailable trauma memories 
in PTSD patients occurs due to cue-dependent hippocampal reactivation, and does not 
initially involve prefrontal strategic retrieval (Krystal et al., 1996, p.172). In PTSD, the 
involuntary re-experiencing of isolated sensory and motor memory components, 
including images, smells, or sensations related to the trauma, indicates that they are 
unconsciously activated by the presence of trauma-associated cues (Krystal, Southwick, 
and Charney, 1995, p.160). Similarly, the involuntary re-experiencing of a visual-audio-
tactile flashback sequence may be due to the inadvertent co-ordinated activation of these 
sensory memories by a current stressor that resembles these features. According to 
Krystal et al. (1996) the hippocampus is involved in the involuntary recall of trauma 
memories (p.172). The activation of the trauma's sensory features by a current stimulus is 
automatically communicated to the hippocampus, which reactivates these specific 
features of the episode without the involvement of the prefrontal strategic retrieval 
system (Krystal et al., 1996, p.172). This accounts for the partial, fragmented recovery of 
sensory components characteristic of involuntary recall. 
Krystal et al. (1995) note that the spatial and temporal co-ordinates of a trauma memory 
may be disturbed or absent during involuntary retrieval (p.158). This indicates that the 
episode was not originally integrated by prefrontal working memory into a spatial-
temporally organised autobiographical context. Prior to involuntary recall, the episode 
cannot be retrieved into consciousness as a coherent event by the prefrontal system 
(Moscovitch, 1995, p.234). The relative absence of spatial-temporal co-ordinates during 
involuntary recall suggests that the prefrontal strategic memory monitoring and retrieval 
functions responsible for mediating these information parameters may somehow be 
temporarily diverted during the encoding and storage of trauma memories (Moscovitch, 
1995, p.245). 
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6.6.3 The Neuropsychology of Dissociation Involves a Decrease in Sensory Arousal and 
Conscious Attention to Trauma-Related Cues 
Involuntary recall of traumatic memones and flashbacks involve an increase in 
autonomic arousal to sensory stimuli (Krystal et al., 1996, p .167; 0 'Brien, 1998, p .183). 
It is therefore logical to assume that emotional numbing, avoidance of trauma-related 
cues, and memory dissociation in response to a trauma involves a corresponding decrease 
in sensory arousal (Krystal et al., 1996, p.172). According to Krystal et al. (1996), 
extreme stressors initially result in very high levels of sensory arousal (p.175). Research 
shows that stressors activate noradrenergic (NE) neurotransmitters in the limbic system, 
and that this increase in NE production stimulates thalamic receptors (p.175). 
The thalamus is a limbic system structure responsible for the modulation of sensory 
arousal. By acting as a sensory gate, the thalamus modulates heightened or lowered 
arousal to sensory information, and in tum controls the degree to which the cortex and 
hippocampus have access to incoming sensory information (Krystal et al., 1996, p.173). 
The initial response to a trauma therefore involves increased activation of thalamic 
receptors via NE modulation, which in tum increases sensory arousal and alertness to 
aversive cues (Krystal et al., 1996, p.175). However, the onset of emotional numbing and 
the generalized avoidance of aversive environmental stimuli accompanying memory 
dissociation in PTSD patients, indicate that some form of sensory gating must occur in 
the wake of this heightened thalamic arousal (Krystal et al., 1996, pp.173-176). These 
authors suggest that glutamate production increases in cases of extremely high aversive 
arousal and serves to subsequently redirect sensory alertness by changing the receptivity 
of the thalamus to incoming stimuli (Krystal et al., 1996, p.175). 
Furthermore, the direct links between the thalamus and the prefrontal cortex indicate that 
sensory gating due to glutamate modulation of thalamic receptivity can lead to changes in 
conscious attention and self-monitoring systems (Krystal et al., 1996, p.176). 
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Changes in thalamic receptivity therefore account for conscious attention being redirected 
during trauma experiences towards less aversive peripheral sensory detail, or non-
aversive internal sensory processes (p.176). Despite the sensory gating and subsequent 
diversion of conscious attention, the traumatic episode is encoded and stored, but without 
the involvement of the prefrontal working memory system which is diverted towards 
non-aversive stimuli (Krystal et al., 1996, p.174). Krystal et al. (1996) suggest that the 
hippocampus, which is involved in the involuntary cue-dependent recall of traumatic 
memories, automatically encodes the trauma into an event episode. Thereafter the 
hippocampus, via unconscious reactivation, ensures that the episode receives cortical 
storage despite not being tagged by prefrontal working memory for later voluntary 
retrieval (Krystal et al., 1996, pp.171-172). 
6. 7 The Role of Presymbolic Memory in the Dissociation and Involuntary Recall of 
Symbolic Traumas 
The neuropsychological theory of dissociation proposed by Krystal et al. (1996) is the 
starting point for the contribution of the presymbolic memory model to understanding the 
phenomenon of traumatic memory dissociation. The sections below describe the 
presymbolic memory regulation of prefrontal processes during the encoding and storage 
of trauma episodes in verbally competent subjects. It is argued that presymbolic memory 
contributes to the dissociation of traumatic memory episodes during the initial phase of 
PTSD. Secondly, involuntary recall of abuse-related memories in verbally competent 
subjects is viewed as an outcome of continous interplay between underlying presymbolic 
memories and external trauma-related cues. Demonstrating that the presymbolic memory 
model can provide a more comprehensive neuropsychological understanding of memory 
dissociation in PTSD patients constitutes the second original contribution to knowledge 
made by the present study. 
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6.7.1 The Presymbolic Memory Contribution to the Neuropsychology of Dissociation 
6. 7 .1.1 Pres_ymbolic Memories can be activated by Traumas m Verbally Competent 
Subjects 
In chapter five, previous research on verified instances of presymbolic infant traumas 
noted the presence of associated procedural memory responses and personality changes 
in later verbal contexts (Terr, 1996, p.75). In addition, Main and Morgan (1996) observe 
that disorganized infant responses in the wake of ambiguous (frightening or frightened) 
caregiver behaviour include trancelike behavioural stilling and freezing, dissociated 
actions and body movements, and the alternating expression of avoidant and resistant 
behaviour (p .131 ). These authors suggest that presymbolic disorganized responses to 
caregiver mediated empathic failures predict later dissociative behaviour and memory 
manipulation observed in older children and adults (p.131). 
In the light of these findings, the present study contends that trauma cues undergoing 
perceptual analysis in verbally competent subjects may inadvertently activate pre-existing 
presymbolic aversive trauma or empathic failure memories stored in the same cortical 
regions. This occurs if the current trauma contains perceptual features reminiscent of 
material contained in the presymbolic memory trace. The present study argues that the 
activated presymbolic trace network sets in motion a sequence of brain processes 
resulting in the current trauma becoming dissociated relative to the subject's 
autobiographical memory system. This sequence of events will be outlined in the 
following sections below. 
6.7.1.2 During Infancy the Amygdala Responds to Aversive Stimuli by Regulating the 
Thalamic and Basal Ganglia Encoding of Procedural Memories 
The present study contends that during infancy the amygdala regulates thalamic arousal 
and basal ganglia functions, so enabling the latter regions to encode procedural memory 
responses to aversive stimuli. 
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The amygdala is directly connected to the thalamus (Davis, 1997, p.385), and produces 
an increase in NE and cholinergic hormone activity in response to aversive stimuli 
(McGaugh et al., 1996, p.13510). The release of cholinergic hormones by the amygdala 
in tum enhances thalamic sensitivity to aversive sensory stimuli (Davis, 1997, p.386). 
The amygdala is therefore responsible for the thalamus acting as an early response 
system to aversive sensory stimuli, a role that Krystal et al. (1996) previously identified 
in relation to the thalamus. 
In verbally competent subjects, the amygdala indirectly regulates prefrontal attention and 
self-monitoring in relation to aversive stimuli, because the prefrontal cortex relies on the 
thalamus for access to sensory information. However, chapter four established that 
prefrontal cortical working memory and retrieval functions are immature prior to 28 
months of age. Therefore the amygdala regulation of thalamic arousal during presymbolic 
infancy has little effect on the immature prefrontal system. Despite this, the heightened 
thalamic arousal to aversive stimuli will prompt the infant to react behaviourally by 
encoding an appropriate procedural memory response. 
In presymbolic infants the sequence from initial perceptual analysis of aversive cues to 
the behavioural enactment of an appropriate procedural response can be divided into 
three stages outlined below. 
i) In response to aversive cues relayed by cortical perceptual receptors, the amygdala 
increases NE and cholinergic hormone release to the thalamus. This leads to heightened 
thalamic arousal and preferential processing of ongoing aversive sensory cues, 
concurring with the initial thalamic response role in relation to traumatic stressors noted 
by Krystal et al. ( 1996) above. 
ii) The increased thalamic arousal facilitates the hippocampal encoding of an aversive 
episodic trace. 
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The present study argues that on analysing the episode trace, the amygdala releases opiate 
receptor agonists that suppress NE production (McGaugh et al., 1996, p.13510), resulting 
in increased glutamate release in the thalamus and decreased arousal to ongoing aversive 
cues (Krystal et al., 1996, p.177). The amygdala therefore contributes to the sensory 
dimension of the procedural memory response by ensuring that presymbolic infants 
nonconsciously "avoid" further aversive sensory cues. This is achieved via an amygdala-
medi~ted switch in thalamic receptivity to aversive stimuli, based on its analysis of the 
aversive episode. 
iii) Simultaneous with the reduction in sensory arousal to aversive cues, the amygdala 
regulates a basal ganglia response which in tum generates avoidant motor activity in the 
premotor cortex. The basal ganglia encode and relay a startle response to the premotor 
cortex. This area translates and co-ordinates the response trace into motor output activity 
geared towards avoiding the ongoing aversive context (Fuster, 1997, p.455; White, 1997, 
pp.166-167). The arnygdala therefore indirectly regulates the motor dimension of the 
procedural memory response as well. 
The present study argues that once the presymbolic procedure is embodied in sensory-
motor reactive activity, the sensory withdrawal and motor response components are 
combined into a procedural memory trace in the cerebellum for storage and automatic 
activation, should similar stressors arise in future. In addition to the cerebellar script, the 
sensory and motor behaviour output patterns of the procedural memory are stored in the 
relevant primary sensory and premotor cortical networks in presymbolic infants. 
6. 7 .1. 3 Presymbolic Memories Account for Dissociative Responses to Traumas in 
Verbally Competent Subjects 
Perceptual analysis of trauma stimuli can trigger presymbolic procedural 
memones. 
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The present study argues that the perceptual analysis of a trauma can trigger an 
underlying presymbolic memory, so initiating the dissociation process in verbally 
competent subjects. Trauma cues analysed by cortical sensory networks will activate 
presymbolic episodes stored in these regions, provided the two sets of sensory data 
resemble one another. If enough sensory features of a presymbolic episode are co-
activated by current trauma cues, the data match is automatically relayed to the basal 
ganglia. The basal ganglia integrate the common features into a network resembling the 
earlier presymbolic stimulus context. The amygdala simultaneously analyses the affect 
component of the trauma stimulus and relays the outcome to the basal ganglia where it is 
integrated into the current context trace. 
The current trauma-presymbolic context resemblance is relayed from the basal ganglia 
via the premotor cortex to the cerebellum, so enabling the corresponding procedural 
memory script to be triggered. The procedural script is activated in response to the 
presymbolic context resemblance processed by the amygdala and basal ganglia on the 
basis of the initial perceptual analysis of the trauma. These limbic system sub-regions 
respond to this shallow perceptual analysis before the relevant prefrontal cortical areas 
can carry out a more in-depth visuospatial and linguistic analysis of the same stimuli. The 
present study argues that because of this initial limbic system response, the presymbolic 
procedural memory associated with the presymbolic-current trauma resemblance is 
triggered in cerebellar storage. 
The procedural memory, comprising both sensory and motor response components, is 
presented to the amygdala-basal ganglia-thalamus complex for processing into 
behavioural output sequences in the sensory and premotor cortices. 
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The entire procedural response activation process is completed before a prefrontal 
linguistic analysis of the trauma information can occur. Thompson and Kim (1996) note 
the reciprocal links between cerebellar, amygdalar, and hippocampal systems, and 
highlight the role of the cerebellum in generating specific behavioural responses designed 
to deal adaptively with aversive events (p.13438). The present study suggests that once 
activated, presymbolic procedural memory scripts stored in the cerebellum are transferred 
via reciprocal connections to the amygdala for operationalisation by the limbic system. 
Presymbolic procedural memories condition the limbic system response to the 
current trauma. 
Once the procedural memory is relayed to the amygdala, the aversive presymbolic 
information this script contains triggers an affective analysis. The amygdala bases its own 
subsequent regulatory activities on the analysis of this presymbolic information, and in 
this sense does not recognize the unique features of the current trauma context. The 
amygdala in response to the script relays the original presymbolic aversive affect data to 
the basal ganglia for motor response output encoding. Simultaneously, in line with the 
goal of the script, the amygdala releases opiate agonists to reduce levels of NE and 
increase glutamate production to the arousal centre in the thalamus (Krystal et al., 1996, 
p.175). As a result, sensory receptiveness to ongoing aversive cues decreases, and 
information pertaining to the trauma is thereby prevented from reaching prefrontal 
cortical attention centres VIa the thalamic pathways in verbally competent subjects 
(Krystal et al., 1996, p.176). 
Prior to the activation of the presymbolic procedural script, the hippocampus receives the 
results of the initial perceptual analysis of the trauma and encodes the data into a sensory-
motor episode. Once the procedural script is activated and prefrontal attention is diverted 
from aversive cues, the trauma episode cannot be integrated into the prefrontal working 
memory system responsible for organising episodic memory retrieval. The episode is 
therefore reactivated by the hippocampus and stored in the sensory and motor areas of the 
cortex without any modification by the prefrontal retrieval system. 
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Conclusion: Presymbolic procedural memory diverts prefrontal attention and 
strategic retrieval during the storage of the trauma episode. 
The decrease in sensory arousal to the trauma data results in the subject redirecting 
conscious attention towards non-aversive cues before any strategic working memory 
encoding of the trauma features can occur. Conscious prefrontal attention processes 
reliant on thalamic data are prevented from focusing either on external trauma-related 
cues or the hippocampal encoding of the trauma. Despite being stored in the various 
sensory areas of the cortex, the trauma episode cannot be consciously organised into 
current self-experience while the prefrontal attention system focuses on non-aversive 
data. The diversion of attention from trauma-related cues means that prefrontal voluntary 
retrieval strategies for the trauma episode are not encoded, since the general prefrontal 
system does not incorporate the trauma context within its own working memory 
parameters at the time it occurs. 
Therefore the current trauma memory is stored in widely separated sensory and motor 
cortex regions without individual components having the capacity to be connected by a 
retrieval strategy into a verbally coherent memory episode. The trauma memory is 
effectively dissociated from the subject's autobiographical memory due to the lack of 
prefrontal retrieval codes that normally enable the separate components of trace networks 
to be re-connected in terms of a common set of spatiotemporal co-ordinates. The lack of 
autobiographical co-ordinates is evident in cases of involuntary recall when previously 
dissociated trauma memories are vividly re-experienced in their immediate sensory and 
affective details, instead of being recalled as a coherent spatial-temporal event (Krystal et 
al., 1996, pp.171-172). 
In summary, the present study argues that pre-existing presymbolic trauma or empathic 
failure memories predispose verbally competent individuals to dissociate in response to 
symbolic trauma stimuli. 
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In cases where memories of traumatic abuse are always remembered, subjects may not 
dissociate at the time the abuse occurs because they lack relevant presymbolic aversive 
memory traces that set up this defence mechanism. Previous research suggests that 
susceptibility to dissociation is due to early pre-verbal traumatic or disorganised infant 
state memories (Chu, 1996, p.385; Main and Morgan, 1996, p.109). The presymbolic 
memory contribution outlined above attempts to explain how this susceptibility may 
work in practise. 
6.7.1.4 Trauma-Avoidant Behaviour Occurs in PTSD Patients due to the Re-Triggering 
of Presymbolic Procedural Memories 
In the first phase of PTSD with dissociation, subjects attempt to avoid situations and 
stimuli reminiscent of the trauma (Cameron, 1996, p.44; O'Brien, 1998, p.183). One of 
the most effective means of accomplishing this may be by focusing on non-aversive cues. 
The present study argues that in this phase moderately aversive environmental cues 
resembling one or more features of the trauma succeed in activating the cortically stored 
trauma episode. The perceptual analysis of the current cue inadvertently activates the 
matching features of the trauma network. If sufficient trauma features are co-activated, 
these inputs are automatically relayed to the basal ganglia, which integrate the features 
into a network resembling the trauma context. This pre-verbal sensory context in tum 
also resembles the presymbolic context originally activated when the trauma first 
occurred. The basal ganglia therefore match the current sensory stimulus with the original 
trauma-presymbolic context association. 
The chain of activation, from current perceptual input, to pre-verbal sensory trauma 
network, to presymbolic context network, results in the basal ganglia relaying the latter 
trace via the premotor cortex to the cerebellum in order to activate the appropriate 
procedural memory script. The whole process occurs before the linguistic and 
visuospatial processing regions of the prefrontal cortex can analyze the current cue. 
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As a result, the limbic system "interprets" the current cue as a re-occurrence of an 
aversive presymbolic episode. This episodic memory context in tum demands the 
appropriate procedural response. The activated presymbolic procedural memory script re-
initiates the limbic system sequence that previously resulted in the subject's dissociative 
response to the trauma. Once again thalamic arousal to ongoing aversive sensory cues is 
modulated, resulting in a re-orientation towards non-aversive stimuli. Simultaneously, a 
basal ganglia fear response is relayed to the premotor networks. The outcome includes 
the behavioural avoidance of current aversive stimuli and the re-orientation of prefrontal 
conscious attention towards non-aversive cues. This re-orientation of behaviour and 
attention towards non-aversive cues is typical of the trauma-avoidant stage exhibited in 
PTSD patients. 
6. 7 .1. 5 Involuntaiy Recall and Presymbolic Memory 
Involuntaiy recall depends on the degree of fit between the trauma memory and a 
current stressor. 
In the second stage of PTSD, subjects are overwhelmed by the involuntary recall of 
image, affect, sensation, and verbal memory components relating to the traumatic event 
(O'Brien, 1998, p.183). Studies of amnesiac survivors of traumatic sexual abuse who 
subsequently recall their abuse report specific cues that initiate the process of involuntary 
recall (Cameron, 1996, p.62). Cues generally take the form of a scenario or aspect of a 
scenario highly similar to the original abuse context. For example, similar abuse episodes 
are experienced by subjects, or happen to someone known to the subjects (Cameron, 
1996, p.62). Alternatively, subjects re-experience a sensory component of the abuse 
experience. For example, a visual, tactile, or somatic feature of a current experience 
replicates a component of the original trauma memory (Cameron, 1996, p.62). It appears 
that the more exact the fit between a current aversive stimulus and the original trauma 
memory, the greater the probability that involuntary recall of the latter will be triggered. 
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The hippocampus matches the current stressor with the trauma memory. 
The present study maintains that prior to involuntary recall, a new stimulus reminiscent 
of the original trauma co-activates the sensory features of the trauma episode while 
undergoing perceptual analysis. The activated trauma features are, along with the current 
stimulus, integrated into a stimulus context by the basal ganglia. Once again, this pre-
verbal sensory context essentially resembles the presymbolic context activated when the 
trauma originally occurred. As in the case of trauma-avoidant behaviour described above, 
the basal ganglia analysis of the current perceptual input results in the triggering of the 
presymbolic procedural memory script in the cerebellum. This occurs before a prefrontal 
verbal analysis of the current stimulus can occur. 
Concurrent with the activation of the procedural memory script, the hippocampus in its 
capacity as a novelty detection device automatically compares the current perceptual 
analysis of the stressor with previous aversive episodic memories (Tulving and 
Markowitsch, 1997, p.211). The present study concurs with Krystal et al. (1996) that the 
hippocampus plays a pivotal role in the involuntary recall of previously inaccessible 
trauma material. At the level of shallow perceptual analysis, the trauma episode can be 
nonconsciously activated by aversive cues that either partially resemble or closely match 
the stored trauma features. In the first case, a more complex hippocampal novelty 
analysis of the same information fails to find enough common features to warrant a match 
with the trauma memory. The current cue is encoded into an unrelated aversive episode 
trace despite other parts of the limbic system (the amygdala, thalamus, and basal ganglia) 
activating the presymbolic procedural script in response to the cue. As a result, aversive 
cues that partially resemble the trauma result in trauma-avoidant behaviour and the 
continued dissociation of the trauma memory. 
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However, in the second case the resemblance between the current cue and the trauma 
initially registered at the level of perceptual analysis is verified by the hippocampal 
novelty detection analysis. There are enough common features in the current aversive 
event to warrant a match with the trauma memory. In the process of this match the 
hippocampus reactivates the trauma memory from cortical storage. Instead of simply 
encoding a new aversive episode, the two sets of aversive event data are first relayed to 
the amygdala for further affective analysis. The amygdala receives both the current 
stressor and trauma data, and analyses both data sets in relation to the simultaneous 
operationalisation of the presymbolic procedural memory script. 
The present study contends that the relaying of episodic data to the amygdala represents 
the first time that the latter region is able to process the trauma data from the perspective 
of the more complex hippocampal analysis. On the occasion that the trauma was initially 
experienced by the subject, the amygdala processed the trauma firstly in terms of the 
outcome of the perceptual analysis, and secondly from within the instruction parameters 
of the presymbolic procedural script. This occurs without hippocampal intervention, 
because no comparative event data match pertaining to the trauma is previously recorded 
by the hippocampus. In the present context, the amygdala finally has access to two 
complex sets of event data. These data sets enable the amygdala to process a new current 
stimulus-trauma association, and hence to recognize the presymbolic procedural script as 
inapplicable to the new stimulus context. 
Contrary to the data parameters of the presymbolic procedural memory script, the new 
association prompts the amygdala's central nucleus, responsible for regulating sensory 
arousal during associative learning (Davis, 1997, p.389), to modulate a further increase in 
thalamic sensitivity to current aversive cues. This enables the amygdala to monitor the 
ongoing aversive situation in order to formulate a behavioural response appropriate to the 
new contingency. The increased thalamic arousal in tum enables the prefrontal conscious 
attention system to become increasingly attuned towards ongoing external and internal 
aversive cues (Krystal et al., 1996, p.176). 
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The current stressor-trauma association results in increased prefrontal attention to 
aversive cues. 
The prefrontal attunement to aversive cues enables the subject to consciously organise the 
current aversive episode into ongoing self-experience. The hippocampal encoding of the 
current episode is accompanied by the co-activation of the prefrontal cortical working 
memory system, which locks onto the trace network and codes it with a spatial-temporal 
tag that facilitates later retrieval. Despite the subject's conscious focus on the current 
stressor, the original trauma episode with which it shares sensory features is still 
unconscious, because the latter lacks its own spatial-temporal retrieval co-ordinates. In 
contrast to Krystal et· al. ( 1996), the present study suggests that cue-dependant 
hippocampal reactivation of trauma memories cannot by itself enable their involuntary 
recall. The present study proposes that the information features common to both the 
current stressor and trauma networks are co-activated when conscious attention is 
focused on the current event. The features common to both networks will therefore be the 
first components of the dissociated trauma to enter consciousness in association with the 
currently experienced event. In turn, the neural pathways linking the unique features of 
the trauma to the shared features when the latter become conscious activate the former. 
Involuntary recall involves co-operation between prefrontal retrieval and 
hippocampal reactivation processes. 
The present study argues that the trauma episode components are involuntarily retrieved 
according to two different information processes. Firstly, the features common to both the 
current stressor and the trauma episode are retrieved during the subject's conscious focus 
on the former event. Secondly, the features unique to the trauma episode are involuntarily 
retrieved once the subject recognises that the common features belong to two distinct 
events. Experientially, the common features in the present event remind the subject of the 
previous trauma. 
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This strategic recognition enables the common data features to function as cues 
conditioning the hippocampal reactivation of the unique features of the trauma episode. 
Cue-dependant hippocampal reactivation is therefore a secondary response to trauma 
memory components inadvertently retrieved by the pre:frontal cortex. This process should 
not be confused with the automatic nonconscious reactivation of the trauma episode when 
the hippocampus is engaged in novelty analysis. At this earlier stage in memory 
processing, the prefrontal retrieval system has no access to the current stressor or trauma 
episode components. It is only once the pre:frontal cortex has partial access to trauma 
memory components that hippocampal reactivation results in the associated unique 
memory components being integrated into the prefrontal working memory system, so 
enabling their conscious retrieval. 
Once the prefrontal retrieval system has access to the current event, involuntary recall of 
the trauma does not occur all at once. Distinct trauma components are recalled on 
different occasions, depending on the specific cues involved in each recall attempt. 
Features unique to the trauma episode may only be recalled some time after the shared 
features, and not necessarily all on one recall occasion. Dissociated episodic memories 
are often recalled as fragmented images, sensations, smells, or sounds that are only 
gradually pieced together and organised into an integrated episode. This view of gradual 
memory integration coincides with Cameron's ( 1996) description of involuntary recall 
where separate components of the original trauma are recalled at different times, often 
over a period of weeks or months (p.63). 
Presymbolic memory and individual differences in dissociation. 
In some cases of involuntary recall, verbal discourse fails to accurately convey the 
aversive impact of a trauma (Krystal et al., 1995, p.158). This suggests that the verbal 
formatting of trauma material does not occur or is segregated from sensory and affective 
data components during the original encoding and storage of the memory. 
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This characteristic appears to be due to sensory and motor components of the trauma 
being stored in isolation from the higher order linguistic and visuospatial features of the 
episode. The prefrontal cortex normally encodes the latter features (Buckner, 1996, 
p.156). From the present study's perspective, the initial activation of the presymbolic 
procedural memory script in response to a trauma produces a shift in prefrontal cortical 
attention away from aversive cues. This may render the prefrontal linguistic and 
visuospatial encoding areas unable to encode the relevant features of the trauma episode. 
Therefore, in some cases of dissociation, the verbal discourse component of the trauma is 
not encoded. In these cases fragmented sights, sounds, sensations, and emotions without 
any accompanying verbal narrative characterise involuntary recall. 
In other cases of dissociation a verbal description of the event is available to 
consciousness from the time of the trauma's occurrence, but sensory and affective 
components of the experience remain unconscious. The present study suggests that the 
left prefrontal cortical linguistic area (Nyberg et al., 1996, p.145) may sometimes encode 
an affect-free verbal account of a trauma, despite adjacent left prefrontal areas mediating 
conscious attention to sensory-affective cues being diverted towards non-ave,rsive stimuli 
by the switch in thalamic arousal. In other words, the decrease in thalamic sensitivity to 
aversive sensory cues may not affect all prefrontal processing regions in the same way in 
different subjects. This variation may be due to the degree to which thalamic arousal is 
affected by individual presymbolic scripts. In some cases, procedural memory scripts 
may produce a total blanket reorientation of sensory arousal towards non-aversive cues. 
In other less extreme cases, peripheral trauma cues, including relatively affect-free 
linguistic data may be encoded. The degree to which the thalamus switches sensory 
arousal focus may be regulated by the affective intensity of the specific presymbolic 
procedural memory underlying the change in thalamic functioning. 
Another possible explanation for this variation in dissociative response may be due to 
differences in the data configurations of individual procedural memory scripts. 
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Chapter five suggests that procedural scripts encoded after eight months of age include 
increasingly complex visuospatial imaging and verbal avoidance components in their 
configurations. These more complex scripts may account for individual differences in 
selective conscious attention towards the verbal aspects of traumatic stimuli. For 
example, a verbal avoidance strategy that is part of a procedural script may allow 
conscious focusing onto linguistic details of the trauma scenario so long as these are 
devoid of affective valence. 
The common factor in these partial forms of dissociation is the absence of rich sensory 
and affective data from the initially conscious memories. This is due to the subject's 
fundamental attentional avoidance of these cues occasioned by the switch in thalamic 
regulation of sensory arousal. The present study contends that it is only once the 
prefrontal working memory system gains access to the stored sensory and affective 
components of the trauma episode during involuntary recall that the dissociation is lifted. 
Involuntary recall enables sensory and verbal components to be integrated into a 
complete episode. In summary, the different kinds of memory compartmentalisation 
typical of dissociation suggest that presymbolic procedural memory scripts . dynamically 
manipulate the sensory-affective, verbal, and visuospatial organisation functions of the 
prefrontal working memory system during the experience of traumatic events. 
6.8 The Presymbolic Memory Contribution to Dissociation: Implications for 
Therapy 
The present study proposes that dissociation is caused by the triggering of a presymbolic 
procedural memory in response to the initial perception of a trauma in verbally competent 
subjects. The presymbolic memory produces a decrease in sensory arousal and prefrontal 
conscious attention to some or all of the trauma-related cues. The diversion of conscious 
attention towards non-aversive cues in tum prevents the prefrontal system from encoding 
an appropriate autobiographical retrieval strategy for the cortically stored trauma episode. 
Therefore dissociation in verbally competent subjects is an avoidant, defensive response 
to a trauma, mediated by the inadvertent activation of the presymbolic memory system. 
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Psychotherapists working with child and adult PTSD victims experiencing dissociation 
followed by involuntary recall of trauma memories need to acknowledge the role of 
presymbolic memory. Clients need to understand that their dissociative reactions to a 
trauma are at least partially conditioned by presymbolic memory scripts encoded prior to 
the traumatic event( s) in question. The presymbolic memory model explains why some 
verbally competent people dissociate in response to traumatic events, viz. due to the 
activation of underlying presymbolic episode and related procedural response memory 
networks. Subjects who consciously experience and recall a trauma from the time it 
occurs may do so because they lack presymbolic memories comparable to the sensory and 
affective features of the trauma. Clients' dissociative reactions need to be contextualised 
in relation to earlier presymbolic memories. Therapists should communicate to clients 
that the content of aversive presymbolic memories is intrinsically unrecoverable to 
conscious recall. Therefore, therapy should focus on identifying and understanding the 
defensive functions of presymbolic procedural scripts, and establish how these are 
triggered by later stressful client experiences. Clients need to understand their 
dissociative responses not only with regard to the trauma experience itself, but also in 
relation to their pre-verbal developmental history. 
At all times in therapy a clear distinction must be maintained between the hypothetical 
nature of aversive episodes occurring during the presymbolic infancy period, and the 
recall of symbolic trauma material. The therapy process may require a fictional 
reconstruction of a presymbolic episode in order to contextualise the specific behavioural 
characteristics of the associated presymbolic procedural script evident in a verbally 
competent client's dissociative response to a trauma. The therapist needs to emphasize 
that this reconstruction does not involve conscious recovery of presymbolic memories. 
Once the existence of a specific procedural script operative in dissociation is clearly 
identified, therapist and client can work together to reconstruct a likely presymbolic event 
scenario. This may be accomplished by: 
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i) Examining how current trauma material is organised as it emerges during involuntary 
recall. This may reveal how sensory aspects of the trauma are segregated from one 
another by the original dissociative response (the presymbolic procedural script). 
ii) A joint analysis of the client's behavioural responses to aversive cues before, during, 
and after the involuntary recall of trauma memories. This may enable a cohesive 
procedural response pattern to emerge in the course of the therapeutic dialogue. 
The organisation of the recovered trauma material together with the client's behavioural 
response repertoire could thereafter be used along with other personal history data to 
reconstruct a likely presymbolic model scene (Lichtenberg et al., 1992, p.26). This 
narrative describes the type of presymbolic episode and procedural response scenario that 
probably occurred during the client's infancy. It should be emphasized to clients that 
model scenes are useful tools for understanding how the procedural memory response 
responsible for the later dissociation may have originated, but do not represent verifiable 
memories of actual events. The model scene has value as a tool for contextualising 
dissociation in terms of a personal, albeit presymbolic developmental history. In this 
sense, it facilitates a more complete understanding of the client's dissociative behaviour 
pattern. 
The therapeutic approach to dissociation should therefore involve an interpretive 
reconstruction of early presymbolic aversive scenarios in order to contextualize the 
client's subsequent dissociative response to a trauma. This hermeneutic component to 
working with dissociation should be made explicit to clients in order to avoid suggestive 
therapeutic techniques that can lead to the fabrication of false memories of presymbolic 
childhood traumas. For example, the recovery of memories of sex abuse allegedly 
occurring prior to 36 months of age. Therapists need to constantly emphasize the 
difference between potentially verifiable dissociated symbolic memories that are 
involuntarily recalled, and presymbolic model scenes that are plausible, but fictional 
reconstructions of pre-verbal, fundamentally unconscious aversive episodes. 
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6.9 Concluding Summary 
This final chapter demonstrates that the presymbolic memory model is an important tool 
for understanding how false memories of sex abuse may develop, and how real traumatic 
events experienced by verbally competent subjects may be unconsciously manipulated by 
a presymbolic memory-response system. To recap, the present study formulated the 
presymbolic memory model in order to provide a contemporary scientific account 
detailing the pre-verbal, infantile origins of unconscious mentation. The presymbolic 
memory model has its roots in the Lacanian theory of presymbolic infant development 
(Lacan, 1966/1992, 1973/1977, 1993; Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, 1995), and in 
Lichtenberg's later synthesis of infant research, neuropsychological memory concepts, 
and psychoanalytic unconscious mentation (1983, 1989, Lichtenberg et al., 1992). The 
present study emphasizes how these earlier theories - the former implicitly, the latter 
explicitly - suggest that the origins of unconscious mentation can be found in pre-verbal 
memory processes in infants. Furthermore, the Lichtenberg model suggests that an 
aversive presymbolic memory system can be located within various reciprocally 
connected regions of the limbic system (Hadley, 1989, pp.361-363). 
The central thesis of the present study is that memory systems and unconscious mentation 
co-evolve when environmental cues are processed by immature sensory receptors during 
infancy. The study attempts to demonstrate that unconscious mentation has an empirical 
foundation visible in the developmental relationship between environmental cues and 
their increasingly complex encoding by maturing sensory and memory processing 
modules in the brain. The present account therefore stands opposed to psychoanalytic 
theories that attempt to define the existence of unconscious mentation exclusively in 
terms of either an imaginary primary process model (Edelson, 1988) or a text-orientated 
model (Habermas, 1968/1971 ). Unlike the presymbolic memory model, neither of these 
models proposes any relationship between dynamic unconscious mentation and 
empirically verifiable constructs such as brain regions, perceptual receptor systems, and 
memory processes. 
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In addition, the presymbolic memory model suggests that brain regions and memory 
processes are implicated in structuring a sense of self and identity. This is particularly 
clear in the sections examining prefrontal cortical involvement in the organisation of 
conscious attention, self-monitoring, and autobiographical memory. Clearly, self-identity 
is inextricably linked to the evolution of an autobiographical memory system, i.e. a self-
narrative consisting of a record of event episodes occurring at specific times and places 
(Tessler and Nelson, 1996, pp.114-115). However, the sections dealing with the creation 
of false memories, the influence of suggestion, and the dissociation of real trauma 
memories reveal that the autobiographical self does not correspond to a historically 
accurate memory bank. 
Furthermore, presymbolic aversive episodic and procedural memones exercise an 
unconscious, pervasive influence on attention to, encoding, storage, and strategic retrieval 
of aversive episodes in verbally competent subjects. The conscious autobiographical self 
that develops as a result of prefrontal spatiotemporal organisation and strategic retrieval 
of episodic memories, is a metaphorical approximation of the history of actual life events 
experienced by subjects. This metaphorical structure is partly the result of presymbolic 
constraints on perceptual and memory systems that impact on episodic encoding, storage 
and retrieval. In turn, these early pre-verbal constraints on memory impact on the 
evolving prefrontal system responsible for organising autobiographical memories in 
verbally competent subjects. 
The metaphorical nature of autobiographical memory is also an outcome of the 
dominance of verbal discourse in structuring consciously retrievable memory episodes. 
The prioritisation of verbal discourse in autobiographical recall enables information to be 
bound more efficiently into coherent narrative episodes (Tessler and Nelson, 1996, 
p.103). However, this encoding efficacy may lead to non-linguistic details being 
marginalized and discarded from episodic memory traces: For example, it is often the 
affective and sensory components of aversive experiences that cannot be voluntarily 
retrieved, while affectively neutral verbal accounts of traumas remain available to 
conscious recall. 
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The linguistic dominance that prevails in autobiographical self-narratives may distort or 
obscure important memory information registered in other modalities. The present study 
therefore arrives at a somewhat paradoxical conclusion given its search for an empirical 
foundation for unconscious mentation. The existence of a presymbolic memory system 
that exercises a dynamic unconscious influence on experience in verbally competent 
subjects ensures that the self-identity embodied by the autobiographical memory system 
is a distorted misrepresentation of the individual's developmental history. In short, verbal-
symbolic memory episodes stored in distributed cortical networks give rise to an 
autobiographical self that is always an incomplete representation of the sum of 
presymbolic and symbolic experiences constituting the developmental history of every 
person. The present study concludes with the reflection that the presymbolic memory 
model of unconscious mentation appears to justify the psychoanalytic claim that 
conscious self-narratives are always partial (mis) representations of subjective 
experience. The present study rests with this discrepancy between cortically stored 
memory traces and the verbal autobiographical self-narrative selectively derived from 
these. 
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